MOTA SPECTATUR

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

MOTA SPECTATURAuthored
The Law Mind • 877 words
Definition
*Mota spectatur* is a Latin legal maxim, the full form of which appears in the tradition of Roman and civil law learning. As encountered in historical legal sources, the phrase is fragmentary — the complete maxim reads, in substance, that intention (*voluntas*) or the motion of the will (*mota*) is regarded, not the outcome. The maxim encapsulates a foundational principle of criminal and tortious liability: what the law scrutinizes is the actor's mental state and purpose, not merely the result produced. The maxim is closely related to the better-attested formulation *In maleficiis voluntas spectatur non exitus* — "In offences, the intention is regarded, not the event" — which appears in the Digest (Dig. 48.8.14) and is cited in Bacon's Maxims and Broom's Legal Maxims. *Mota spectatur* functions as a compressed variant pointing to the same principle: the movement or impulse of the will (*mota*, from *movere*, to move) is what is examined by the law. In practical legal application, the maxim stands for the proposition that criminal guilt and tortious liability do not attach purely by reason of a harmful outcome; the will animating the act — whether corrupt, negligent, or innocent — must be weighed. A good intention does not automatically excuse a harmful act, but the maxim directs the inquiry toward intent as the primary object of legal scrutiny. ---
Common Confusion
*Mota spectatur* is easily conflated with the more frequently cited *In maleficiis voluntas spectatur non exitus*, and historical sources do not always distinguish them clearly. Researchers encountering *mota spectatur* in older texts should treat it as pointing toward this cluster of intent-based maxims rather than as a self-contained rule with independent doctrinal weight. The phrase should not be confused with *actus reus* / *mens rea* doctrine as understood in modern common law — the maxim originates in the civil law tradition and carries somewhat different freight, applying to the moral quality of the will rather than to the technical elements of a statutory offense. ---
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers will rarely encounter *mota spectatur* as a standalone citation in common law casework. Its appearance in historical legal writing — particularly in civil law treatises, ecclesiastical sources, and early modern English equity materials — signals an argument grounded in the Roman law tradition that privileges the quality of intent over the fact of harm. Key navigational points: 1. **Fragmentary citation hazard.** Bouvier's Dictionary, the primary English-language source for this maxim in the Law Mind corpus, presents the phrase within a dense run of Latin maxims without full gloss. Researchers must trace the principle to the Digest and to Bacon's and Broom's treatments of *voluntas spectatur* to reconstruct full context. 2. **Civil law vs. common law register.** The maxim carries more direct authority in civil law jurisdictions and in equity than in common law criminal proceedings. When it appears in common law sources, it typically functions rhetorically — as persuasive or interpretive authority — rather than as binding rule. 3. **Corpus connections.** Entries on *mens rea*, *dolus*, *culpa*, and *animus* in the Law Mind corpus will provide the surrounding doctrinal framework. The maxim belongs to a network of intent-related Latin rules that 19th-century treatise writers regularly invoked together. 4. **Historical period sensitivity.** In early modern legal writing, arguments from civilian maxims like this one were more freely integrated into common law reasoning than they would be after the sharper separation of common law and civil law traditions in the 18th and 19th centuries. Encountering this maxim in a 17th-century English source means something different than encountering it in a Victorian treatise. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
**Bouvier's Law Dictionary** presents *mota spectatur* within a sequence of civil law maxims but does not provide an independent gloss for the phrase as a complete entry. Its placement adjacent to *In maleficiis voluntas spectatur non exitus* — cited to Dig. 48.8.14, Bacon's Maxims Reg. 7, and Broom's Maxims p. 324 — makes clear that Bouvier treats these as expressions of the same underlying principle. This is a notable gap in the historical dictionary record. Neither Bouvier nor the other major English legal dictionaries of the 19th century (Black's, Stroud's, Wharton's) develop *mota spectatur* as a free-standing entry with independent authority. Researchers relying solely on the dictionary tradition will need to move to primary civilian sources — particularly the Digest and the Institutionalist commentators — to find the maxim treated with doctrinal precision. Bacon's *Maxims of the Law* and Broom's *Legal Maxims* remain the most useful English-language secondary treatments of the *voluntas spectatur* principle, and by extension of *mota spectatur*, even though neither work uses that compressed form as a headword. ---
Jurisdictional Note
The maxim carries greatest authority in civil law systems and in mixed jurisdictions (Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland) where Roman law principles directly inform substantive doctrine. In common law jurisdictions, it functions as persuasive interpretive material, most likely to appear in equity proceedings, ecclesiastical matters, or academic argument. ---
Related Terms
- In maleficiis voluntas spectatur non exitus - Mens rea - Dolus - Animus - Culpa - Actus reus - Malice aforethought - Intention (legal) - Maxims of law - Ratification (in tort)
MOTA SPECTATURmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
In majore summa continetur minor. In the greater sum is contained the less. 5 Co. 115. In maleficiis voluntas spectatur non exitus. In offences, the intention is regarded, not the event. Dig. 48. 8. 14; Bacon, Max. Reg. 7; Broom, Max. 324. In maleficio ratihabitio mandato comparetur. In a tort, ratification is equivalent to authority. Dig. 50. 17. 152. 2. In maxima potentia minima licentia. In the greatest power there is the least liberty. Hob. 139. In mercibus illicitis non sit commercium. There should be no commerce in illicit goods. 3 Kent 262, п. In novo casu novum remedium apponendum est. In a new state of facts a new legal remedy must be found. 2 Inst. 8. In obscuris inspici solere quod verisimilius est, aut quod plerumque fieri solet. Where there is ob- scurity, we usually regard what is probable or what is generally done. Dig. 50. 17. 114. In obscuris quod minimum est sequimur. In ob- scure cases, we follow that which is least so. Dig. 50. 17. 9. In odium spoliatoris omnia præsumuntur. All things are presumed against a wrong-doer. Broom, Max. 939; 1 Vern. 19; 1 P. Wms. 731; 1 Ch. Cas. 292. In omni actione ubi due concurrunt districtiones, videlicet in rem et in personam, illa districtio te- nendu est que magis timetur et magis ligat. In every action where two distresses concur, that is in rem and in personam, that is to be chosen which is most dreaded, and which binds most firmly. Bract. 372; Fleta, L. 6, c. 14, § 28. In omni re nascitur res quæ ipsam rem exter- minat. In every thing, the thing is born which de- stroys the thing itself. 2 Inst. 15. In omnibus contractibus, sive nominatis sive in- nominatis, permutatio continetur. In every con- tract, whether nominate or innominate, there is implied an exchange, i. e, a consideration. In omnibus obligationibus, in quibus dies non ponitur, præsenti die debetur. In all obligations, when no time is fixed for the performance, the thing is due immediately. Dig. 50. 17. 14. In omnibus pœnalibus judiciis, et ætati et impru- dentiæ succurritur. In all trials for penal offences, allowance is made for youth and lack of discretion. Dig. 50. 17. 108; Broom, Max. 314. In omnibus quidem mazime tamen in jure æqui- tas spectanda sit. In all affairs indeed, but princi- pally in those which concern the administration of justice, equity should be regarded. Dig. 50. 17.90. In pari causa possessor potior haberi debet. When two parties have equal rights, the advantage is al- ways in favor of the possessor. Dig. 50. 17. 128; Broom, Max. 714. In pari delicto melior est conditio possidentis. When the parties are equally in the wrong, the con- dition of the possessor is better. 11 Wheat. 258; 8 Cra. 244; Cowp. 341; Broom, Max. 325; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3724; 83 Ala. 142. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis (et possidentis). Where both parties are equally in fault, the condition of the defendant is preferable. L. R. 7 Ch. 473; 11 Mass. 376; 101 Mass, 150, 864; Broom, Max. 290, 721; 38 Fed. Rep. 191; 15 Wash. 490; 166 III. 282. In pænalibus causis benignius interpretandum est. In penal cases, the more favorable interpreta- tion is to be made. Dig. 50. 17. 155. 2; Plowd. 80 0; 2 Hale, P. С. 865. In præparatoriis ad judicium favetur actori. In things preparatory before trial, the plaintiff is favored. 2 Inst. 57. In præsentia majoris potestatis, minor potestas cessat. In the presence of the superior power, the minor power ceases. Jenk. Cent. 214; Hardw. 28; 13 How. 142; 18 Q. B. 740. See Broom, Max. 111, 112. In pretio emptionis et venditionis naturaliter licet contrahentibus se circumvenire. In the price of buying and selling, it is naturally allowed to the con- tracting parties to overreach each other. 1 Story, Contr. 606. In propria causa nemo juder. No one can be Judge in his own cause. 12 Co. 18. In quo quis delinquit, in eo de jure est puniendus. In whatever thing one offends, in that he is right- fully to be punished. Co. Litt. 233 b. In re communi neminem dominorum jure facere quicquam, invito altero, posse. One co-proprietor can exercise no authority over the common prop- erty against the will of the other. Dig. 10. 8. 28. In re dubia benigniorem interpretationem sequi, non minus justius est, quam tutius. In a doubtful case, to follow the milder interpretation is not less

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