An established principle or proposition. A principle of law univer- sally admitted as being just and consonant with reason. Maxims are said to have been of compar- atively late origin in the Roman law. There are none in the Twelve Tables, and they appear but rarely in Gaius and the ante-Justinian fragments, or in the older English text-books and reports. The word maximum or maxima does not occur in the Corpus Juris in any meaning resembling that now borne by it; the nearest word in classical Romar law is regula; Fortescue identifies the two terms, and Du Cange de- fines maxima as recepta sententia, regula vulgo nostris et Anglis maxime. Doctor and Student defines maxims as "the foun- dations of the Law and the conclusions of reason, and therefore they ought not to be impugned, but always to be admitted." Coke says they are "a sure foundation or ground of art and a conclusion of reason, so sure and uncontrolled that they ought not to be questioned," and that a maxim is so called quia maxima ejus dignitas et certissima auctoritas, atque quod mazime omnibus probetur." Co. Litt. 11a. He says in another place: "A maxime is a proро- sition to be of all men confessed and grant- ed without proofe, argument, or discourse." See 20 L. Quart. & Rev. 283. Regula appears not to be quite the same thing as maxim. The Digest makes the line between regula, definitio, and sententia a narrow one. Sententia is used in several texts as equivalent to regula. Definitio, in Labeo, is really a rule of law. In Papinius it is more like responsa prudentis. In some editions of the Corpus Juris, maxims are given under the name of Regulæ et Sen- tentiæ Juris. See 20 L. Mag. & Rev. 283. Maxims in law are said to be somewhat like axioms in geometry. 1 Bla. Com. 68. They are principles and authorities, and part of the general customs or common law of the land, and are of the same strength as acts of parliament, when the judges have determined what is a maxim. This determination belongs to the court and not the jury; Termes de la Ley Doct. & Stud. Dial. 1, c. 8; they prove themselves; id. Maxims of the laware holden for law, and all other cases that may be applied to them shall be taken for granted; Co. Litt. 11, 67. See Plowd. 27 b. The alteration of any of the maxims of the common law is dangerous; 2 Inst. 210. See the introduction by W. F. Cooper to Barton's Maxims. Later writers place less value on maxims; thus: "It seems to me that legal maxims in general are little more than pert head- ings of chapters. They are rather minims than maxims, for they give not a particu- larly great, but a particularly small, amount of information. As often as not the excсер- tions and qualifications to them are more important than the so-called rules." 2 Steph. Hist. of Cr. L. 94. "We believe that not a single law maxim can be pointed out which is not obnoxious to objection." Towns. Sl. & Lib. § 88. "Many of the sayings that are dignified by the name of maxims are nothing but the obiter dicta of ancient judges who were fond of sententious phrases, and sometimes sacrificed accuracy of defini- tion to terseness of expression; and some have no definite meaning at all." E. Q. Keasbey, in 3 N. J. L. J. 160. "Maxims are not all of equal value; some ought to be amended and others discarded altogether; they are neither definitions nor treatises; they require the test of care- ful analysis; they are in many instances merely guide-posts pointing to the right road, but not the road itself." Prof. Jere- miah Smith, in 9 Harv. L. Rev. 26. "I need hardly repeat that I detest the attempt to fetter the law by maxims. They are almost invariably misleading; they are for the most part so large and general in their language that they always include something which really is not intended to be included in them." Lord Esher, M. R., in 19 Q. B. D. 653. Maxims have been divided, as to their origin, into three classes: Roman, Roman modified, and indigenous; 20 L. Mag. & Rev. 283. The application of the maxim to the case before the court is generally the only diffi- culty. The true method of making the ap- plication is to ascertain how the maxim arose, and to consider whether the case to which it is sought to be applied is of the same character, or whether it is an exceр- tion to an apparently general rule. This requires extended discussion, which it has received (so far as the more important maxims are concerned) in the able treatise on Legal Maxims by Broom. Non ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure quod est regula fiat. The law should not be taken from maxims, but maxims from the law; 9 Jurid. Rev. 307. The earliest work on maxims appears to have been that of Bacon (1630), followed by Noy (1641), Wingate (1658), Heath (Pleading, 1694), Francis (1728), Grounds and Rudiments of Law and Equity (an- onymous, 1751, of which Francis was the author), Branch (1753), Lofft (1776, in his Reports). In the present century, Broom (1845), Trayner (1872, 1883), Cotterell (1881, 1894), and Wharton