In Practice. A re examination of an issue in fact before a court and a jury, which has been tried at least once before the same court: Hill. N. Tr. 1. A rehearing of the legal rights of the parties, upon disputed facts, before another jury, granted by the court on motion of the party dissatisfied with the result of the previous trial, upon a proper case being presented for the purpose; 4 Chitty, Gen. Pr. 30; Grah. & W. N. Tr. 32. It is either upon the same, or different, or additional evidence, before a new jury, and probably, but not necessarily, before s different judge. It is a re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court after a trial and decision by a jury, court or referee: 99 Cal. 265. The origin of the practice of granting new trials is of extremely ancient date, and, consequently, involved in some obscurity. Blackstone gives the most connected and satisfactory account of it of any writer; 3 Com. 387. Courts have, in general, a discretionary power to grant or refuse new trials, ao- cording to the exigency of each particular case, upon principles of substantial justice; 1 Burr. 390. That the trial judge is not satisfied with a verdict is not binding on the court in banc, but deserves serious consideration; L. J. 55 Q. B. 403. This discretion is generally not reviewable on error; 10 Vt. 520; 14 N. H. 441: 20 Pick. 285; 10 Ga. 93; 132 U. S. 103. It should be exercised with great caution where a new trial is asked only because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; 31 W. Va. 428. Where one party moves for a new trial and the opposing party consents thereto, the court is not compelled to grant the same; 44 Kan. 144; 45 III. App. 426. An order granting a new trial operates to set aside the judgment: 76 Cal. 90. The usual grounds for a new trial may be enumerated as follows: The not giving the defendant sufficient notice of the time and place of trial, unless waived by an appearance and making a defence, will be a ground for setting aside the verdict; 3 Price 72; 1 Wend. 22. But the defendant's ignorance must not have been owing to his own negligence, and the insufficiency of the notice must have been reasonably calculated to mislead him: 2 Bibb 177; 3 B. & P. 1; 13 Tex. 516; 32 Conn. 402; 36 Ν. Η. 74. Pleadings. Failure of the complaint to state a cause of action is available on motion for a new trial: 46 Pac. Rep. (Ariz.) 74; so of one which shows the cause of action alleged to be barred: 26 S. E. Rep. (W. Va.) 431. Misconduct of parties, counsel, or wit- nesses. The use of crutches by plaintiff in going to and from the witness stand, when just before and after the trial he walked readily without them, is ground for a new trial; 42 N. Y. S. 941; but plain- tiff's hysteria while on the witness stand is not; 45 N. E. Rep. (III.) 290; nor is a controversy, between court and counsel, during the trial, not prejudicial to the defeated party; 37 S. W. Rep. (Mo.) 115; nor improper remarks made by counsel in his argument; 27 U. S. App. 663. Mistakes or omissions of officers in sum- moning and drawing jurors, when the irregularity deprives the party complain- ing of a substantial right, will entitle him to a new trial: 2 Halst. 244: 16 Ark. 87; 12 Pick. 496. Likewise, where the officer summoning the jury is nearly related to one of the parties: 10 S. & R. 334; 1 South. 364; 20 Tex. 234; 1 Dev. & B. 196: or is in- terested in the event: 5 Johns. 183: unless the objection to the officer was waived by the party: 3 Me. 215; 21 Pick. 457; or the authority of the officer be so circumscribed as to put it out of his power to select an improper jury; 7 Ala. 253; 7 Cow. 720. A verdict will be set aside for the following causes: The unauthorized interference of a party, or his attorney, or the court. in select- ing or returning jurors, unless the inter- ference can be satisfactorily explained ; 8 Humphr. 412; that a juror not regularly summoned and returned personated an- other; 77 Ga. 108; 7 Dowl. & R. 684; but not if the juror personated another through mistake, was qualified in other respects, and no injustice has been done; 12 East 229; 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. 367. That a juror sat on the trial after being challenged and stood aside, unless the party complaining knew of it, and did not object; 3 Yeates 318; that a juror, was discharged without any sufficient reason, after being sworn; 1 Ohio St. 66; but not if the juror was dis- charged by mistake and with the knowl- elge and acquiescence of the party; 9 Metc. Mass 572; 5 Ired. 58; that the jury were not sworn, or that the oath was not ad- ministered in the form prescribed by law; 1 How. 497; 2 Me. 270. The disqualification of jurors, if it has not been waived, will be ground for a new trial; but a principal cause of challenge to a juror, not discovered during the trial, will not require a new trial in a criminal case, unless injustice resulted to the prisoner from the fact that such juror served; 36 W. Va. 729; that a juror was also a member of the grand ju