NON VALENTIA AGERE

4 definitions found across Law Mind sources

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NON VALENTIA AGEREAuthored
The Law Mind • 967 words
Definition
Non valentia agere (Latin: "inability to act" or "inability to sue") is a maxim of equity and civil law describing a condition in which a party is legally or practically incapable of bringing an action. Where that incapacity exists, the running of a limitations period is suspended — the law does not count time against a person who had no capacity to act within it. The principle reflects the foundational equitable proposition that statutes of limitation are designed to pressure those who sleep on their rights, not to extinguish the claims of those who could not pursue them. The maxim operates as a tolling doctrine: when a plaintiff is rendered incapable of suing — whether by legal disability, fraud, duress, imprisonment, infancy, or other incapacity recognized at law or in equity — the limitation clock pauses until the incapacity is removed. ---
Common Confusion
Non valentia agere is sometimes loosely conflated with the broader concept of equitable tolling, but the two are not identical. Equitable tolling is a modern, largely judge-made doctrine with varying standards across jurisdictions. Non valentia agere is the classical Latin formulation of the same underlying principle, drawn from Roman and civil law roots and invoked historically in both common law and equity courts. Researchers working in older sources will encounter the Latin maxim where modern opinions would simply say "equitable tolling" or "disability tolling." The maxim also should not be confused with laches, which concerns unreasonable delay by a plaintiff who could have acted but did not. ---
Why It Matters in Research
This term appears in historical sources as a shorthand for an entire doctrine rather than a defined cause of action or defense, which makes it easy to overlook in corpus searches. Several research traps apply. First, the maxim is almost always cited in the context of limitations and prescription, not as a standalone topic. A researcher searching for statutes of limitations or prescriptive periods in historical materials should watch for this phrase as a signal that a tolling argument is being raised or addressed. Second, the phrase appears inconsistently across the corpus. Black's and Burrill's present it as a discrete entry, but courts and treatises frequently deploy it mid-argument without definition, assuming reader familiarity with the civil law tradition. A full-text search for "non valentia agere" will surface relevant cases, but searchers should also run parallel searches for "inability to sue," "legal disability," and "suspension of limitations" to capture the same doctrine stated in English. Third, the 5 Bell's Appeal Cases 172 citation appears in both Black's editions and in Burrill — it is the anchor citation for the phrase across the historical dictionaries. That Scottish appellate authority reflects the civil law influence on Scots law, which is a point of origin for some of the doctrine's English-language formulation. Researchers working in jurisdictions with strong civil law inheritance (Louisiana, Quebec, mixed-law jurisdictions) will find the maxim more directly operative. Fourth, the scope of recognized "inability" varied considerably across eras. Historical courts were more likely to confine non valentia agere to formal legal disabilities (infancy, coverture, imprisonment) and less willing to extend it to practical or factual incapacity. Modern tolling doctrine has generally expanded the recognized categories. Reading old cases on disability tolling through a modern lens will overstate the historical breadth of the doctrine. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
All three source dictionaries agree on the core definition — inability to sue — and all three anchor to the same citation: 5 Bell's Appeal Cases 172. The brevity of the entries in Black's (both editions) and Burrill is striking: each treats the phrase as nearly self-defining, which reflects how well-settled the maxim was assumed to be among trained lawyers of the period. Burrill adds the most context, placing the entry alongside the adjacent maxims Non valet exceptio ejusdem rei and Non valet impedimentum, suggesting an editorial intent to cluster maxims bearing on the validity and effect of legal bars and objections. This grouping is useful: it signals that historical legal writers understood non valentia agere as part of a family of principles regulating when and how legal obstacles operate, not as an isolated tolling rule. What the dictionaries do not address is the equitable machinery surrounding the maxim — the conditions under which courts would apply it, the burden on the party claiming incapacity, or how it interacted with specific limitation statutes. Those questions were worked out in case law, not in the dictionary entries. Researchers should not treat the brevity of these definitions as evidence that the doctrine was simple; it was simply assumed that the reader would consult cases and treatises for operational detail. The Scottish provenance of the primary citation is worth flagging. Bell's Appeal Cases are Scottish, and Scots private law draws more directly from Roman and civilian sources than English common law. The maxim's Latin formulation and its clean principle of suspending prescription against those who cannot act are natural fits for a civil law system. English and American courts borrowing the maxim were importing a civilian concept into common law, which sometimes created friction with the stricter English approach to statutory construction of limitations periods. ---
Jurisdictional Note
Louisiana and other mixed civil law jurisdictions apply the doctrine most directly, as it maps onto civilian prescription rules more cleanly than onto common law limitations statutes. In U.S. federal courts, the principle is recognized but subsumed under the rubric of equitable tolling, where each circuit applies its own tests for what constitutes actionable incapacity. ---
Related Terms
Equitable tolling — Statute of limitations — Legal disability — Laches — Prescription (civil law) — Tolling — Coverture — Infancy (as legal disability) — Suspension of limitations — Maxims of law
NON VALENTIA AGEREmain
Black's Law Dictionary • 1891
Inability to sue. 5 Bell, App. Cas. 172. Non valet confirmatio, nisi ille, qui confirmat, sit in possessione rei vel ju- ris unde fieri debet confirmatio; et eo- dem modo, nisi ille cui confirmatio fit sit in possessione. Co. Litt. 295. Con- firmation is not valid unless he who confirms is either in possession of the thing itself or of the right of which confirmation is to be made, and, in like manner, unless he to whom confirmation is made is in possession. Non valet exceptio ejusdem rei cujus petitur dissolutio. A plea of the same matter the dissolution of which is sought, is not valid. Called a "maxim of law and com- mon sense." 2 Eden, 134. Non valet impedimentum quod de jure non sortitur effectum. 4 Coke, 31a. An impediment which does not derive its ef- fect from law is of no force. Non verbis, sed ipsis rebus, leges im- ponimus. Cod. 6, 43, 2. We impose laws, not upon words, but upon things themselves. Non videntur qui errant consentire. The vacation between They are not considered to consent who commit a mistake. Dig. 50, 17, 116, § 2; Broom, Max. 262.
NON VALENTIA AGEREmain
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.) • 1910
& maternal or paternal inheritance; but, if he had offspring before the felony, such offspring may succeed as to the inheritance of the father or mother by whom the felony was not committed. sue. 5 Bell, App. Cas. 172. Inability to Non valet confirmatio, nisi ille, qui confirmat, sit in possessione rei vel juris unde fieri debet confirmatio; et eodem modo, nisi ille cui confirmatio fit sit in possessione. Co. Litt. 295. Confirmation is not valid unless he who confirms is either in possession of the thing itself or of the right of which confirmation is to be made, and, in like manner, unless he to whom confirmation is made is in possession. Non valet exceptio ejusdem rei cujus petitur dissolutio. <A plea of the same matter the dissolution of which is sought, is not valid. Called a “maxim of law and common sense.” 2 Eden, 134. Non valet impedimentum quod de jure non sortitur effectum. 4 Coke, 3la. An impediment which does not derive its effect from law is of no force. Non verbis, sed ipsis rebus, leges imponimus. Cod. 6, 43, 2. We impose laws, not upon words, but upon things themselves. Non videntur qui errant consentire, They are not considered to consent who commit a mistake. Dig. 50, 17, 116, § 23; Broom, Max. 262. Non vwidetur consensum retinuisse si quis ex prescripto minantis aliquid immutavit. He does not appear to have retained consent, who has changed anything through menaces. Broom, Max. 278. Non videtur perfecte cujusque id csse, quod ex casu auferri potest. That does not seem to be completely one’s own which can be taken from him on occasion. Dig. 50, 17, 139, 1. Non videtur quisquam id capcre quod ei mecesse est alii restitutere. Dig. 50, 17, 51. No one is considered entitled to recover that which he must give up to another. Non videtur vim facere, qui jure suo utitur et ordinaria actione experitur. He is not deemed to use force who exercises his own right, and proceeds by ordinary action. Dig. 50, 17, 155, 1.
NON VALENTIA AGEREmain
Burrill's Law Dictionary • 1870
L. Lat. Inability to sue. 5 Bell's Ap. Cas. 172. Non valet exceptio ejusdem rei cujus petitur dissolutio. A plea of the same matter the dissolution of which is sought, is not valid. Called a maxim of law and common sense. Henley, Lord C. 2 Eden, 134. Non valet impedimentum quod de jure non sortitur effectum. An impediment or bar which does not derive its effect from law, is of no force. 4 Co. 31 a, French's case. In Branch's Principia and Wharton's Lexicon, the words quod de jure non sortitur effectum are erroneously rendered, "which does not destroy the force of law." Non verbis, sed ipsis rebus, leges imponimus. We impose laws, not upon words, but upon things themselves. Cod. 6. 43. 2. Non videntur qui errant consentire. They who mistake, are not supposed to consent. Dig. 50. 17. 116. 2. There can be no consent, when the parties are in an error respecting the object of their agreement. Pothier, Obl. part 1. ch. 1, sect. 1, art. 3, § 1. A contract entered into, under a mistake of facts or circumstances going to the essence of it, is not considered as made by consent, and is therefore no contract.* 2 Kent's Com. 477. "This is a clear principle of universal justice." Id. ibid. See Broom's Мах. [197.] 14 Georgia R. 207. Another form is, Non consentit qui errat, (q. v.) Non videtur consensum retinuisse, si quis ex præscripto minantis aliquid immutavit. Where a person [under duress] has made any change from the terms of the party threatening him, he is not [for all that] considered as having retained his consent [to such terms.] Bacon's Max. 89, reg. 22. Broom's Max. [208.] See Consensus, for a full illustration of this maxim. Non videtur perfecte cujusque id esse, quod ex casu auferri potest. That does not seem to be completely one's own, which can be taken from him on occasion. Dig. 50.17. 139. 1. Non videtur vim facere, qui jure suo utitur et ordinaria actione experitur. He is not considered to use force, who exercises his own right, and proceeds by ordinary action. Dig. 50.17. 155. 1.

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