Definition
A Latin maxim of the common law, translating literally as "no one is called a felon [until he has been convicted]." The full form of the maxim — *nullus dicitur felo nisi inde attinctus* — means that no person is to be deemed or treated as a felon until he has been formally attainted or convicted by due process of law. The principle is a foundational expression of the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings: accusation alone does not establish guilt, and the legal status of "felon" — with all its attendant consequences at common law, including forfeiture of lands and goods and corruption of blood — attaches only upon a lawful judgment of conviction.
---
Common Confusion
The maxim is sometimes loosely cited as authority for the modern presumption of innocence as a constitutional doctrine. The two are related but not identical. The maxim is a common law rule about when the legal status and consequences of felony attach; the presumption of innocence as developed in Anglo-American constitutional law is a broader procedural doctrine governing the burden of proof at trial. Researchers should not treat the maxim as a direct ancestor of constitutional innocence doctrine without accounting for the intervening doctrinal development.
---
Why It Matters in Research
This maxim functions primarily as interpretive authority in historical common law materials rather than as a standalone legal rule with active modern application. Researchers will encounter it most often in pre-nineteenth century treatises, abridgments, and case law dealing with the consequences of felony — particularly forfeiture, attainder, and corruption of blood — where courts used the maxim to limit the premature imposition of those consequences before conviction. Because felony forfeiture and attainder were abolished or substantially curtailed in both England and most American jurisdictions during the nineteenth century, the maxim's practical context has largely disappeared. Modern appearances tend to be rhetorical rather than operative.
The source fragment in Black's 2nd Edition places this maxim in proximity to other Latin maximsa of procedure and property (nullum matrimonium, ibi nulla dos; nullum simile est idem), suggesting it was catalogued as part of a standard maxim series rather than given extended treatment. Researchers using Black's 2nd Edition should be aware that these maxim entries are often very brief and may lack the doctrinal context necessary to trace the maxim's application in historical cases. Consulting Bacon's Abridgment (Bac. Abr.) — referenced in the surrounding Black's text — and Coke's Institutes will provide richer treatment of the maxim within the law of felony and attainder.
The maxim is jurisdictionally significant in the American context because the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder and the abolition of felony forfeiture at the federal level (and in most states) during the founding and reform eras removed the legal infrastructure within which the maxim originally operated. Corpus researchers working on American sources from the early national period may find the maxim cited in debates over those reforms as historical justification.
---
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.) does not provide a dedicated entry with full treatment of this maxim in the available source fragment; the text appears in a section cataloguing related Latin maxims in sequence. This is consistent with Black's practice in early editions of treating Latin maxims as brief reference items rather than developed doctrinal entries.
The maxim's fuller exposition is found in the classical common law literature. Coke and Blackstone both address the principle that attainder and its consequences require formal conviction, and Bacon's Abridgment (referenced in the Black's source text) treats arbitration and related procedural maxims in the same tradition. Historical dictionaries of this era tend to agree on the core translation and application of the maxim but do not always distinguish clearly between the maxim as a rule about the timing of legal consequences and the broader presumption of innocence doctrine — a conflation that has persisted in secondary literature.
What historical sources predictably miss is any engagement with the maxim's diminished relevance after the abolition of felony forfeiture and attainder. Researchers relying solely on pre-twentieth century dictionary entries will not find guidance on how — or whether — the maxim survives in modern criminal law discourse.
---
Jurisdictional Note
The maxim originated in English common law and has its fullest application in jurisdictions that retained the classical consequences of felony — forfeiture, attainder, corruption of blood. In the United States, the Constitution prohibits bills of attainder and Congress abolished federal felony forfeiture of estate in 1790, substantially narrowing the maxim's operative field. Its survival in American law is largely rhetorical and historical.
---