Cases of nuisance which rest for their sanction upon the intent of the law under which they are created, the paramount power of the legislature, the principle of the "greatest good of the greatest number," and the importance of the public benefit and convenience involved in their continuance, are termed "legalized nuisances."1 Private nuisance. Anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another. Public or common nuisance. Doing a thing to the annoyance of the public, or neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires.2 Examples: a house so close to another as to cause rain-water to fall upon its roof; animals kept so near a dwelling-house that the stench taints the air; any offensive trade, as, a tanner's, a tallow-chandler's, lead-works the fumes of which poison the herbage; diverting water that naturally runs to another's land; corrupting or poisoning running water by maintaining a dye house or a lime-kiln; obstructing a right of way; a ferry or bridge unlawfully near another; disorderly houses; and all lotteries. 3 A business which is lawful, carried on reasonably, and does not necessarily affect health, comfort, or the ordinary uses and enjoyment of property in the neighborhood, is not a nuisance in fact or in anticipation. As the atmosphere cannot rightfully be infected with noxious smells or exhalations, so it should not be caused to vibrate by ringing bells, in a way to wound the sense of hearing. 5 Noise (as, the ringing of a factory bell), which constitutes an annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibility to sound, such as materially to interfere with the ordinary comfort of life, and impair the reasonable enjoyment of his habitation, is a nuisance to him, the continuance of which may be restrained by injunetion. See NOISE. If a party may acquire a prescriptive right to con. tinue a nuisance, it can only be by continuous use for twenty years. No acquiescence short of that period will bar one from complaining of the nuisance, unless by some act or omission he has induced the party causing the nuisance to incur large expenditures, or to take some action upon which an estoppel may be based.7 Relief is had by abatement, injunction, action for damages, or criminal prosecution. A public nuisance can only be redressed by public prosecution, unless the complainant suffers damage differing in kind from that sustained by the public at large.2 In regard to public nuisances, the jurisdiction of courts of equity seems to be of a very ancient date. The jurisdiction is applicable not only to public nuisances, strictly so called, but to purprestures upon public rights and property. An indictment lies to abate public nuisances, properly so called, and to punish the offender; and an information lies in equity to redress the grievance by injunction.3 The ground of this jurisdiction is the ability of courts of equity to give a more speedy, effectual, and permanent remedy than can be had at law. They cannot only prevent nuisances that are threatened, and before irreparable mischief ensues, but arrest or abate those in progress, and, by perpetual injunction, protect the public against them in the future; whereas courts of law can only reach existing nuisances, leaving future acts the subject of new proceedings. This is a salutary jurisdiction, especially where a nuisance affects the health, morals, or safety of the community. Though not frequently exercised, the power undoubtedly exists. Courts of law afford redress by giving damages against the wrong-doer, and, when the cause of the annoyance is continuous, courts of equity will restrain the nuisance. Grants of privileges or powers to corporate bodies confer no license to use them in disregard of the private rights of others, and with immunity for their invasion. The measure of damages is not simply the depreciation of the property; the jury may take into consideration personal discomfort, and any causes which produce a constant apprehension of danger. See ABATEMENT, 3; AIR; BLACKSMITH SHOP; DAMAGES; HEALTH; INJUNCTION; PARDON; POLICE, 2; PURPRESTURE; UNDERTAKER. No, no one, none. from Latin nullus, q. v. Nul agard. No award, q. ν. Law-French, See Bowden v. Lewis, 13 R. I. 191 (1881); 19 Cent. Law J. 42-45 (1884), cases. 2 School District v. Neil, 36 Kan. 619-20 (1887), cases; Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 670 Hogan v. Central R. Co., 71 Cal. 86 (1886). (1878), Swayne, J. 23 Bl. Com. 216; 4 id. 166; 40 Ark. 87; 49 Conn. 117; 7 Ga. 311; 80 Ky. 138, 146; 30 Me. 174; 74 id. 271; 34 Mich. 473; 80 N. Y. 582; 37 Ohio St. 516; 17 Tex. 502; 1 McLean, 381. 33 Bl. Com. 216-20; 4 id. 167-69. Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 290 (1868); Strawbridge v. Philadelphia, 13 Rep. 216 (1882). 32 Story, Eq. §§ 921-22. 4 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 672-73 (1887), cases, Harlan J. That an injunction will not be granted where there is a remedy at law, see Sellers v. Parvis Co., 30 F. R. 164 (1887). * Baltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 331 (1883); Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91 (1838); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling • Harrison v. St. Mark's Church, 3 W. N. C. 384 (1877): Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (1851); Mississippi, &c. R. Co. 15 Alb. Law J. 248, 245. • Davis v. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 290 (1882), cases. See further, as to a planing-mill, Hurlburt v. McKone, 55 Conn. 31 (1887), cases. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568, 584 (1876), cases. v. Ward, 2 Black, 485 (1862); Parker v. Winnipiseogee Co., ib. 545 (1862); 49 Md. 277; 50 id. 516; 10 Oreg. 170, 172; 2 Bish. Cr. L. § 856; Whart. Cr. L. § 1410. • Baltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 835 (1883).