Knowledge and belief. Nothing more than firm belief. Belief applies to the impression on the memory. The difference is in degree.1 See further BELIEF. Personal knowledge. Actual knowledge of the truth or falsity of a matter, not derived from another person.2 An affidavit filed in an application for a change of venue, alleging that the defendant had not theretofore "full knowledge" of a particular fact, was held to be too indefinite, as an averment. "Full knowledge might never come to him; but he had knowledge, and, for aught that appears, it might have been sufficient to satisfy his mind." 3 Knowledge is imputed from a duty to exercise ordinary care. Inquiry is a moral duty where the circumstances are such that a person of ordinary prudence would refuse to act. One who has reason to believe that a fact exists knows that it exists. Where there is enough to put one concerned upon inquiry, the means of knowledge and knowledge itself are, in legal effect, the same thing." When a party is about to perform an act which he has reason to believe may affect the rights of third persons, an inquiry as to the facts is a moral duty, and diligence an act of justice. Whatever fairly puts a party upon inquiry in such case is sufficient notice in equity, where the means of knowledge are at hand; and, if he omits to inquire and proceeds to act, he does so at his peril, as he is then chargeable with all the facts which by a proper inquiry he might have ascertained.7 Knowledge of facts which will enable a party to take effectual action is implied in such terms as "acquiescence," "estoppel," "waiver," 8 qq. v. Equal knowledge on both sides makes contracting parties equal. Information in the agent is information in the principal; but not so, if professional confidence would be 1 Hatch v. Carpenter, 7 Gray, 274 (1857). See Harrison v. Beard, 30 Kan. 532 (1883). 2 See West v. Home Ins. Co., 18 F. R. 622 (1883). 3 McCann v. People, 88 III. 105 (1878). Compare White v. Murtland, 71 id. 259 (1874); Roberts v. People, 9 Col. 463 (1886). 4 Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Cliff. 68-69 (1869), cases. 5 Shaw v. North Pennsylvania R. Co., 101 U. S. 566 (1879). *Jones v. Guaranty, &c. Co., 101 U. S. 633 (1879), Swayne, J.; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 id. 637 (1880); Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 367 (1857). 7 Angle v. N. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 342 (1875), cases, Clifford, J. See also Commissioners of Leavenworth Co. v. Chicago, &c. R. Co., 18 F. R. 210 (1883); Martin v. Smith, 1 Dill. 96 (1870), cases; Filmore v. Reithman, 6 Col. 129 (1881), cases; Effingar v. Hall, 81 Va. 106 (1885), cases. Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 581 (1878), Swayne, J. Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 327 (1879); Rogers v. Palmer, 102 id. 263 (1880). betrayed, as, between an attorney and his client.¹ See further AGENT. Knowingly. Imports that an accused person knew what he was about to do, and with such knowledge proceeded to commit the offense charged.2 Known; unknown. In the laws of taxation and seizures of property, apply to owners whose residence is, and is not, known. See NOTICE, 1. See FRAUD; GUILTY; IGNORANCE; IGNORE; INFORMATION, 1; INNOCENCE; INQUIRY; INTENT; PERMIT; REPRESENTATION, 1; RESCISSION; WILL, 1; WITTINGLY. Compare NOSCITUR; SCIRE. 2. Sexual bodily connection: carnal knowledge.3 "Carnaliy knew" is the technical phrase used in charging rape, q. v. 1, п. toilsome nature.4 Manual exertion of a This is the meaning in statutes, unless plainly used in another sense. Toil, or that which does or may produce weariness, and not mere business, is the idea conveyed by the word as ordinarily employed in Sunday laws.4 Technically, embraces all sorts of services, whether physical or mental, or whether the 1 The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 366-67 (1870), cases. As to presumptions of knowledge, in general, see 18 Alb. Law J. 7-9 (1883), cases. 2 United States v. Claypool, 14 F. R. 128 (1882); Gregory v. United States, 17 Blatch. 330 (1879). See generally 2 Steph. Hist. Cr. Law Eng. 114-18. 3 Commonwealth v. Squires, 97 Mass. 61 (1867), cases. 4 Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 401 (1853), Thurman, J.; More v. Clymer, 12 Mo. Ар. 15-16 (1882); Richmond v. Moore, 107 III. 437-38 (1883). main ingredient is manual toil or professional or other skill; but in the narrower and popular signification, is restricted to physical toil.1 In its most extended sense, includes every possible human exertion, mental or physical.2 Common labor. Ordinary manual labor, as distinguished from intellectual labor. In the Sunday law of Ohio, embraces "trading, bartering, selling, or buying any goods, wares, or merchandise. 3 Gaming is not an act of "common labor" or of one's usual vocation.4 Hard labor. State's prison convicts often are sentenced to perform "hard labor." This imports nothing more than ordinary industry at some mechanical trade.5 Imprisonment at hard labor may be changed to mere imprisonment, where an act provides for imprisonment only. Where hard labor is prescribed as part of the punishment it must be included in the sentence; but where mere imprisonment is required, a Federal court is authorized, in its discretion, to order its sentence to be executed at a place where, as part of the discipline, hard labor is required." When the use of the word "hard" may be treated as surplusage, the sentence will still stand. Hard labor was first introduced into English prisons in 1706. See further IMPRISONMENT; INFAMY. Laborer. One who labors in a toilsome occupation.9 One who gains a livelihood by manual toil; one who depends on hand work, not on head work, for a living. 10 He is a species of servant, hired by the day or week, and not part of the family of the employer. 11 In statutes giving laborers a lien or priority, or a special remedy, "laborer" means a person engaged in manual occupation, rather than one engaged in a learned profession. 10 Within the meaning of lien laws "labor" has been held to include the services of an architect; 12 but not of one who superintends the erection of a building; 1 nor of a civil or consulting engineer; 2 nor of the foreman of a mine; nor of an overseer of a plantation; 4 nor of a teamster; nor of a time-keeper and superintendent; nor of a cook in a hotel.7 Bodily labor bestowed upon a subject which before lay in common to all men, gives the most reasonable title to an exclusive property therein. Labor is property. As such it merits protection. The right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. It lies, to a large extent, at the foundation of most forms of property, and of all solid individual and national prosperity. The act of Congress of February 26, 1886 (23 St. L. 333), makes it unlawful for any person to assist or encourage the importation or migration of foreigners under contract to perform labor or service of any kind, made previous to the importation. The penalty is a forfeiture of one thousand dollars for every laborer brought into the country; and the master of any vessel who knowingly brings in such emigrant laborer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, pay a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months. The act excepts foreigners engaged as private secretaries, servants or domestics of foreigners, skilled workmen performing labor in a new industry, professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers, domestic servants, and relatives and friends assisted to come here for settlement. That act was amended by the act of February 23, 1887 (24 St. L. 414), empowering the secretary of the treasury to execute the original act, and, for that purpose, to make contracts with State officers - to take charge of immigration, to examine ships as to the condition of passengers, to report to the collector of the port any persons within the prohibition of the act, and that such persons shall not be permitted to land, but shall be sent back to the country whence they came, at the expense of the owners of the vessel in which they emigrated. Labor, bureau of. An act approved June 27, 1884 (23 St. L. 60), provides that there shall be established in the department of the interior a bureau of labor, to be under the charge of a commissioner of labor, appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate. The commissioner shall hold office for 1 Weymouth v. Sanborn, 43 Ν. Η. 173 (1861), Bellows, four years, and, until his successor shall be qualified, Judge. 2 Brockway v. Innes, 39 Mich. 48 (1878); Peck υ. Miller, ib. 597 (1878). 3 Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 240-41 (1846). 4 State v. Conger, 14 Ind. 396 (1860). 5 See 4 Bl. Com. 370, 377. • Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 169 (1878). Exp. Karstendick, 93 U. S. 398 (1876); United States v. Coppersmith, 2 Flip. 553 (1880). 8 Weaver v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 448 (1857). See Re Edwards, 43 N. J. L. 555 (1881), cases. • Blume v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 401 (1853). 10 Pennsylvania, &c. R. Co. v. Leuffer, 84 Pa. 171 (1877); Caraker v. Mathews, 25 Ga. 576 (1858); Re Hoking, 8 Saw. 439-40 (1883). 11 [1 Bl. Com. 426. 12 18 La. An. 20; 13 Minn. 475; 26 N. J. E. 29, 389; 24 unless sooner removed, at a salary of $3,000 a year. He "shall collect information up