Definition
As used in legal contexts, "naturally" means occurring in the ordinary or usual course of things, without the need for unusual intervening forces or circumstances. The term most frequently appears in contract law and tort law, where it functions as a limiting standard for recoverable damages: losses that "naturally" arise are those that flow directly and predictably from a wrong, as distinguished from remote or speculative harms.
In the damages context specifically, "naturally" describes consequences that a reasonable person would expect to follow from the act or breach in question under normal conditions. This is distinct from consequential damages, which may require special notice or foreseeability of unusual circumstances.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): In a natural manner; inherently or by nature; surely or without any doubt.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): In a natural manner or way; according to the usual course of things; spontaneously.
The ordinary English word carries a broad, almost casual meaning — something done easily, inevitably, or without contrivance. In legal usage, "naturally" is a term of limitation, not emphasis. When a court or contract clause uses it, the word is doing precise doctrinal work: it restricts recovery or liability to harms within a defined zone of expected consequence. A researcher reading it as mere rhetorical filler will miss its operative function.
Common Confusion
"Naturally" and "proximately" are sometimes used interchangeably in older sources, but they are not synonymous. Proximate cause asks whether a legal connection exists between an act and a harm, including policy judgments about when that connection should be severed. "Naturally" in the damages context asks whether the harm falls within the predictable, ordinary course of events flowing from the breach or wrong — a narrower inquiry more closely tied to the parties' reasonable expectations at the time of contracting. In tort contexts, "natural and probable consequences" language sometimes merges with proximate cause analysis, which compounds the confusion in historical sources.
Why It Matters in Research
The word "naturally" is a signpost for the first limb of the damages rule that American courts inherited from Hadley v. Baxendale (1854), though the term itself predates and coexists with explicit citation to that case. When researching breach-of-contract damages in 19th- and early 20th-century American cases, you will frequently encounter formulations using "naturally" as the operative word — not "foreseeably" or "proximately" — because the Hadley framework had not yet been uniformly systematized under those labels. Treat "naturally" in those sources as equivalent in function to the general damages limb of modern foreseeability analysis, but do not assume the terminology maps perfectly.
In tort materials, "natural and probable consequences" appears in older negligence and intentional tort doctrine as both a causation test and a damages limiter. These two uses — causation and damages scope — are easily conflated in historical digests and headnotes. A case indexed under "natural consequences" may be addressing causation, not damages, or both simultaneously.
Researchers using Bouvier's will find only the bare bones: "according to the usual course of things," with a California citation appended. Both editions of Black's add the party-contemplation gloss, which is the critical doctrinal contribution. That gloss reflects the Hadley rule's dual structure (usual course + contemplated by parties), and its presence in Black's is useful for dating when courts were treating the two limbs as analytically distinct.
The term also appears in statutory and constitutional contexts with a different meaning — "naturally born," "naturally acquired" — where it carries lineage and status connotations rather than a damages or causation function. Do not carry the damages-context meaning into those materials.
Historical Dictionary Support
All three source dictionaries agree that "naturally" in the legal sense means "according to the usual course of things," and both editions of Black's ground the definition in the same California authority (Mitchell v. Clarke, 71 Cal. 164). Bouvier's is the most spare, offering only the definitional phrase and the citation without elaboration. Black's (1st ed.) omits the full case citation found in the 2nd edition, which added the American Reports parallel citation — a minor bibliographic point but useful if tracing the authority chain.
The shared reliance on a single California case as the definitional anchor is notable. Neither Black's edition attempts a synthesis of conflicting authorities or acknowledges that courts in other jurisdictions framed the standard differently. Researchers should not treat the Black's entry as a settled uniform rule; it represents one articulation of a concept that was still being worked out across jurisdictions in the late 19th century.
None of the three historical dictionaries address the tort usage of "naturally" in causation analysis, an omission that reflects the contract-law orientation of their damages entries. The tort dimension requires supplemental research in treatises and case digests.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The Law Mind Contracts & Commercial Law Encyclopedia, contracts_1: Contracts -- Definition, Nature, and Sources of Contract Law