Definition
A Latin term carrying two distinct legal meanings, both drawn from the verb *licere* (to be permitted or allowed):
1. "Although; notwithstanding." Used as a conjunction in pleading and legal instruments to introduce a subordinate clause that concedes a fact while affirming the principal claim. In this sense, *licet* does not weaken the assertion that follows — it imports a direct affirmation of the main proposition despite the conceded circumstance.
2. "It is allowed; it is lawful; it is permissible." Used as a declarative in maxims and legal commentary to signal that a particular act or course of conduct falls within the bounds of law. In this sense, *licet* is the affirmative counterpart to terms like *non licet* (it is not permitted).
Both meanings appear throughout the classical common law corpus. Context — whether *licet* introduces a clause or stands as a predicate — determines which reading applies.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Not a standard English word; encountered almost exclusively in legal or ecclesiastical Latin contexts, where it means "although" or "it is permitted."
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Not separately entered; treated as a Latin term used in law and formal writing.
The gap worth noting is small but consequential: a reader encountering *licet* in an old pleading form might instinctively read it as a hedging word — "although" suggesting doubt or qualification — when in fact its function in pleading was the opposite. Courts and treatise writers treated *licet* as carrying a positive affirmation of the fact to which the concession was attached.
Common Confusion
The two meanings of *licet* can pull a reader in different directions. When *licet* appears mid-sentence as a conjunction ("*licet* the defendant often requested..."), it means "although." When it appears in a maxim or short declaration ("*licet* hoc facere"), it means "it is lawful to do this." Researchers unfamiliar with Latin pleading conventions sometimes read the conjunctive *licet* as a permissive statement, or vice versa. The phrase *non licet* — it is not permitted — appears frequently in maxims and should not be confused with the conjunctive negative construction *licet non* (although not).
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers working with pre-nineteenth-century English pleadings will encounter *licet* most often in the stock phrase *licet sæpius requisitus* — "although often requested" — a formulaic clause inserted in debt and contract declarations alleging that the defendant failed to pay or perform despite repeated demands. The phrase was a term of art, not a factual narration requiring proof in the modern sense, and its presence or absence in a declaration carried procedural significance. Chitty's Pleading treatises explain the clause and its translation into anglicized forms, and researchers reading early American precedents will find direct carry-overs from English practice.
In the second sense — *licet* as permissibility — the term anchors a cluster of maxims that appear in Justinian's Digest and recur throughout common law commentary. The maxim *non omne quod licet honestum est* ("not everything that is lawful is honorable") and *non debet, cui plus licet, quod minus est non licere* are frequently cited in equity and natural law discussions. These maxims carry moral-philosophical weight beyond their literal legal content, and researchers should be alert to the difference between their use as rhetorical flourishes and their use as operative legal propositions.
Because *licet* is purely Latin and disappeared from ordinary pleading when Latin was abolished in English courts (1733 in common law courts, with exceptions), researchers working the corpus boundary between pre- and post-abolition practice will find the term on only one side of that line. Post-abolition documents that retain *licet* are either quoting older forms, reproducing maxims, or operating in ecclesiastical or civil law contexts.
The maxim *licet dispositio de interesse futuro sit inutilis, tamen potest fieri declaratio præcedens quæ sortiatur effectum, interveniente novo actu* — "although a disposition of a future interest is inoperative, yet a preceding declaration may be made which takes effect upon a new intervening act" — appears in property law discussions and is relevant to springing uses and executory interests. Researchers in that area should note that this maxim is doing substantive doctrinal work, not merely ornamental Latin.
Historical Dictionary Support
The three source dictionaries handle *licet* with reasonable consistency. Black's (both editions) leads with the conjunctive meaning and notes the direct-affirmation function, while Burrill leads with the permissive meaning and gives greater attention to the maxims. The sources agree that both meanings derive from *licere* and that context governs interpretation.
Burrill's citation to the Digest (50.17.144) for *non omne quod licet honestum est* is standard and reflects the civilian tradition's influence on equity maxims. The citations in Black's 2nd edition to Yelverton and Chitty ground the pleading usage in practical English sources.
None of the historical dictionaries adequately flags the abolition-of-Latin context, which is the most important practical fact for a researcher trying to understand why *licet* appears in some records and not others. Nor do they distinguish carefully between *licet* operating as a maxim-element and *licet* operating as a pleading term of art — a distinction that matters for how much legal weight to assign the term in any given document.
Jurisdictional Note
The pleading use of *licet sæpius requisitus* was transplanted into early American practice from English forms and appears in American declarations through the late eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, varying by state depending on how quickly each jurisdiction reformed its pleading conventions. Civil law jurisdictions in the United States may encounter *licet* in maxim form through the civilian tradition rather than through common law pleading.