Definition
"Likewise" is a connective adverb meaning "in like manner," "also," "moreover," or "too." In ordinary drafting it links clauses or sentences to indicate that what follows applies in the same way as what precedes. In legal instruments — particularly wills and deeds — the word carries interpretive weight beyond simple addition: courts have examined whether "likewise" at the opening of a new clause severs what follows from a condition or contingency expressed earlier in the document, or whether it merely continues the same conditional scheme.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): In a similar manner; also; moreover; too. Also used colloquially as a social response meaning "the same to you."
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): In like manner; also; moreover; too. Used in both formal and scriptural prose to connect parallel statements.
The common and legal meanings are essentially the same in isolation. The legal significance emerges not from any specialized definition but from interpretive context: when "likewise" heads a clause in a will, the question is whether it incorporates the surrounding conditional language or breaks free of it. That is a question of construction, not vocabulary, and ordinary readers would have no reason to anticipate it.
Common Confusion
"Likewise" is occasionally confused with "in the same manner" or "as aforesaid" in older instruments. These phrases are not interchangeable in construction analysis: "as aforesaid" typically incorporates all prior conditions by reference, while "likewise" may or may not do so depending on context. Drafters who use "likewise" intending a clean severance — or full incorporation — risk ambiguity. Modern drafting guidance generally recommends explicit conditional language over reliance on "likewise" to carry interpretive weight.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encountering "likewise" in historical wills, deeds, or conveyances should treat it as a flag for a construction dispute rather than a neutral connector. The central issue in testamentary contexts is severance: does "likewise" at the start of a bequest clause import a condition from a prior clause, or does it stand independently? Bouvier cites Jarman on Wills for the proposition that "likewise" sometimes denotes severance from a previously expressed contingency — but immediately qualifies that the context of the will may rebut this. That tension is the research problem. A bequest reading "I give Blackacre to A; likewise I give Whiteacre to B" may or may not carry over a prior condition (such as survivorship or reaching a certain age) depending on the surrounding language.
In corpus research, this means "likewise" in a will or settlement instrument warrants closer examination of the document structure: What contingency or condition precedes it? Is the clause introduced by "likewise" substantively parallel to the prior clause, or does it introduce a new subject? Courts have resolved this fact-specifically, which is why Bouvier cites case law rather than offering a firm rule.
For legislative drafting and statutory interpretation, "likewise" functions more predictably as a simple parallel connector and rarely generates the same construction disputes. The interpretive complexity is concentrated in private instruments, especially wills.
Researchers using 19th-century English chancery reports (the De Gex, Macnaghten & Gordon series and the Beavan reports cited by Bouvier) will find relevant will construction cases. These reports are organized by court term and reporter, not by subject, so the Bouvier citations are a useful starting point for tracing the doctrine.
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier defines "likewise" functionally — "in like manner; also; moreover; too" — in alignment with Webster's 1913 and with ordinary usage. The legal content in Bouvier is entirely in the will-construction note: the word "sometimes" doing meaningful work to signal that no firm rule existed. Bouvier cites Jarman's Wills (a leading 19th-century English treatise on testamentary construction) and two English chancery decisions, indicating the doctrine was developed primarily in English equity courts and imported into American practice through treatise literature.
What Bouvier does not address is the use of "likewise" in statutes or contracts, where the interpretive stakes differ. Nor does it address modern American will construction doctrine, which has largely moved toward holistic intent analysis over keyword-based rules. Researchers relying on Bouvier for guidance on "likewise" in contemporary instruments should treat it as historical context only.