Definition
A phrase appearing in wills that specifies both the timing of legacy payment and the accrual of interest on the unpaid sum. When a testator directs that a legacy is "to be paid with interest in" a stated period — most commonly three months — the will is establishing two things simultaneously: a deadline for the executor to satisfy the bequest, and an obligation to pay interest on the legacy amount if payment is delayed beyond that period, or in some constructions, from the moment the period begins to run.
The phrase functions as a testamentary direction that operates on the executor, not merely as a description of the legacy itself. It imposes a duty to tender both principal and accrued interest within the time specified. Courts have treated such provisions as evidence of the testator's intent that the legatee not be kept out of money indefinitely without compensation for the wait.
Why It Matters in Research
This phrase is nearly invisible to modern researchers because it appears as a subordinate clause in will language rather than as a standalone legal term. It is easy to overlook the interest component when reviewing a will's payment directives, and the two duties — payment within a period and interest on the legacy — may be treated as independent obligations depending on how the will is drafted.
The temporal anchor matters enormously. The period "in three months" (the example given in Rapalje & Lawrence) was a common formulation in early American and English probate practice. Researchers working with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century wills should understand that the running of this period could be measured from the testator's death, from probate of the will, or from letters testamentary being granted — and courts did not always agree on which event triggered the clock. That ambiguity is a live research issue in historical estate disputes.
The 4 Mass. 208 reference in Rapalje & Lawrence (Doggett v. Morse, 1808) is an early Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case addressing exactly this construction. Researchers working in early American probate law will find that Massachusetts courts were among the first to work through the mechanics of interest accrual on time-limited legacies, and this case sits near the foundation of that line of authority.
More broadly, when researching estate disputes in Law Mind's corpus, be alert to the fact that "legacies to be paid with interest" language can generate two distinct causes of action: one for the legacy principal and one for interest. Historical pleadings may address these separately, and a failure to claim interest in time could be treated as a waiver in some jurisdictions.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence treat this phrase under the heading "THREE MONTHS, (in a will)" and direct readers to 4 Mass. 208, 215. The entry is brief to the point of being a signpost rather than an explanation — it identifies the phrase as a term of art in testamentary construction and anchors it to a single Massachusetts authority. This is characteristic of Rapalje & Lawrence's approach to probate terminology: pointing researchers toward the leading case rather than synthesizing doctrine.
What the historical dictionaries do not supply is any discussion of how courts resolved the tension between the interest-bearing period and the executor's duty of timely administration. The Massachusetts case supplies that substance; the dictionary entry alone does not. Researchers should not treat the Rapalje & Lawrence entry as a complete statement of the rule — it is a finding aid to the primary authority.
No other shelf sources in the Law Mind corpus appear to carry a dedicated entry for this phrase, which reflects how deeply embedded it is in specific will language rather than in general legal taxonomy.
Jurisdictional Note
Early American probate courts — particularly in Massachusetts and New York — developed the most detailed doctrine on interest accrual in time-limited legacies. English equity practice influenced these courts but was not uniform. Researchers should not assume that a rule stated in a Massachusetts decision from the early nineteenth century applies without modification in other states, where the triggering event for the interest period, and the applicable interest rate, may differ by statute or local practice.