Definition
A phrase describing incorporeal rights and interests that, by their nature, cannot be transferred by physical delivery or livery of seisin. Because such interests have no physical existence — they exist only in contemplation of law — they can only pass from one party to another by delivery of a deed. In contrast, corporeal interests (tangible property capable of physical possession) were said to "lie in livery," meaning they could be conveyed by the ancient ceremony of livery of seisin on the land itself.
The classic examples of interests lying in grant include easements, advowsons, rents, commons, and other incorporeal hereditaments. You cannot hand someone a right-of-way across a field the same way you might hand over a coin or walk a buyer around a parcel of land. The interest exists only as a legal concept, so the deed is not merely evidence of the transfer — it is the transfer.
Common Confusion
LYING IN GRANT vs. LYING IN LIVERY: These are opposing categories of the same conceptual framework. Corporeal hereditaments (land capable of physical entry and use) traditionally lay in livery and passed by the act of livery of seisin — a ceremonial act performed on the land. Incorporeal hereditaments lay in grant and passed only by deed. The distinction was practically crucial before the Statute of Uses (1535) and the Statute of Frauds (1677) progressively subordinated ceremony to documentation. Modern researchers sometimes read historical conveyancing records without appreciating that an attempt to convey an incorporeal interest by livery alone would have been void at common law.
Why It Matters in Research
This term is primarily a historical marker. Researchers encountering it in older English or early American property documents need to recognize that it signals an incorporeal right and that the conveyancing method described is deed-based, not ceremonial. Its practical importance collapsed progressively as deed requirements became universal for all real property transfers under statutes of frauds across common law jurisdictions, eliminating the need to distinguish which category of interest was being transferred.
Several research traps arise:
First, historical sources discussing "grant" as a mode of conveyance often use "lying in grant" as a term of art distinguishing incorporeal from corporeal — but later sources using "grant" simply mean any deed-based conveyance. The specialized meaning of the phrase becomes diluted in 19th-century American sources.
Second, because easements and other incorporeal hereditaments lie in grant, their creation and transfer disputes in historical case law will often invoke this principle. A court ruling that an interest lies in grant is also ruling, implicitly, that livery of seisin could not have created it — which has chain-of-title consequences.
Third, researchers working across jurisdictions should be alert to the fact that early American courts imported this English common law framework but applied it unevenly as statutory deed requirements evolved at different paces in different states.
The corpus connection to easements — particularly express grant easements — is direct. Any historical analysis of easement creation by express grant will likely pass through this conceptual territory.
Historical Dictionary Support
The three source dictionaries are in close agreement on substance, with minor differences in elaboration. Both editions of Black's define the phrase as applying to incorporeal rights incapable of manual tradition, passing by deed delivery. Bouvier's adds the most analytically useful framing: that such things "exist only in idea, in contemplation of law," which captures the philosophical basis of the distinction rather than merely its mechanical consequence. Bouvier also cross-references GRANT, LIVERY OF SEISIN, and SEISIN, signaling that the phrase should not be read in isolation from the broader conveyancing framework.
None of the historical dictionaries flag what researchers most need to know: that the practical significance of the distinction was largely historical even at the time these entries were written. By the late 19th century, statutes of frauds had made written instruments standard for all real property transfers, rendering the lying-in-grant / lying-in-livery distinction largely academic except as a tool for interpreting earlier conveyances and understanding the theoretical basis of incorporeal hereditaments.
Jurisdictional Note
The distinction between lying in grant and lying in livery is a product of English common law and was received into American law, but American jurisdictions moved at varying speeds to require deeds for all property transfers. In most U.S. states today, the distinction is legally inert — all real property interests pass by written instrument. Its importance in American legal research is therefore almost exclusively historical.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Property Law Encyclopedia: Easements — Creation by Express Grant or Reservation