Definition
A Latin adverb meaning "more," "more fully," "more in number," or "rather." MAGIS does not function as a standalone legal term but appears as a component of Latin maxims that carry substantive doctrinal weight in Anglo-American common law. Its primary role is comparative — indicating a preference, a greater degree, or the prevailing interpretive force of one construction over another.
The two maxims in which MAGIS most commonly appears in legal sources are:
1. Magis de bono quam de malo lex intendit — "The law favors a good rather than a bad construction." Where the words of an agreement or instrument are susceptible of two meanings, one lawful and one unlawful, the lawful construction is preferred. This reflects the broader principle of charitable construction in the interpretation of contracts, deeds, and conditions.
2. Magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum — "The more worthy draws to itself the less worthy." Where a more significant legal matter and a lesser one are joined, the lesser follows the greater. This principle appears in contexts involving joinder, merger, and the absorption of minor claims or interests by dominant ones.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): In contemporary usage outside law, "magis" is encountered primarily in religious and philosophical contexts — specifically Ignatian spirituality, where it denotes a principle of striving to do more in service of a higher purpose.
Historical common usage: In classical Latin, magis is a straightforward comparative adverb derived from magnus, meaning simply "more" or "to a greater degree." No specialized non-legal meaning attached to it in English usage.
Editorial note: The religious and philosophical use of "magis" in modern English is wholly unrelated to its legal function. Researchers encountering the term in historical legal texts should read it as a plain Latin comparative, not as a reference to any theological principle.
Why It Matters in Research
MAGIS matters to corpus researchers not as a term of art in itself but as a reliable signal that a Latin maxim of interpretive doctrine follows. When scanning historical legal texts — treatises, pleading manuals, equity reports, and early common law digests — the appearance of magis typically precedes or forms part of a maxim that the author is deploying to justify a preferred construction.
The maxim magis de bono quam de malo lex intendit has particular research relevance in contract and conveyancing history. It underlies the interpretive preference for legality that courts applied when construing ambiguous conditions in bonds, covenants, and testamentary instruments. Researchers working in equity, wills, or early commercial instruments should treat this maxim as a marker of the court's reasoning about ambiguity — it signals not merely that a lawful reading was chosen, but that the court treated lawfulness as a thumb on the interpretive scale.
The maxim magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum has relevance in procedural and property contexts. It surfaces in arguments about merger of estates, absorption of lesser interests by dominant titles, and joinder questions. Burrill's citation to the Year Books (T. 20 Hen. VI) places this principle deep in the medieval common law tradition, and researchers should expect to find it in pre-modern pleading and property materials rather than in modern statutory analysis.
A practical trap: Latin maxims using magis were frequently abbreviated or paraphrased in historical reporters, and the maxim itself was sometimes invoked without full quotation. Researchers should search both the Latin phrase and its English translation equivalent when working through historical digests.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's (1st and 2nd editions) are in close agreement, both presenting MAGIS primarily through the lens of the de bono quam de malo maxim, with the example of a bond conditioned "to assign all offices" as the illustrative case — an example drawn from Coke on Littleton (Co. Litt. 78b), a primary source that lends the maxim authoritative weight. The two editions differ only in minor typographic rendering.
Burrill takes a different emphasis, leading instead with magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum and citing the Year Books directly. This reflects Burrill's broader reliance on medieval English authority and his tendency to foreground procedural and hierarchical principles alongside interpretive ones.
Neither Black's nor Burrill treats MAGIS as an independent legal term requiring extended definition — both use the entry as a gateway to the maxims. This is appropriate, but it means that researchers relying solely on these sources may underestimate how frequently the de bono maxim was deployed in equity and chancery reasoning beyond the contract context illustrated by the bond example.
No historical dictionary in the Law Mind corpus provides a comprehensive survey of all maxims in which magis appears, so the entry-level definitions should be treated as representative, not exhaustive.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
See Law Mind Encyclopedia: Maxims of Law; Construction and Interpretation of Instruments.