Definition
The human race, collectively — all persons of the species regardless of sex. In legal usage, MANKIND encompasses both males and females unless a specific statutory or contextual reading limits the term otherwise. The word appears most frequently in older criminal statutes (particularly those defining offenses against persons), constitutional and philosophical legal texts, and common law treatises where it was used to denote the full human species as the object of legal protection or moral obligation.
Bouvier introduces a tension: his entry defines MANKIND as "persons of the male sex; the human species" — holding both meanings simultaneously. This ambiguity is not merely historical trivia. It reflects a genuine drafting instability in older statutes and instruments, where the word could plausibly be read either as genus (all humans) or sex-specific (males only), depending on context.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "The human race in its entirety" or, alternatively, "men collectively, as opposed to all women."
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "The human race; man, taken collectively" — but also "Men, as distinguished from women; the male portion of the human race," citing Leviticus xviii. 22.
The gap between common and legal meaning is not a reversal but a resolution. Both historical common usage and historical legal usage carried the same internal ambiguity. Legal sources, however, moved toward clarifying that MANKIND in law includes women — a resolution ordinary language did not always make. Researchers reading older statutes must not assume that common meaning at the time of drafting governed; the legal canon of construction tilted toward the inclusive reading.
Common Confusion
MANKIND vs. MAN (in law): The two terms share similar interpretive history. MAN, in many common law contexts, was also held to include women for purposes of statutory coverage. The inclusive construction applied to MANKIND is an extension of the same principle applied to MAN. Anderson's entry for MANKIND simply redirects to MAN, confirming the terms were treated as functionally parallel in interpretive doctrine. Researchers should not assume one term is broader than the other without examining the specific instrument and jurisdiction.
MANKIND vs. PERSON: In modern drafting, PERSON has entirely displaced MANKIND and MAN as the preferred neutral term. Where historical instruments used MANKIND, courts applying those instruments may have needed to resolve the sex-inclusion question; modern instruments using PERSON do not.
Why It Matters in Research
The primary research trap with MANKIND is the assumption that a historical statute using the term excluded women from its coverage or protections. Black's Law Dictionary (both first and second editions) explicitly rejects this reading, noting that females may be included. Researchers analyzing historical criminal statutes — particularly offenses against persons, sodomy laws referencing Leviticus, or early civil rights instruments — must not treat MANKIND as a term of sex limitation without affirmative evidence that the drafter intended restriction.
The Bouvier entry is the most problematic source here. His dual definition ("persons of the male sex; the human species") reflects the word's genuine semantic instability in the early nineteenth century. A researcher relying solely on Bouvier to argue that a pre-Civil War statute using MANKIND applied only to males would be on weak footing given the contrary Black's construction.
The Fortescue citation appearing in both Black's editions (Fortesc. 91) points to Sir John Fortescue's De Laudibus Legum Angliae, a foundational common law text. The citation grounds the inclusive reading in classical common law authority, not merely in modern liberal construction. This strengthens the argument that the gender-inclusive reading of MANKIND was not a late revision but was present in the tradition from early on.
For corpus researchers working in Law Mind: expect MANKIND to appear in criminal law contexts (offenses against persons or nature), in natural law and constitutional theory passages, and in statutory preambles. The term is largely absent from modern legal instruments. Its appearance in a source is itself a dating signal — heavy use suggests pre-twentieth century drafting.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's (1st and 2nd editions) are in complete agreement, offering identical entries: the race or species of human beings, with females included. The Fortescue citation is carried in both without elaboration. Neither edition engages with Bouvier's competing male-sex-specific reading, which is notable — Black's simply asserts the inclusive definition as settled.
Bouvier's entry is the outlier and the most historically revealing. By listing "persons of the male sex" first, followed by "the human species," Bouvier records the word's semantic contest rather than resolving it. His citation to 25 Hen. (presumably a Henrician statute) suggests the male-specific reading had actual statutory grounding in English law at some points, even if courts and treatise writers later favored the inclusive construction.
Anderson adds nothing substantive, redirecting to MAN without elaboration — suggesting the two terms were considered interchangeable in interpretive treatment.
Webster's 1913 confirms that the ambiguity was not confined to legal vocabulary. The dual common meaning (universal human race vs. males specifically) was alive in general usage through the nineteenth century. Legal sources resolved the tension differently than popular usage sometimes did.
Jurisdictional Note
No significant modern jurisdictional variation exists because MANKIND has been displaced by PERSON or gender-neutral alternatives in virtually all current drafting. Variation in historical jurisdictions is possible: English statutes using MANKIND may have been construed differently than American statutes using the same term, and researchers should examine the relevant common law tradition for the jurisdiction and era in question.