Definition
Capable of being levied. A thing, interest, or sum is leviable when it may lawfully be assessed, collected, or seized through a levy. The term applies most often in two contexts: (1) taxes, duties, or assessments that can legally be imposed and collected; and (2) property or interests in property that are subject to seizure under a writ of execution or similar legal process. A leviable interest in property is one on which a creditor may execute — meaning the interest is sufficiently definite, transferable, and vested to be reached by legal process.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Able to be levied.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Fit to be levied; capable of being assessed and collected; as, sums leviable by course of law.
The gap between common and legal usage is narrow but worth noting. In ordinary language, "leviable" applies almost exclusively to taxes or financial assessments. In legal usage, the term extends to property interests subject to execution — a broader application that matters significantly in creditor-debtor and judgment enforcement contexts.
Common Confusion
LEVIABLE vs. ATTACHABLE: These terms are sometimes used interchangeably but describe legally distinct processes. Attachment typically occurs before judgment, securing property against dissipation during litigation. A levy under execution occurs after judgment. An interest may be attachable but not yet leviable, or conditions may affect one process but not the other. Researchers working in execution and enforcement materials should not assume interchangeability.
LEVIABLE INTEREST vs. LEGAL TITLE: A leviable interest does not require full legal title. Courts have found that equitable interests and possessory rights may or may not qualify depending on whether they are sufficiently concrete to be reached by execution. The question of what makes an interest "leviable" has generated case law that bare definitions do not resolve.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers will encounter "leviable" most frequently in three areas of the Law Mind corpus: tax law, judgment enforcement, and property law as it intersects with creditor remedies.
In tax materials, the term describes the authority to impose and collect — a constitutional and statutory question. An assessment may be authorized but still fail the leviable standard if procedural prerequisites have not been met.
In execution and sheriff's return materials, the critical research question is whether a particular interest in property qualifies. Historical courts were not uniform. A preemption claim, for example, was held not to be a leviable interest (Bray v. Ragsdale, 53 Mo. 172), which illustrates that inchoate or contingent rights frequently fell outside the definition. Researchers tracing the scope of leviable interests through 19th-century Missouri, Minnesota, and federal materials will find the concept litigated around exactly these boundary cases.
Rapalje & Lawrence groups "leviable" with related levy terms — levied, levied his certain plaint, levied upon — which signals that historical practitioners understood these as a cluster of related concepts. Researchers using older digests should check entries for all variants, as relevant cases may be indexed under any of these headings rather than "leviable" specifically.
The term largely disappeared from modern legal drafting, replaced by more specific statutory language in execution statutes and tax codes. This means primary sources from the late 19th and early 20th centuries are more likely to use "leviable" expressly; later materials may address the same legal question without using the word.
Historical Dictionary Support
All three source dictionaries agree on the core meaning: that which may be levied. Black's (1st ed.) states this without elaboration. Black's (2nd ed.) adds the important qualification of "proper or permissible subject," which shifts the definition from purely descriptive to normative — something is leviable not merely because it can be seized as a practical matter, but because the law permits it. This distinction between capability and permissibility is legally significant and worth preserving when reading historical sources.
Rapalje & Lawrence is the most useful of the three for research purposes. It does not just define the term; it anchors it to specific holdings. The notation that a preemption claim is not a leviable interest (53 Mo. 170) gives researchers an immediate reference point for the outer boundary of the concept. Rapalje also implicitly signals, through its grouping of levy-related terms, that "leviable" was understood as part of a family of execution concepts rather than as a standalone word.
Webster's 1913 corroborates that the term was in standard legal and general use by the early modern period, citing Bacon — suggesting the concept has common-law roots predating American codification.
None of the dictionaries address the constitutional dimensions of leviability in the tax context, nor do they engage with the question of equitable interests in property. Researchers should treat these definitions as starting points, not endpoints.
Jurisdictional Note
The leviability of specific property interests varied by state statute and court interpretation throughout the 19th century. Missouri and Minnesota cases appear frequently in historical digests as reference points, but other jurisdictions developed independent rules about which interests were reachable by execution. Federal tax levy authority operates under a separate statutory framework and should not be assumed to track common-law leviability doctrine.