Definition
"Large number," as a legal term of art, refers to an indefinite but significant quantity — the precise size of which depends on context and drafting intent. The term does not carry a fixed numerical threshold. Courts have held that it means whatever substantial number the drafter had in mind — which may be as few as ten or as many as hundreds — but that it does not, without more, mean a majority of a total or an absolute numerical standard.
The phrase appears most often in electoral and political statutes, where thresholds for petitions, voter challenges, or candidate qualifications may be expressed in relative or descriptive terms rather than fixed numerals. When legislatures use "a large number" rather than a specific figure, courts treat the phrase as intentionally flexible, interpreting it by reference to the evident purpose of the provision.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): A quantity considerably above average or above some implied baseline; informally, more than a few and often more than expected in context.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Not separately defined; "large" is treated as an adjective meaning great in quantity, extent, or capacity relative to a standard.
Editorial note: In ordinary speech, "large number" signals magnitude relative to context — a large number of applicants differs from a large number of stars. In law, the phrase is similarly contextual, but courts have been explicit that it does not import any mathematical relationship to a whole — particularly, it does not mean majority. The legal risk is that readers may assume the term implies a proportional or dominant share, which courts have expressly rejected.
Common Confusion
"Large number" is sometimes assumed to mean a majority, plurality, or supermajority of a relevant group. Courts have directly rejected this reading. A large number is an indefinite quantity that may be satisfied by a relatively small absolute figure; it carries no implication that the number described dominates, controls, or constitutes any fraction of a larger total. Drafters who intend a majority or supermajority requirement should state it explicitly.
Why It Matters in Research
This term appears infrequently as a defined phrase in legal sources, which is precisely the trap for researchers. Because it looks like ordinary language, it is easy to read past it without recognizing that courts have given it a specific — and counterintuitive — construction. The key holding from the Kentucky authority cited in Bouvier's is that the phrase is drafting-dependent and explicitly non-majoritarian. Researchers working with 19th-century electoral statutes, voter challenge provisions, or petition requirements should flag every instance of "large number" and treat it as an undefined term requiring judicial interpretation rather than a self-defining standard.
Historical sources are thin on this phrase. Bouvier's provides the only substantive treatment in the standard reference shelf, and it does so in a single sentence tied to one case. This means the phrase has not accumulated a rich doctrinal gloss, and researchers should look to the specific statutory or regulatory context — and any available legislative history — rather than expecting cross-jurisdictional consistency.
The phrase also appears in non-electoral contexts (e.g., contract provisions, administrative rules, zoning ordinances) where it may receive different treatment depending on subject matter. Research should not transfer the electoral-law construction automatically to other fields.
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's Law Dictionary is the sole historical dictionary source with a direct entry. Bouvier's treatment is brief but pointed: the phrase means "any number that the draftsman may have upon his mind," giving ten and a hundred as illustrative examples, and then draws the critical negative boundary — it does not mean a majority of legal votes cast. The Kentucky authority (93 Ky. 223) is cited to anchor this construction.
No other standard historical legal dictionaries — Black's, Burrill, or Wharton — provide a dedicated entry for the phrase, which reflects its status as an interpretive footnote rather than a term of independent doctrinal weight. The absence of broader treatment confirms that "large number" was understood as too context-dependent to admit of universal definition, and that Bouvier's brief note was capturing a narrow judicial clarification rather than announcing a general rule.
Jurisdictional Note
The construction recorded in Bouvier's derives from Kentucky authority and should not be treated as a universal rule. Other jurisdictions may read "large number" differently depending on statutory context, and some modern courts may apply plain-meaning analysis without reference to the non-majority gloss. Always verify whether the jurisdiction at issue has addressed the phrase directly.