tion, and taking cognizance of the duties which the citizen assumes when he enters into the military service of the country.1 In cases fitted for its determination, its judgment is final, conclusive, and authoritative. 1 Courts-martial derive their jurisdiction from and are regulated by an act of Congress, in which the crimes that may be committed, the manner of charging the accused, and of trial, and the punishments, are expressed in terms; or they get jurisdiction by a fair deduction from the definition of the crime that it comprehends, and that Congress meant to subject to punishment, or from the practice of the courts-martial of the nations generally. If such a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the charge it has been regularly convened to try, or if it inflicts a punishment forbidden by law, the civil courts, at the instance of the aggrieved, may inquire into the want of jurisdiction, and give redress by habeas corpus.2 Their jurisdiction extends to the trial and punishment of acts of officers which tend to bring disgrace upon the service of which they are members, whether those acts are done in the performance of military duties, in a civil position, in a social relation, or in private business. Any such court is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. When the object of its creation has been accomplished it is dissolved. To give effect to a sentence, it must appear affirmatively and unequivocally that the court was legally constituted, that it had jurisdiction, that all statutory regulations governing its proceedings had been complied with, and that its sentence was conformable to law. There are no presumptions in its favor as to these matters. The sentence of a general court-martial, in time of peace, to the effect that a commissioned officer be cashiered (dismissed from service), is inoperative until approved by the President in person; and that he approved it must be stated in positive terms, and not be left to be inferred argumentatively.4 Courts-martial are spoken of as general, regimental, and garrison. Those for the regulation of the militia are held in the States, and, in the main, resemble the courts provided for the army of the United States.5 See JUDGE ADVOCATE. Martial law. The law of military necessity in the actual presence of war, administered by the general of the army. 1 Records of Courts-Martial, 11 Op. Att. Gen. 138-39 (1865); Approval of Court-Martial Sentence, 15 id. 297303 (1877), note. • Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 82-83 (1857), cases, Wayne, J. See also Barrett v. Hopkins, 2 McCrary, 131 (1881); Re White, 17 F. R. 723 (1883); Keyes v. United States, 109 U. S. 340 (1883), cases. • Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 183 (1886), Gray, J. Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 555-57 (1887), cases, Waite, C. J.; Articles of War, No. 65, 2 St. 359, 367, с. 29. See, as to the army, R. S. § 1342, arts. 61-121; as to the navy, § 1624, art. 8; as to the militia, §§ 1649, 1658. Of necessity it is arbitrary, but it must be obeyed.1 It is the will of the general who commands the army. It supersedes all existing civil laws; and is regulated by a known system or code of laws. The commander is the legislator, judge, and executioner. There may or may not be a hearing upon the charges, at his will. This law is resorted to only in cases of necessity; which is to be shown affirmatively by the commander who assumes to exercise it.2 In time of insurrection it cannot be applied to citizens in States in which the courts are open and their process unobstructed.* For any abuse of the authority, the officer ordering and the person committing the act may be liable as trespassers. Martial law is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions; in reality it is no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as law. The necessity of order and discipline in the army alone gives it countenance; and therefore it is not permitted in time of peace, when the courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land. "Martial law" is exercised over all classes of persons indiscriminately, in the actual presence of war. "Military law" governs persons in the military service only, in time of peace as well as in time of war, by regulations previously defined; and is a permanent branch of the law of the land. See MILITARY; WAR. Whether gifts to a Roman Catholic church for paying for masses are legal "charities," has been variously decided. A devise to a church to be devoted to paying for the repose of the testator's soul is not a devise to a "charitable or religious use.". Such a devise or bequest is certainly a "religious use." If, therefore, in Pennsylvania, it is made within one month before death, it falls within the prohibition of the act of April 26, 1855.7 "Masses are religious ceremonials or observances, and come within the religious or pious uses which are upheld as public charities." In the case cited, the language of the will was that the residue of the estate should be disposed of "for charitable purposes, masses," etc.8 A bequest of all the residue of a testator's estate to his executors "for the purpose of having prayers offered for the repose of my soul, the souls of my fam1 United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 526 (1875), Waite, C. J.: s. c. 11 Ct. Cl. 439. 2 Re Egan, 5 Blatch. 321-23 (1866), Nelson, J. 3 Exp. Milligan, 4 Wall. 107, 123, 127 (1866). 4 See Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 128 (1851). 1 Bl. Com. 413. See 7 How. 59-88; 15 id. 115; 16 id. 144; 8 Op. Att. Gen. 365-74; 39 Ala. 658; 44 III. 153; 21 Ind. 377; 2 Story, Const. § 1342; North Am. Rev., Oct. 1861; 1 Lieber, Civ. Lib. 130. Re Estate of Power, 35 Leg. Int. 68 (Pa., 1878). Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Pa. 142, 146 (1880). 8 Schouler, Petitioner, 134 Mass. 427 (1883).