Definition
"Like" in legal usage means equal in quantity, quality, or degree, or sufficiently similar in essential characteristics to satisfy a legal standard, requirement, or comparison. The term occupies a functional middle ground between "identical" and "similar," and its precise meaning in any given context depends on the interpretive framework applied.
Two primary senses operate in legal texts:
1. Substantially equivalent. In statutory and contractual contexts, "like" often means corresponding in all material or essential respects, without requiring exact identity in every particular. A "like offense" means an offense sharing the same essential elements, not necessarily a word-for-word duplicate.
2. Equal in kind or class. In tax law, property law, and commercial law, "like" describes items of the same nature or character, as distinct from items of identical specification. This sense is most prominent in the doctrine of like-kind exchanges under tax law, where the comparison is made at the level of asset class, not individual asset attributes.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Similar; resembling; probable or likely; inclined toward.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "Having the same, or nearly the same, appearance, qualities, or characteristics; resembling; similar to."
The gap between common and legal meaning is subtle but consequential. In ordinary English, "like" comfortably tolerates near-resemblance — things that are approximately similar. In legal instruments and statutes, courts have repeatedly been asked to determine whether "like" demands exact correspondence or permits substantial equivalence. The answer has not been uniform, and treating "like" as a loose synonym for "similar" can produce the wrong analytical result in contexts where legislatures or drafters intended a more exacting standard.
Common Confusion
"Like" versus "same": These terms are not interchangeable in legal texts. "Same" typically signals numerical identity — the identical thing. "Like" signals qualitative or categorical equivalence, which may include items that are not numerically identical. Anderson's makes this explicit: "not, necessarily, identical with." The confusion matters most in penal statutes (double jeopardy analysis), property descriptions, and tax characterization.
"Like" versus "similar": In many contexts these words are treated as synonyms, but courts have occasionally distinguished them, reading "like" as demanding closer correspondence than "similar." Drafters who use both words in the same instrument invite arguments that each must mean something different.
Why It Matters in Research
The word "like" is one of the most deceptively ordinary words in legal texts, and researchers encounter it in at least three high-stakes settings where its exact scope is disputed.
First, in tax and property law, the phrase "like-kind" in IRC § 1031 has generated extensive administrative guidance and litigation over what constitutes sufficient categorical equivalence. The legal standard there is not factual similarity between two specific parcels or assets — it is a classification question about the nature of the property. Historical sources will not illuminate the modern tax doctrine; researchers must move to the regulatory and administrative materials.
Second, in criminal law and sentencing, "like offense" language appears in recidivism statutes, sex offender registration schemes, and sentencing enhancement provisions. Whether an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a "like offense" turns on element-by-element comparison in some jurisdictions and a broader equivalence analysis in others. Pre-twentieth-century dictionary sources can provide baseline interpretive evidence here, but the analysis is now governed largely by jurisdiction-specific case law.
Third, in contract interpretation, "like quality," "like kind," and "like character" appear in commercial agreements, insurance policies, and real property instruments. Whether these phrases demand strict equivalence or permit substitution is a recurring source of dispute. Historical dictionary definitions — which confirm that "like" does not mean "identical" — may be introduced in litigation to support a flexible reading.
Researchers working backward through historical sources should be aware that the term's general meaning has been consistent across centuries (resemblance without identity), but its application has become increasingly specialized and context-dependent in modern statutory law.
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier and Anderson agree on the foundational point: "like" does not mean identical. Bouvier defines it as "equal in quantity, quality, or degree, exactly corresponding," but then immediately qualifies this with authority for the proposition that "like does not necessarily mean the same in all parts." Anderson reinforces this with a spare but direct note: "not, necessarily, identical with."
The tension in Bouvier's own entry — leading with "exactly corresponding" and then citing authority for the opposite — reflects genuine interpretive ambiguity that courts were already resolving in the nineteenth century. The Massachusetts authority Bouvier cites for "like offence" (sameness in all essential parts) shows that even in the criminal context, the standard was essentials-based, not total identity.
Neither historical dictionary addresses the modern tax law sense of "like-kind," which is a product of twentieth-century federal statutory interpretation and has no meaningful analog in the older sources.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
tax_149: Like-Kind Exchanges (The Law Mind Tax Encyclopedia)
property_51: Real Estate Transactions — Like-Kind Exchanges (IRC 1031) (The Law Mind Property Law Encyclopedia)