Marriage, being a legal relation, and not (as sometimes supposed) a mere contract, can only be dissolved by legal authority. The relation originates in the consent of the parties, but, once entered into, it must continue until the death of either husband or wife, unless sooner put an end to by the sovereign power. The Supreme Court of the United States, in 125 U.S. 210, say that whilst marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions of courts a civil contract, it is something more. When the contract to marry is executed by the mar- riage, a relation between the parties is created which cannot change. Other con- tracts may be modified, restricted, or en- larged, or entirely released upon the con- sent of the parties, but not so with mar- riage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. The supreme court then approves the views laid down in 51 Me. 483, where it is said that when the contracting parties have entered into the marriage state, they have not so much entered into a contract as into a new rela- tion, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon their agreement, but upon the general law of the state, statutory or common; they are of law, not of con- tract. It was of contract that the relation should be established, but being established, the power of the parties as to its extent or duration is at an end. Their rights under it are determined by the will of the sov- ereign as evidenced by the law. They can neither be modified nor changed by any agreement of the parties. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any con- tract they may make. "Marriage has been said to be something more than a mere con- tract, religious or civil; to be an institu- tion"; L. R. 1 P. & D. 130. In England, until late years, no authority existed in any of the judicial courts to grant a divorce in the strict sense of the term. The subject of marriage and divorce generally belonged exclusively to the various ecclesiastical courts; and they were in the constant habit of granting what were termed divorces a mensa et thoro, for various causes, and of pronouncing sentences of nullity; but they had no power to dissolve a marriage, valid and binding in its origin, for causes arising subsequent to its solemnization. For that purpose recourse must be had to parlia- ment; 2 Burn, Eccl. Law 202; Macq. Parl. Pr. 470. But by the statute of 20 & 21 Vict. (1857) c. 85, entitled "An act to amend the law relating to divorce and matrimonial causes in England," a new court was created, to be called "The Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes," upon which was conferred exclusively all jurisdiction over matrimonial matters then vested in the various ecclesiastical courts, and also the jurisdiction theretofore exercised by par- liament in granting divorces. At present divorce causes are heard, in the first in- stance, in the "Probate and Divorce Divi- sion of the High Court of Justice," whence an appeal lies to the "Court of Appeal." In this country the usage has been various. Formerly it was common for the various state legislatures, like the English parlia- ment, to grant divorces by special act. Latterly, however, this practice is now much less common. In many states, also, it has been expressly prohibited by recent state constitutions; 1 Bish. Mar. & D. § 1471; Lloyd, Div. 12, 18. Such a statute is con- stitutional and it does not offend against the constitutional provision which forbids laws impairing the obligation of contracts, even though there was no valid ground for divorce and the wife was not notified; 125 U. S. 190, where the husband was a resident of the territory. See also 90 Wis. 272. Generally, at the present time, the jurisdio- tion to grant divorces is conferred by statute upon courts of equity, or courts possessing equity powers, to be exercised in accord- ance with the general principles of equity practice, subject to such modifications as the statute may direct. The practice of the English ecclesiastical courts, which is also the foundation of the practice of the new court for divorce and matrimonial causes in England, has never been adopted to any considerable extent in this country; but it is said that in some jurisdictions the prin- ciples and practice of the ecclesiastical courts are followed so far as they are ap plicable to our altered conditions and ir accord with the spirit of our laws: 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. 460. See 35 Vt. 365; 33 Md. 401. Numerous and difficult questions are con- stantly arising in regard to the validity in one state of divorces granted by the courts or legislature of another state. The subject is fully and ably treated in 2 Bish. Mar. Div. and Sep. § 128. The learned author there states the following propositions, which he elaborates with great care:-first, the tri- bunals of a country have no jurisdiction over a cause of divorce, wherever the of- fence may h