Definition
A mischarge is an erroneous instruction given by a trial court to a jury — one containing legal errors serious enough to warrant reversal of the resulting judgment on appeal. The term refers specifically to the judicial act of instructing the jury incorrectly on the applicable law, the legal standards governing the case, or the elements a party must prove. A mischarge may arise from misstating the law, omitting a required instruction, or giving an instruction that misleads the jury as to the burden of proof, the definition of a legal standard, or the consequences of particular findings.
The defect must be material. Not every imprecision in a jury charge constitutes a mischarge warranting reversal; the error must have been prejudicial — meaning it likely affected the outcome.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): A mistake in charging, as in an account.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): To charge erroneously, as in account. — n. A mistake in charging.
The common meaning of mischarge is commercial and financial: an incorrect charge on a bill or invoice. The legal meaning is entirely different and confined to trial procedure — specifically, a court's erroneous instruction to a jury. A researcher encountering "mischarge" in a legal context should not import the accounting sense. The two uses share only the surface meaning of "an error in charging" and otherwise describe entirely unrelated problems.
Common Confusion
Mischarge is sometimes loosely conflated with misdirection, particularly in older English and Commonwealth legal sources, where "misdirection" was the more common term for an erroneous jury instruction. In American practice, mischarge and misdirection are functionally equivalent, but researchers consulting English authorities or treatises drawing on English precedent should be aware that "misdirection" was the preferred vocabulary there. A mischarge is also distinct from a directed verdict or a defective verdict — both of which concern the outcome rather than the court's legal instruction preceding deliberation.
Why It Matters in Research
Mischarge appears almost exclusively in appellate opinions addressing reversible error in trial court jury instructions. Researchers tracking mischarge claims should understand several things:
First, the term's frequency varies by era. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century American reporters use mischarge regularly and without qualification; later opinions tend to fold the concept into broader discussions of "instructional error" or "error in jury instructions," making mischarge less common as a standalone term in modern case law but still present in treatises and appellate briefs.
Second, Anderson's cross-reference to "CHARGE, 2 (2, c)" signals that the substantive doctrine lives under CHARGE in most historical dictionaries. A researcher relying solely on the mischarge entry in older sources will miss the fuller treatment. This is a navigational trap worth noting: the index term and the doctrinal home are separated in historical reference works.
Third, the threshold for reversal matters enormously in research context. Mischarge doctrine intersects with harmless error analysis, and the standard for what rises to reversible mischarge has shifted over time — nineteenth-century courts were sometimes more readily moved to reverse on instructional grounds than modern appellate courts, which apply harmless error review more robustly. Historical case law on mischarge may therefore overstate the practical reversibility of instructional errors by contemporary standards.
Fourth, in criminal cases, mischarge claims are commonly raised alongside other grounds for appeal and appear in habeas corpus petitions as due process arguments. In civil cases, they arise primarily in post-trial motions and direct appeals. The procedural posture shapes the vocabulary used and the standard applied.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (both the first and second editions) define mischarge identically in substance: an erroneous charge given by a court to a jury, involving errors for which the judgment may be reversed. The near-verbatim consistency across editions signals that the term was treated as stable and settled during this period. Neither edition elaborates on the standard for reversal or the distinction between harmful and harmless error, which reflects the state of doctrine at the time — harmless error analysis was less developed when these editions were compiled.
Anderson's Dictionary of Law declines to define the term independently, directing the reader instead to the entry for CHARGE. This cross-referencing approach reflects Anderson's general method of organizing doctrine by its primary concept rather than by derivative terms, and it is useful confirmation that mischarge was understood as a subspecies of charge doctrine rather than an independent legal category.
None of the three historical sources address the relationship between mischarge and the harmless error doctrine, the distinction between omitted and incorrect instructions, or the criminal/civil divide in how mischarge claims are evaluated. These are substantive gaps that a researcher should fill from primary sources and modern treatises rather than relying on these dictionary entries alone.
Jurisdictional Note
All American jurisdictions recognize mischarge as grounds for appellate reversal, but the standard of review and the harmless error threshold vary. Federal courts apply a plain error standard when the mischarge was not objected to at trial; most states follow similar frameworks. Some states have codified specific rules governing jury instruction errors and the required form of objection to preserve the issue for appeal.