although it does not extend across the road. See OPEN, 1 (7). The primary purpose of streets is use by the public for travel and transportation, and the rule is that any obstruction or encroachment which interferes with such use is a public nuisance. But there are exceptions to the rule, born of necessity and justified by public convenience. An abutting owner engaged in building may temporarily encroach upon the street by the deposit of building materials. A tradesman may convey goods to or from his adjoining store. A coach or omnibus may stop to take up or set down passengers, and use for public travel may be temporarily interfered with in a variety of other ways without the creation of a nuisance; but all such interruptions and obstructions must be justified by necessity. It is not sufficient that the obstructions are necessary with reference to the business of him who creates and maintains them. They must also be reasonable with reference to the rights of the public, who have interests which may not be sacrificed or disregarded. Whether an obstruction is necessary and reasonable must generally be a question of fact to be determined upon the evidence relating thereto.2 One who wrongfully pulls a signal rope and stops a train does not "obstruct" the train.3 2. "Any person who shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or any carriage, horse, driver, or carrier carrying the same, shall, for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars." 4 When acts which create an obstruction of the mails are in themselves unlawful the intention to obstruct will be imputed to their author, although to attain another end may have been his primary object. The prohibition has no reference to acts lawful in themselves, from the execution of which a temporary delay to the mails unavoidably follows. The offense is complete when one or more persons unlawfully prevent the moving of a railroad train carrying the mails. 3. Obstructing an officer executing lawful process is an offense against public justice." The offense is committed when he is prevented by actual violence, or by threats of violence which it is in the power of the offender to enforce, from executing the writ. See RESIST. 1 Mosher v. Vincent, 39 Iowa, 609 (1874); State v. Leaver, 62 Wis. 392 (1885). So as to obstructing a railroad track, State v. Kilty, 28 Minn. 422 (1881). In Nashville, &c. R. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 368 (1871), held that such "obstruction" was not for expert testimony. 2 Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 365 (1888), cases. Commonwealth v. Killian, 109 Mass. 374 (1872). See Reg. v. Hardy, L. R., 1 C. C. 280 (1870), as to false signal. R. S. § 3995: Act 8 June, 1872. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 486 (1866), Field, J. • United States v. Kane, 19 F. R. 42 (1884). See also United States v. Claypool, 14 id. 127 (1882). 4 Bl. Com. 129. • United States v. Lowry, 2 Wash 170 (1808); United States v. Lukins, 3 id. 337 (1818); 1 Idaho, 211; 15 Mo. 487; 25 Vt. 421. To hold in possession; to hold or keep for use; as, to occupy an apartment.3 Implies actual use, possession or cultivation by a particular person: as, in a devise of land occupied" by the testator.4 "Occupy" and its inflections may well enough be used in the sense of possess; "occupancy" and "occupant" for assuming property which has no owner; "occupation" and "occupier" for the more general idea of possession.5 Occupied; unoccupied. As used in policies of insurance, are always construed with reference to the character of the building, the purposes for which it is designed and the uses contemplated by the parties as expressed in the contract. The occupancy of a dwelling, and of a barn or a mill, is in each case essentially different in its scope and character. "Occupied" always implies a substantial and practical use of the building for the purposes for which it is intended, and as contemplated by the terms of the policy. A dwelling-house is occupied when human beings habitually reside in it, and unoccupied when no one lives or dwells in it. Occupation of a dwelling-house, within the meaning of a policy of insurance, requires that there be in the house the presence of human beings as at their customary place of abode, not absolutely and uninterruptedly continuous, but the house must be the place of usual return and habitual stoppage." See VACANT. Within the meaning of a tax law, the owner of land may be in occupation of it by his tenant; so that "unoccupied" will mean untenanted. See USE, 2. Occupancy. Possession; actual control; occupation, q. v. 1 People v. General Sessions, 13 Hun, 400 (1878); Regina v. Garrett, 1 Dears. C. C. 242 (1853), Parke, B. 2 L. occupare, to lay hold of. Missionary Society v. Dalles, 107 U. S. 343 (1882): Webster's Dict. 4 Jackson v. Sill, 11 Johns. *214 (1814), Thompson, C. J.; Inhabitants of Phillipsburgh v. Bruch, 37 Ν. J. Ε. 485-86 (1883), cases. [Abbott's Law Dict. • Sonneborn v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 44 N. J. L. 223 (1882), Green, J. See also 112 Mass. 422; 136 id. 491. 7 Herrman v. Adriatic Fire Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 169 (1881), Folger, C. J.; Barry v. Prescott Ins. Co., 35 Hun, 603 (1885). 8 State v. Reinhardt, 31 N. J. L. 218 (1865); Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Kiernan, 83 Ky. 473 (1885); Stensgaard v. National Fire Ins. Co., 36 Minn. 181 (1886). See Walters v. People, 21 III. 178 (1859); 38 id. 263; 110 Mass. 175; 113 id. 518; 25 Barb. 54; 36 Wis. 73.