Definition
A Latin term meaning "nature" or "natural character," used in classical legal texts and maxims to invoke the concept of nature as a model or standard for legal reasoning. Natura appears most frequently in two well-known maxims embedded in the common law tradition:
1. Natura appetit perfectum; ita et lex — "Nature covets perfection; so does law also." Used to support the proposition that law, like nature, strives toward completeness and regularity.
2. Natura non facit saltum; ita nec lex — "Nature makes no leap; neither does law." Used to justify the orderly, step-by-step progression required in certain legal procedures, particularly the historical degrees of writs of entry in real property practice. The idea is that legal process, like natural process, advances through regular gradations and cannot skip stages arbitrarily.
As a standalone term, natura also appears in Anderson's dictionary paired with "disposition" and "nature," indicating its use in civil law contexts to describe the inherent character or quality of a thing or obligation.
Common Confusion
Natura should not be confused with naturalis, the adjectival form appearing in phrases like obligatio naturalis (natural obligation) or naturalis possessio (natural possession). Those terms carry specific doctrinal content in civil law. Natura alone typically appears as a component of maxims or as a general modifier, not as an independent technical doctrine.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encounter natura almost exclusively in two contexts: maxim collections embedded in early common law treatises, and civil law texts dealing with the character or qualities of legal relations.
The maxim Natura non facit saltum; ita nec lex has real procedural significance. Coke's citation in Co. Litt. 238 applies it specifically to the degrees of writs of entry — a highly technical area of early real property law in which a tenant's right to contest a claim depended on following prescribed sequential steps. A researcher tracing writ-of-entry practice must understand that this maxim was not merely ornamental; it was invoked to defeat writs that attempted to bypass required procedural stages. The maxim appears in a body of practice that became obsolete after the real property reforms of the nineteenth century in England, so its operational significance is primarily historical.
The Hobart citation (Hob. 144) for Natura appetit perfectum is characteristic of seventeenth-century judicial reasoning in which appeals to natural analogy carried persuasive weight. Modern researchers should treat such citations as evidence of legal culture and reasoning style, not as binding authority.
Neither maxim will appear in modern statutory codes or contemporary case law in operative form, so searching for natura in electronic databases keyed to modern sources will return little of value. Searches in digitized early modern treatises, Year Books, and maxim collections are more productive.
Researchers working in civil law traditions (Louisiana, Quebec, mixed jurisdictions) may encounter natura in the sense of "nature of an obligation" or "nature of a contract," where it describes the essential, inherent characteristics that distinguish one legal institution from another. In that context, natura functions as a conceptual category rather than a procedural standard.
Historical Dictionary Support
The three source dictionaries reflect different levels of engagement with the term. Burrill's is the most substantive, providing both maxims with Latin text, English translation, and source citations to Hobart and Coke — the standard seventeenth-century authorities. This reflects Burrill's characteristic thoroughness with Latin legal terminology and maxims.
Anderson's entry is minimal — "Disposition; nature" with a cross-reference — suggesting the term was treated as self-explanatory within the civil law framework Anderson was glossing. Rapalje & Lawrence appears not to have carried a dedicated entry for natura, and the surrounding text in the source material concerns unrelated terms.
None of the historical dictionaries attempt a doctrinal synthesis or explain how the maxims functioned in practice. For that, researchers must go directly to Coke's Institutes and the Hobart reports. The dictionaries are useful for confirming the term's existence and standard meaning, but not for understanding procedural application.
Jurisdictional Note
The maxim Natura non facit saltum applied specifically to common law writ practice in England and was carried into early American common law through Coke and Blackstone. It has no operative modern application in either system. The civil law sense of natura as inherent character remains relevant in Louisiana and other mixed-law jurisdictions where civilians distinguish between the nature and the terms of an obligation.