Definition
"Let" functions as both a verb and a noun in legal usage, and the meanings are distinct enough to require separate treatment.
1. (v.) To lease or grant the use and possession of real property in exchange for compensation. In this sense, "let" is the correlative of "hire" — the lessor lets, the lessee hires. As an operative word in a lease, it is treated as synonymous with "demise." A sub-let occurs when a lessee grants a further interest to a third party; a re-let occurs when property is leased again, typically after a prior tenancy has ended.
2. (v.) To award a contract. After proposals or bids have been received and evaluated, the contracting party "lets" the contract to the successful bidder. This is the formal act of selection and award, distinct from the prior invitation to bid. The phrase "letting a contract" is common in public works and government procurement contexts.
3. (n.) A hindrance, obstruction, or impediment. This meaning is archaic in modern usage but appears in older instruments in the formula "without let, suit, trouble, or interruption," granting broad freedom of action to an agent or grantee. It survives occasionally in formal boilerplate and in historical documents.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): To allow something to happen; to permit; to allow possession of property in exchange for rent; to assign a contract or privilege.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): To retard, hinder, or impede — the precise opposite of the modern common meaning. This archaic sense was in active use through the early modern period.
The legal noun form of "let" — meaning hindrance — is a direct survival of the archaic common meaning that Webster's records and Wiktionary no longer lists as primary. A researcher reading an older instrument granting rights "without let or hindrance" must recognize that "let" is not a verb phrase but a noun meaning obstruction. Failure to spot this inverts the operative meaning of the clause entirely.
Common Confusion
The verb "let" meaning to lease and the verb "let" meaning to award a contract are easily conflated in historical documents where context is thin. The distinction matters: letting a tenancy creates a landlord-tenant relationship governed by property law; letting a contract creates a contractor-owner relationship governed by contract and, in public contexts, procurement law. The noun "let" (hindrance) compounds the confusion when encountered by readers unfamiliar with the archaic usage.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers working in the Law Mind corpus will encounter all three senses of "let" across different document types, and the operative sense is rarely flagged explicitly.
In property instruments, "let" as a leasing operative word appears alongside "demise" and "lease." Older English authorities treat the three as functionally equivalent, though some conveyancers drew fine distinctions. If a document uses "let" alone without "demise," check whether the jurisdiction and period recognized the word as sufficient to convey a leasehold interest — there is historical disagreement on this point.
In procurement and public works records, "letting" is the term of art for the award stage of competitive bidding. Sources indexed under "contract" may not cross-reference "letting" explicitly. The 1878 federal statute on mail-letting (referenced in Anderson's) is a period-specific example of this usage in regulatory contexts.
The archaic noun sense appears almost exclusively in older agency instruments, powers of attorney, and seisin-granting language. Burrill notes the phrase "without any let, suit, trouble" as characteristic of this form. When working with pre-19th-century instruments in the corpus, this usage requires active attention; modern readers consistently misread it as a verbal construction.
Jurisdictional variation is less significant than temporal variation here. The leasing and contract-award senses are stable across common law jurisdictions; the archaic noun sense is a purely historical phenomenon.
Historical Dictionary Support
The four source dictionaries present a consistent picture but with useful differences in emphasis.
Bouvier treats "let" as a leasing operative word equivalent to "demise," citing English authorities, and separately addresses the contract-award sense. Bouvier also preserves the noun sense (hindrance) as a distinct entry, which signals that 19th-century practitioners still needed to recognize it.
Anderson provides the most practical treatment of the contract-award sense, noting the regulatory context of the 1878 mail-letting statute and distinguishing "letting" from "invitation to propose." This distinction — that the invitation precedes the letting — is an important doctrinal point for procurement research.
Black's focuses almost entirely on the contract-award sense in the surviving excerpt, offering the clearest doctrinal framing: letting is the act of awarding, subsequent to invitation and consideration of proposals.
Burrill is uniquely valuable for the archaic noun sense, tracing its use in old conveyancing and locating it in the formula "without any let, suit, trouble." Burrill's gloss connecting it to powers of attorney helps researchers understand what type of instrument is likely to contain the usage.
None of the historical dictionaries fully integrates all three senses in a single entry, which means researchers relying on any single source risk missing the form they actually encounter.
Jurisdictional Note
In British usage, "to let" as a synonym for leasing remains in active everyday and legal use; American usage more commonly employs "lease" or "rent" as the primary verb, though "let" appears in formal instruments. In government contracting, "letting" as the award stage of a competitive bid process is standard American legal and regulatory terminology, particularly in state highway and public works law.