The ques- tion whether a judgment is a contract is an old one very much discussed, and in some cases it was held to be such, chiefly upon the authority of Blackstone, who rested his opinion as to the propriety of this classifi- cation upon the doctrine of the social com- pact. The relations of a judgment to the idea of a contract or a quasi-contract have of late received much attention. in con- nection with the more careful investigation and accurate understanding of that class of obligations known as quasi-contracts. Blackstone said, "Upon showing the judg- ment, once obtained, still in full force and yet unsatisfied, the law immediately implies that, by the original contract of society, the defendant hath contracted a debt, and is bound to pay it;" 8 Bla. Com. 160. Of this expression it has been said, "This is certainly a very remarkable statement, and involves large assumptions in regard to 'an original contract of society' and its sup- posed binding force upon a judgment debtor of the nineteenth century; " Howe, Stud. Civ. L. 188. This early theory of an "original contract of society" has been long since abandoned, and after the time of Blackstone's Commentaries Lord Mansfield, in a carefully considered case, said, "A judgment is no contract, nor can it be con- sidered in the light of a contract, as judi- cium redditur in invitum;" 8 Burr. 1545. The same view of the question was taken by the United States supreme court, which held that a judgment was not a "contract within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against impairing the obliga- tion of a contract;" 113 U. S. 452. That court has, in two other important cases, discussed the question of the nature of a judgment and the obligation which is cre- ated by it, and in both cases it strongly dissents from the view of Blackstone and the earlier text-writers. In Louisiana v. Mayor, 108 U. S. 285, 288, the court said: "A judgment for damages, estimated in money, is sometimes called, by text-writ- ers, a specialty or contract of record, be- cause it establishes a legal obligation to pay the amount recovered, and, by a fic- tion of law, a promise to pay is implied where such legal obligation exists. It is on this principle that an action ex con- tractu will lie upon a judgment. But this iction cannot convert a transaction, want- ing the assent of the parties, into one which necessarily implies it. Judgments for torts are usually the result of violent con- tests, and, as observed by the court below, are imposed on the losing party, by a higher authority, against his will and protest. The prohibition of the federal constitution was intended to secure the observance of good faith, in the stipulation of parties, against state action. Where a transaction is not based upon any assent of parties, it cannot be said that any faith is pledged with re- spect to it, and no case arises for the oper- ation of the prohibition." In this case it was held that the conversion of a statutory right to demand compensation for damages caused by a mob into a judgment does not make it a contract within the constitu- tional prohibition against impairing the obligation of a contract. In the more re- cent case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 118, in referring to the doctrine of Blackstone, with reference to a foreign judgment, the court held that the idea that such judg- ment imposed or created an obligation or duty was a remnant of an ancient fic- tion, and "while the theory in question would serve to explain rules of pleading which originated while the fiction was be- lieved in, it is hardly a sufficient guide at the present day in dealing with questions of international law; and it might be safer to adopt the maxim applied to foreign judgments by Chief Justice Weston, speak- ing for the supreme judicial court of Maine, judicium redditur in invitum, or as given by Lord Coke, in præsumptione legis judicium redditur in invitum; 15 Me. 167; Co. Lit. 248b." In New York it is held that a judgment is in no sense a contract or agreement; 1 Cow. 316; even a judg- mert founded upon a contract; 50 N. Y. 176; and the same doctrine is asserted with great vigor in a later case: 95 id. 428; this is also the prevailing doctrine in other states; 35 Cal. 155; 33 Ala. N. s. 706; 56 id. 56; 18 Me. 168; 87 N. C. 404; 15 Ohio St. 364; 2 S. C. N. S. 226; 38 G. Greene 489; (and see 30 Ia. 283); 17 Ill. 572; some cases are cited contra: 3 Gray 411; 19 Vt. 43; 4 Keyes 335; S. c. 4 Abb. N. Y. App. Cas. 382. The last case alone was relied on as the authority for the proposition that a judgment is a contract by Harlan, J., dis- senting, in Louisiana v. Mayor, supra, but the case so relied upon is in a collection omitted from the regular reports and is in direct contradiction to cases cited supra, in which the opposing doctrine is emphati- cally stated by the same court, one decided four and the other sixteen years later. See also 9 Kan. 658. The most recent text books concur in supporting the statement