Definition
A Latin maxim meaning, roughly, "it is natural for anything [to be dissolved in the same way it was bound together]." The full form of the maxim is *naturale est quidlibet dissolvi eo ligamine quo ligatum est* — it is natural that anything be dissolved by the same bond by which it was bound. In legal usage, the phrase encapsulates a principle of symmetry in obligations and contracts: the method of dissolution or discharge should correspond to the method of creation. A contract made by deed is discharged by deed; an obligation arising from consent is released by consent. The maxim functions less as a rule of strict positive law and more as a guiding principle of natural reason — the kind of legal logic that common law jurists treated as self-evident from the structure of human relations rather than from enacted authority.
The phrase also appears in the broader context of natural law discourse, where it signals that certain legal principles derive their authority not from positive enactment but from reason and the constitution of human nature. In this sense the maxim belongs to the tradition of treating natural law as a background framework against which positive obligations are measured.
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Common Confusion
The maxim is sometimes loosely associated with *contrarius actus* — the idea that an act is undone by its contrary. The two principles overlap in contractual dissolution contexts but are not identical. *Contrarius actus* emphasizes opposition or reversal; *naturale est quidlibet* emphasizes correspondence and symmetry of method. Conflating them can obscure whether a historical source is making a formal doctrinal point about mode of discharge or a broader philosophical point about the natural order of obligations.
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Why It Matters in Research
This maxim appears almost exclusively in older treatise literature and in judicial opinions from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries that engaged seriously with natural law reasoning. Researchers encountering it in historical sources should be alert to two distinct uses: the narrow contractual symmetry principle (dissolution mirrors formation) and the broader natural law invocation (this rule derives from reason, not statute).
The narrower use has practical staying power. Courts applying it in equity and common law contexts used it to evaluate whether a purported discharge or release of an obligation was legally effective — if the mode of release did not correspond to the mode of creation, the release might be challenged. This logic appears in discussions of releases, accord and satisfaction, and the formal requirements for discharging sealed instruments.
The broader natural law invocation is significant for research into legal philosophy and constitutional history. When courts or treatise writers cite this maxim as an example of natural law, they are situating a specific rule within the claim that its authority precedes positive enactment. This matters when tracing how natural law arguments were used to fill gaps in statutory or common law frameworks, particularly in American jurisprudence before the Civil War.
Black's 2nd Edition preserves only a fragment of the broader context in which the maxim was discussed — the surviving text concerns the distinction between natural laws, knowable by reason, and positive or revealed laws, grounded in divine will. Researchers should not assume that Black's truncated entry captures the full doctrinal application of the phrase. Fuller treatment appears in the natural law treatise tradition, including writers such as Grotius, Pufendorf, and their common law interpreters.
Do not confuse the maxim's appearance in equity sources with any claim that it operated as a formal rule of positive law. Courts invoked it as persuasive reasoning, not as binding authority independent of the underlying doctrinal rule it was used to support.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.) presents a fragment clearly excerpted from a longer discussion. The surviving text distinguishes "natural laws" — knowable through reason and grounded in the constitution of human nature — from positive or revealed laws, which rest on divine will rather than the general structure of human nature, though Black's notes that positive law may also be founded on reason and may produce practical advantage. This framing situates the maxim squarely within Enlightenment-era natural jurisprudence rather than technical common law doctrine.
The entry as preserved does not supply the full maxim or its contractual application. This is a meaningful gap. The dissolution-mirrors-formation principle, which is the most practically significant legal use of the phrase, is not visible in the Black's fragment at all. Researchers relying solely on Black's 2nd for this term would receive a natural law framing without the doctrinal content that gave the maxim its utility in pleading and equity practice.
No other historical dictionary in the current corpus provides an entry for this term. The absence is consistent with the maxim's character: it was a tool of trained jurists comfortable with Latin and natural law reasoning, not a term requiring popular explanation.
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