MASTER IN CHANCERY

4 definitions found across Law Mind sources

MASTER IN CHANCERYAuthored
The Law Mind • 1159 words
Definition
A master in chancery is a judicial officer appointed to assist a court of equity (chancery) in the administration of cases that require investigation, accounting, or fact-finding beyond what the court can conveniently perform on its own. The master does not decide cases independently but performs delegated judicial functions and reports findings back to the court, which may then adopt, modify, or reject those findings when entering its decree. The master's core functions historically included: examining witnesses and taking testimony, reviewing and stating accounts, computing interest and damages, investigating title questions and other factual inquiries, and administering oaths and affidavits. The master's report served as the evidentiary and analytical foundation upon which the chancellor issued a final decree. In modern American practice, the master in chancery has been substantially replaced — and formally succeeded — by the special master under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and equivalent state rules. The title itself survives in some state courts, particularly in jurisdictions that retain distinct chancery or equity divisions. ---
Common Confusion
MASTER IN CHANCERY vs. SPECIAL MASTER: These terms are often used interchangeably in modern legal writing, but the distinction matters for historical research. Master in chancery is the historical English and early American title, rooted in the Court of Chancery's institutional structure. Special master is the modernized, codified successor created by procedural rules reform — most prominently Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A researcher encountering "master in chancery" in a pre-twentieth-century source is reading about a common law equity institution; a researcher encountering "special master" in a post-1938 federal source is reading about a creature of procedural rule. The functions substantially overlap, but the legal authority, accountability, and scope of review differ across these two frameworks. MASTER IN CHANCERY vs. REFEREE: In some jurisdictions and historical periods, courts used referees to perform similar fact-finding functions. The referee operated more commonly in courts of law, while the master in chancery was tied to equity jurisdiction. The labels were sometimes used loosely and interchangeably in state courts, creating a sourcing hazard in historical research. ---
Why It Matters in Research
This term sits at the intersection of institutional history and procedural doctrine, which means researchers face distinct hazards depending on whether they are reading nineteenth-century equity practice sources or modern civil procedure materials. **Jurisdictional survival:** The master in chancery as an active office was abolished in federal courts under the Field Code reforms and, more decisively, in the merger of law and equity effected by the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which replaced the master in chancery with the special master under Rule 53. However, many state courts — particularly those in jurisdictions with distinct equity or chancery divisions, such as Delaware and New Jersey — retained the master in chancery title well into the twentieth century and some retain it today. Research in those state court systems requires awareness that the term still carries institutional significance rather than serving as historical shorthand. **Scope of reference traps:** Historical sources show significant variation in when courts were permitted to refer matters to a master. Bouvier's entries capture a frequently litigated question: courts were not supposed to refer matters to a master as a matter of convenience alone. Reference was appropriate for complex accounts, voluminous testimony, or matters requiring specialized computation — not simply because the court preferred to delegate. Researchers reading nineteenth-century equity opinions will encounter disputes about whether a reference to a master was proper in the first instance, a question that has no clean analogue in modern Rule 53 analysis. **Evidentiary weight of the master's report:** Under traditional chancery practice, the master's report carried presumptive validity, but exceptions could be filed and argued. The standard by which courts reviewed exceptions to master's reports evolved over time and varied across jurisdictions. This is a trap for researchers comparing pre- and post-1938 materials: the standard of review for a special master's report under Rule 53 has its own codified history (the 2003 amendments to Rule 53 significantly changed the default review standard), and that history should not be read backward onto older master-in-chancery practice. **Corpus connections:** Sources describing the master in chancery's role often appear in equity practice treatises, chancery court rules, and early state procedural codes. Cross-reference with the Law Mind encyclopedia entry on special masters (civpro_119) when tracing the institutional evolution from chancery office to modern procedural device. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's, Rapalje & Lawrence, and Bouvier's agree on the master's essential character: a subordinate judicial officer, not an independent decision-maker, whose function is investigative and reportorial. All three sources describe the master's role as producing findings that the chancellor could act on — not as issuing binding orders. Rapalje & Lawrence is the most analytically precise, characterizing the master's duties as "mixed" — partly judicial and partly ministerial. This framing is useful: the master exercised judgment in weighing evidence and framing conclusions, but lacked final decisional authority. This dual character explains why masters occupied an uncomfortable position in later procedural reform debates about delegation of judicial power. Bouvier's provides the most granular treatment of when reference to a master was appropriate and, notably, when it was not. The enumerated restrictions — including the prohibition on reference where the court already has sufficient facts before it, or where the evidence is all in writing and the decree can be rendered without difficulty — reflect a genuine common law constraint that courts of equity enforced with some rigor. This material is directly relevant to researchers examining nineteenth-century objections to the master reference procedure. What the historical dictionaries largely omit: the procedural mechanics for filing exceptions to a master's report, the treatment of master's fees (which were historically taxed as costs and often contested), and the English institutional origins of the office in the English Court of Chancery's staff of twelve masters. Researchers needing that depth should consult equity practice treatises of the era rather than relying on dictionary entries alone. ---
Jurisdictional Note
Delaware's Court of Chancery retains the master in chancery as an active judicial officer, making Delaware an exception to the general national trend toward replacement by the "special master" label. New Jersey has similarly maintained distinct chancery-adjacent procedures. Federal courts operate exclusively under Rule 53's special master framework. State courts vary widely, with some having abolished the office entirely and others retaining the title with modernized procedural rules governing the master's authority and the court's review of reports. ---
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Receivership and Appointment of Special Masters — Rule 53 (The Law Mind Civil Procedure & Evidence Encyclopedia, civpro_119) ---
Related Terms
Special Master Referee (judicial) Court of Chancery Equity Jurisdiction Rule 53 (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) Chancellor Decree Reference (procedural) Receiver Commissioner in Chancery
MASTER IN CHANCERYmain
Black's Law Dictionary • 1891
An of- ficer of a court of chancery who acts as an assistant to the judge or chancellor. His of- fice is to inquire into such matters as may be referred to him by the court, examine causes, take testimony, take accounts, compute dam-glish law. An assistant judge of the court ages, etc., reporting his findings to the court in such shape that a decree may be made; also to take oaths and affidavits and acknowl- edgments of deeds. In modern practice, many of the functions of a master are per- formed by clerks, commissioners, auditors, and referees, and in some jurisdictions the office has been superseded.
MASTER IN CHANCERYmain
Rapalje & Lawrence • 1883
-An officer of the Court of Chancery, whose duty it is to make inquiries (when so required by the court) into matters which the court cannot conveniently, without assistance, make for itself, and to report to the court his findings or conclusions with respect to such matters. The duties of the master are of a mixed character, being 6. During war, a master should be partly judicial and partly ministerial, the powers which he possesses in both respects attentive to the regulations as to sailing under convoy; for besides his responsi-
MASTER IN CHANCERYmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
An officer of a court of chancery, who acts as an assistant to the chancellor. 3 Edw. Ch. 458; 19 Ill. 131. A master in chancery is an officer ap pointed by a court to assist it in various proceedings incidental to the progress of the case before it, and is usually employed to take and state accounts, to take and re- port testimony, and to perform such duties as require computation of interest, the value of annuities, the amount of damages in particular cases, the auditing and ascer- taining of liens upon property involved,. and similar services. The information which he may communicate by his findings in such cases, upon the evidence presented to him, is merely advisory to the court, which it may accept and act upon, or dis- regard in whole or in part, according to its own judgment as to the weight of the evidence; 104 U. S. 420. The masters were originally clerks associated with the chancellor, to discharge some of the more mechanical duties of his office. They were called preceptores, and gradually increased in number un- til there were twelve of them. They obtained the title of masters in the reign of Edw. III. Their office was mainly judicial in its character, but some- times included ministerial offices. See 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 360-367; 1 Harr. Ch. 436; 1 Bail. Ch. 77; 1 Des. Ch. 587. The office was abolished in England by 15 & 16 Vict. c. 80. In the United States, officers of this name exist in many of the states, with similar powers to those exercised by the English masters, but variously modified, restricted, and enlarged by statute, and in some of the states similar officers are called commissioners and by other titles. The master's office is a branch of the court and he has power to control the proceedings of parties be- fore him: 3 Edw. Ch. 458. It is not within the general province of a master to pass upon all the issues in an equity case, nor is it competent for the court to refer the entire decision of a case to him without the consent of the parties. It cannot, of its own motion, or upon the request of one party, abdicate its duty to determine by its own judgment the con- troversy presented, and devolve that duty upon any of its officers; Field, J., in 129 U. S. 524. But when the parties consent to the reference of a case to a master to hear and decide all the issues therein and such reference is entered as a rule of the court, the determinations of the master are not subject to be set aside and disregarded at the mere discretion of the court. A refer- ence by consent of parties of an entire case, though not strictly a submission of the controversy to arbitration-a proceeding which is governed by special rule-is a sub- mission of the controversy to a tribunal of the parties' own selection, to be governed in its conduct by the rules applicable to the administration of justice in tribunals es- tablished by law. Its findings, like those of an independent tribunal, are to be taken as presumptively correct, to be re- viewed under the reservation contained in the consent and order of the court, when there has been manifest error in the con- sideration given to the evidence, or in the application of the law, but not other- wise; id. The reference of a whole case to a master has become in late years a matter of more common occurrence than formerly, though it has always been within the power of a court of chancery, with the consent of both parties, to order such a reference; 1 Sim. 134. The power is incident to all courts of superior jurisdiction; 97 U. S. 581; and is covered in most of the states by statutes; 129 U. S. 525, followed in 144 U. S. 585; 145 U. S. 132; 155 U. S. 637. In most jurisdictions, where an action is properly in equity, the court has a right to refer it to a master, without consent of parties; 25 Ia. 280; and such was the regu- lar practice in Pennsylvania until recent rules, made by the supreme court, required equity cases to be tried by the judges in open court on viva voce testimony. The duties of the masters are, generally; first, to take accounts and make computa- tions; 18 How. 295; 2 Munf. 129; 14 Vt. 501; Walk. Ch. 532; second, to make in- quiries and report facts; 3 W. & Μ. 258;8 Paige 305; 23 Conn. 529; 1 Stockt. Ch. 809; 2 Jones, Eq. 238; 5 Gray 423; 5 Cal. 90: third, to perform some special minis- terial acts directed by the court, such as the sale of property; 11 Humphr. 278; 25 Barb. 440; settlement of deeds; see 1 Cow. 711; appointment of new trustees, and the like; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 468; fourth, to dis- charge such duties as are specially charged upon them by statute. In the federal courts the judges are pro- hibited by statute from appointing as masters any relation within the degree of first cousin 1 Fed. Rep. 91; or except when special reasons exist therefor, a clerk of a federal court; 20 Stat. L. ch. 415; but consent of parties is held to be sufficient special reason; 3 Cliff. 146; 1 Fed. Rep. 91; Rule 75. Cases in which reference to the master should be ordere

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