LIGION

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

LIGIONAuthored
The Law Mind • 750 words
Definition
Ligion is an archaic legal term denoting the offense of cohabiting with more than one woman simultaneously. Under federal law as it existed in the late nineteenth century — specifically Section 3 of the Act of March 22, 1882 — ligion was a distinct statutory crime targeting plural cohabitation, closely associated with anti-polygamy enforcement in United States territories. The offense did not require proof of a formal plural marriage ceremony, nor did it require evidence of sexual intercourse or shared sleeping arrangements. It was established by proof that a man lived in the same household with two women, shared meals with them on a regular and roughly equal basis (characterized in practice as approximately one-third of his time at each table), and held both women out to the public — through language or conduct — as his wives.
Common Confusion
Ligion is frequently conflated with polygamy, but the two are legally distinct. Polygamy, in its strict sense, requires proof of multiple marriage contracts — ceremonies, solemnizations, or legally recognized unions. Ligion required none of this. It was a cohabitation offense: the crime lay in the domestic arrangement and public representation, not in the validity or existence of any marriage. This distinction was operationally significant in anti-polygamy prosecutions in Utah and other territories, where formal plural marriage records were often unavailable or inaccessible to prosecutors. Ligion provided an alternative charge requiring a lower evidentiary threshold. Researchers who treat ligion and polygamy as synonyms will misread the prosecutorial strategy and the legislative intent of the 1882 Act.
Why It Matters in Research
Ligion is a term that will not appear in modern legal sources. It belongs almost entirely to the narrow body of federal territorial law generated by the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862 and its successor, the Edmunds Act of March 22, 1882. The 1882 Act created ligion as a separate offense precisely because bigamy charges under the 1862 Act had proven difficult to prosecute — plural marriages in Latter-day Saint practice often left no accessible paper record, and eyewitness testimony to ceremonies was hard to obtain. Researchers encountering ligion in nineteenth-century territorial court records, congressional debates, or legal commentary should understand it as a prosecutorial workaround: an offense defined in behavioral and reputational terms rather than documentary ones. The elements — shared household, shared meals, public representation as wives — were observable facts a neighbor or community member could testify to without access to any church record or ceremony. The term is rare even in historical legal dictionaries. Its absence from most reference works reflects how quickly the social and legal context that generated it disappeared. After federal pressure, the formal renunciation of plural marriage doctrine, and eventual Utah statehood in 1896, the offense became a dead letter. Researchers working in federal territorial records from the 1882–1896 period should be alert to it; those working outside that window are unlikely to encounter it at all. Anderson's cross-reference to "Cohabit, 2" signals that the full doctrinal elaboration in that source appears under the cohabitation entry, not under ligion itself — a reminder that historical dictionaries often scatter related material across multiple headwords.
Historical Dictionary Support
Anderson's Dictionary of Law provides the only dictionary-level definition identified in the Law Mind corpus. The entry is brief and functional: it recites the statutory elements, notes the meal-sharing standard as the operative measure of cohabitation, and clarifies that sexual congress is not an element of the offense. Anderson's cross-reference to Cohabit suggests the compiler treated ligion as a derivative or application of the broader cohabitation concept rather than a freestanding doctrinal category. No other historical dictionaries in the corpus — including Bouvier's or Black's early editions — appear to carry a dedicated entry for this term. This absence likely reflects both the term's narrow statutory origin and its rapid obsolescence. Researchers relying solely on Bouvier or Black for this period will find the offense treated, if at all, under polygamy or cohabitation headings, without the specific ligion terminology.
Jurisdictional Note
Ligion as a named offense existed under federal territorial law and applied primarily in Utah Territory and other territories subject to the Edmunds Act. It had no direct common law counterpart and was not adopted into state criminal codes after territorial reorganization. It has no operative meaning in modern American jurisdictions.
Related Terms
Cohabitation — Bigamy — Polygamy — Edmunds Act — Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act — Plural Marriage — Territorial Law — Unlawful Cohabitation
LIGIONmain
Anderson's Dictionary of Law • 1890
The offense of cohabiting with more than one woman, created by § 3 of the act of March 22, 1882, is committed by a man who lives in the same house with two women, and eats at their tables one-third of his time, or thereabouts, and holds them out to the world, by his language or conduct, as his wives. It is not necessary that he and the women, or either of them, shall sleep together. See СонавІт, 2. The uniform current of authority is, that for the purposes of prosecution the offense of bigamy or polygamy can be committed but once prior to the time the prosecution is instituted. See further Act of March 3, 1888, under POLYGAMY. 122 St. L. 30-32. See 116 U. S. 56-57; 118 id. 350. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 35, 41 (1885), Matthews, J. Approved, 116 id. 72, infra. * Cannon v. United States, 116 U. S. 55 (1885), Blatchford, J. Afterward, May 10, 1886, the court decided that it had no jurisdiction under the writ of error in the case, as see 118 U. S. 354-55. 1 See 1 Bl. Com. 406. 2 F. essoine, excuse. See 3 Bl. Com. 277. F. establir: L. stabilis, steady, firm: stare, to stand. Smith v. Forrest, 49 N. H. 237 (1870), Nesmith, J. • [Ketchum v. City of Buffalo, 21 Barb. 298, 296 (1854); 27 id. 260; 28 id. 65. 7 Ketchum v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 361 (1856). • Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. 455 (1866). • Newton v. Mahoning County, 100 U. S. 562 (1879); Mead v. Ballard, 7 Wall. 290 (1868); Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 796 (1879); 18 III. 463. 10 Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 210 (1859). 11 Ware v. United States, 4 Wall. 632 (1866). 121 Story, Const. § 454. the lords temporal, and the commons.3 3. (1) (Subjective idea.) Estate in lands, tenements, and hereditaments: such interest as the tenant has therein. 4 In Latin status, the condition or circumstances in which the owner stands with regard to his property. Does not import a fee or even a freehold, but any legal interest in land. The quantity of interest which a person has, from absolute ownership down to naked possession.6 The condition, in respect to property, of an individual: as, in speaking of the estate of an insolvent or of a deceased person. Here, indebtedness, as well as ownership, is part of the idea. Debts and assets together constitute the estate; if an estate consisted of assets only, the expression insolvent estate would be a misnomer." (2) (Objective idea.) The thing itself of which one is owner; any species of property, real or personal. Equivalent to the more technical expression, "things real and things personal." More specifically, realty, land, "landed estate." 8 Sometimes excludes realty; sometimes is a word of mere local description, as, "my estate at" such a place. But when it can be construed to intend all one's realty it carries a fee, as, in devises." Unless limited by some special epithet or some association, construed to mean all one's property; but "real" or "personal" puts the matter beyond cavil. 10 1 F. estat: L. status: stare, to stand. 2 State v. Bishop, 15 Me. 124 (1838). 3 See 1 Bl. Com. 153, 157. 42 Bl. Com. 103; 66 Ga. 711; 2 Wall. 500. Inhabitants of Sunbury v. Inhabitants of Stow, 13 Mass. *464 (1816). Jackson v. Parker, 9 Cow. 81 (1828), Savage, C. J.; Moody v. Farr, 33 Miss. 195 (1857). See Abbott's Law Dict., Estate, 4; Davis v. Elkins, 9 La. 142 (1835). • See Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 241 (1859). • See Bates v. Sparrell, 10 Mass. 324 (1813); Godfrey v. Humphrey, 18 Pick. 539 (1837); Leland v. Adams, 9 Gray, 175 (1857), cases; Canedy v. Jones, 19 S. C. 301 (1882). 10 Hooper v. Hooper, 9 Cush. 128 (1851); Archer v. Deneale, 1 Pet. 589 (1828); Cook v. Lanning, 40 N. J. E. 372 (1885). See also 3 Cranch, 97; 2 MacA. 70; 2 Cranch, С. С. 640; 16 Conn. 1; 46 III. 32; 55 Me. 287; 32 Miss. 107; 14 N. J. L. 53, 68; 14 N. J. E. 51; 40 id. 36-37, 372; 6 Johns. 185; 11 id. 365; 8 R. I. 384; 26 Vt. 260.

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