Definition
The objects of a power are the persons who make up the class eligible to benefit from the exercise of a power of appointment. When property is settled subject to a power — meaning a donee has been granted authority to direct how and to whom the property shall pass — the individuals among whom the donee may appoint are collectively called the objects of that power.
The concept is most clearly illustrated by example: if a trust instrument grants a parent the power to appoint a fund among her children, each child is an object of the power. The donee (the parent) exercises the power; the objects (the children) are the potential recipients of its exercise.
Crucially, being an object does not guarantee receipt. The objects form the permissible class — the universe of eligible appointees — but only those actually selected by the donee when the power is exercised take any property. If the power is never exercised, or is exercised in favor of fewer than all objects, the remainder typically passes under the gift-in-default clause or by operation of applicable trust or property law.
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Common Confusion
Objects of a power should not be confused with the donee of a power. The donee is the person who holds and exercises the power of appointment; the objects are the persons over whom the power operates — that is, those who may receive the appointed property. A single individual can sometimes be both (a donee who is also within the class of permissible objects), which is characteristic of a general power of appointment, but the roles remain conceptually distinct. Researchers should also distinguish objects from takers in default, who receive the property when the power is not exercised and who may or may not overlap with the objects of the power.
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Why It Matters in Research
The term is a term of art in the law of powers of appointment and trust administration, and its significance ramifies in several directions that researchers must track carefully.
First, the boundaries of the objects class determine the validity of an appointment. An appointment to someone outside the class — a non-object — is typically void, though partial appointments touching non-objects can, in some jurisdictions, be saved in part. Historical sources treat this consequence as foundational, and modern trust codes largely preserve it.
Second, the composition of the objects class has creditor and tax implications. Under traditional common law, a donee with a power limited to a defined class of objects held a special (or limited) power, which attracted different treatment for estate tax purposes than a general power exercisable in favor of the donee, the donee's estate, creditors, or creditors of the estate. Identifying who counts as an object is therefore not merely a question of beneficial entitlement but a threshold question for federal tax analysis.
Third, historical sources use the term somewhat narrowly and sometimes inconsistently. Black's and Rapalje & Lawrence define objects by reference to the "limited class" formulation — implying a special power — while Bouvier frames the concept around intended beneficiaries more broadly. Researchers working with older instruments or older equity decisions should be alert to the possibility that courts used "objects" loosely to mean all potential beneficiaries of a trust arrangement, not solely the permissible appointees under a formal power. Context is essential.
Fourth, the Law Mind corpus researcher should note that the term appears almost exclusively in materials dealing with trusts, wills, and settled estates. It is nearly absent from contract and tort sources. Cross-referencing to donee of a power, power of appointment, and takers in default will typically be necessary to reconstruct a complete picture of a given instrument's operation.
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Historical Dictionary Support
The three source dictionaries are in substantial agreement on the core definition, and the example each uses — a parent's power to appoint among children — is identical across Black's and Rapalje & Lawrence, suggesting a common reference point in Mozley & Whitley's Law Dictionary, which Black's explicitly credits. This is a term that entered Anglo-American legal vocabulary through English equity practice and was transplanted without significant alteration into American usage.
Bouvier's formulation — "persons who are intended to be benefited by the distribution of property settled subject to a power" — is slightly broader and more purposivist in tone, emphasizing intent rather than formal class membership. This phrasing can mislead: a person may be intended to benefit and yet fall outside the formal objects class as defined by the instrument, or an object may go unbenefited if the donee exercises the power in favor of others within the class. Bouvier's definition reflects an earlier, more equitable mode of analysis; Black's and Rapalje & Lawrence reflect the more formalized, instrument-centered approach that predominated in later practice.
None of the three historical sources addresses the modern tax dimensions of the objects class, and none engages with the Uniform Trust Code or the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act — developments researchers working in contemporary materials must consult separately.
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Jurisdictional Note
American jurisdictions have increasingly codified the law of powers of appointment through adoption or adaptation of the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act (2013), which uses the term "permissible appointee" in preference to "object," though the underlying concept is identical. Researchers comparing older common law materials with modern statutory sources should treat these terms as equivalent while remaining alert to any refinements the applicable state statute introduces.
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Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Contested Accountings and Objections to Fiduciary Conduct (The Law Mind Trusts, Estates & Probate Encyclopedia)
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