Definition
In Roman civil law, to mark or brand a person with infamy — that is, to impose upon them the formal legal status of disgrace known as infamia. The phrase translates literally as "to note with infamy" or "to mark with dishonor." The act was not merely a social stigma but a juridical consequence that stripped the affected person of certain civic capacities, including the right to represent others in legal proceedings, to hold public office, or to make certain accusations before a court. The marking arose by operation of law upon conviction of specified offenses or dishonorable conduct, rather than through a separate proceeding dedicated solely to that purpose.
Common Confusion
NOTARE INFAMIA should not be confused with infamia itself as a status, nor with the broader concept of ignominia. Infamia was the general category of legal disgrace in Roman law; notare infamia describes the act of imposing that status. Additionally, infamia immediata (arising directly from the nature of an act) differed from infamia mediata (arising from a judicial sentence), though both resulted in the person being notatus — marked. Researchers encountering the phrase in Digest materials should determine which mechanism produced the marking, as the procedural and substantive consequences could differ.
Why It Matters in Research
This term is almost exclusively a term of Roman civil law and appears in sources organized around the Corpus Juris Civilis, particularly Digest 3.2, which collects rules on those who incur infamy (de his qui notantur infamia). Researchers working in the Law Mind corpus will encounter the phrase in treatises on Roman law, civil law commentaries, and in historical discussions of legal disability and civic capacity.
Several research traps deserve attention. First, the concept of infamia was received imperfectly into canon law and into early modern civil law systems — the term notare infamia in a medieval or early modern source may carry modified meaning shaped by ecclesiastical overlay or local statutory refinement. Second, English common law had no direct structural equivalent; researchers tracing parallel concepts in common law sources should look instead to attainder, corruption of blood, outlawry, and civil death, none of which operate identically. Third, the list of persons subject to notare infamia was a defined, enumerated category under Roman law — not a general moral judgment — so applying the concept by analogy to other legal systems requires caution.
For researchers interested in the downstream effects of legal disgrace on procedural capacity (such as who could testify, bring suit, or hold office), the Digest passage cited by Burrill is the primary structural source. The same title (Dig. 3.2) addresses the praetor's edict on persons of infamy, making it the natural starting point for corpus research on this phrase.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's Law Dictionary provides a compact but accurate treatment. His entry correctly identifies the civil law provenance, gives the literal translation, and points researchers to Digest 3.2 as the governing locus. The reference to de his qui notantur infamia — the rubric of that Digest title — is useful navigational guidance.
What Burrill does not supply is the substantive content of the disability: what civic rights were lost upon being notatus, how the marking was removed or waived, or how the concept migrated into canon law and into the ius commune tradition. Researchers needing that depth must move beyond the dictionary entry to the Digest itself and to civilian commentators such as Bartolus and Baldus, who treated infamia extensively. English-language legal dictionaries of the nineteenth century generally give thin treatment to Roman law terminology of this specificity, and Burrill's entry is representative in its brevity.
Jurisdictional Note
Notare infamia is a term of Roman civil law with no direct analogue in Anglo-American common law. It has historical relevance to jurisdictions in the civil law tradition — particularly those whose foundational legal texts derive from the Corpus Juris Civilis — and to canon law. Modern civil law systems have generally replaced the Roman infamia framework with statutory provisions on legal capacity and civil rights deprivation upon conviction.