Definition
A Latin adjective meaning "new." In legal usage, *novus* does not appear as a standalone term of art but functions as a root and prefix element in a cluster of doctrinally significant Latin phrases and compound terms found throughout common law and civil law sources. Its legal weight is carried almost entirely by the phrases it forms: *novus actus interveniens* (a new intervening act breaking a causal chain), *de novo* (anew, from the beginning), *novation* (substitution of a new obligation), and the maxim *novis injuriis emersis, nova constituuntur remedia* (as new injuries arise, new remedies are ordained). Researchers encountering *novus* alone in historical sources should treat it as a component term and pursue the full phrase or compound in which it operates.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Not an active English word; recognized in English primarily as a Latin borrowing meaning "new," occasionally used in brand names, scientific nomenclature, and learned writing.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Not entered as an English headword; treated as Latin.
The gap here is one of register rather than meaning: *novus* means "new" in both Latin and any modern context where it appears. The significance for legal research is that in law, "new" carries precise technical weight depending on context — a *novus actus* does not merely introduce something recent, it severs legal responsibility. Ordinary familiarity with the word's meaning does not prepare a researcher for its doctrinal consequences.
Common Confusion
*Novus* is sometimes conflated with *nova* or *novum* due to Latin declension (all are forms of the same adjective, varying by grammatical gender and case). In legal phrases, the form used is not interchangeable: *novus actus interveniens* uses the masculine nominative; *de novo* uses the neuter ablative. Historical sources that abbreviate or corrupt Latin phrases may present unfamiliar forms that are nonetheless the same root. Researchers should not treat variant forms as distinct terms.
Why It Matters in Research
The practical value of understanding *novus* as a root lies in navigating historical legal sources, where Latin phrases appear in varying states of completeness. A reporter or treatise writer may cite *novus* alone as a shorthand, expecting the reader to supply the full phrase from context. Burrill's maxim — *novis injuriis emersis, nova constituuntur remedia* — illustrates this: it appears in Fleta and echoes through equity practice as a justification for extending remedies to novel wrongs. Researchers working in early equity, tort history, or the development of common law remedies will encounter this principle without always seeing it spelled out.
Anderson's entry cross-references NOVATION, NOVELTY, and VENIRE (De novo), which are the three primary legal branches from this root. Each carries its own doctrine and its own research path. A researcher who understands *novus* as the shared ancestor of these terms can move between them more fluidly, recognizing when a source is drawing on the same underlying concept of legal "newness" — whether that means a substituted obligation, a fresh proceeding, or a ground of patent invalidity.
The causal-chain doctrine (*novus actus interveniens*) is the most heavily litigated application of the root and is underrepresented in the historical dictionaries, neither of which enters it directly. Researchers in tort and criminal law should not expect the historical dictionary shelf to be the primary resource on this doctrine; it developed substantially through 19th- and 20th-century case law.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's entry is the more substantive of the two, providing the Latin definition, a canonical maxim, and a primary source citation to Fleta. The maxim itself (*novis injuriis emersis, nova constituuntur remedia*) is a genuine principle of legal development and appears in early common law writing as a foundation for judicial creativity in remedy. Burrill's citation to Fleta, lib. 2, c. 2, § 1 points to a 13th-century treatise on English law, situating the concept at the foundations of the common law tradition.
Anderson's entry, by contrast, is purely navigational — a see-also directing the reader to the substantive compounds. This is a common and appropriate approach for a Latin root that does no independent doctrinal work. The two entries together confirm that *novus* was treated in the historical dictionary tradition as a gateway term, not a doctrine in itself.
Neither source addresses *novus actus interveniens*, which had not yet crystallized into standard doctrinal vocabulary at the time these dictionaries were compiled. This is a meaningful gap for researchers in tort causation working backward from modern doctrine into historical sources.