KNOWLEDGE

9 definitions found across Law Mind sources

KNOWLEDGEAuthored
The Law Mind • 1290 words
Definition
Knowledge, in law, is awareness or understanding of a fact, circumstance, or legal consequence sufficient to affect a party's rights, duties, or culpability. It operates differently depending on context — as a mental state element in criminal and tort law, as a standard for imputing legal responsibility in civil and agency law, and as a prerequisite for procedural competency in evidence law. 1. Criminal and Tort Law (Mens Rea). Knowledge is a culpable mental state: the actor is aware that a fact exists or that a result is practically certain to follow from conduct. It sits above recklessness (conscious disregard of risk) and below purpose (conscious objective). The Model Penal Code treats knowledge and purpose as the two highest levels of culpability, and many criminal statutes require knowing conduct to distinguish it from innocent or negligent acts. 2. Civil and Agency Law. Knowledge of a principal, partner, or corporation is often determined by what its authorized agents knew at the relevant time, regardless of whether that information was formally communicated upward. Constructive knowledge — what a party should have known through reasonable inquiry — extends the concept beyond actual awareness and is frequently dispositive in contract, real property, and fraud cases. 3. Evidence Law. A witness may testify only from personal knowledge: direct sensory awareness of the matter at issue. This is distinct from the epistemic quality of belief and from knowledge acquired through hearsay.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "To confess as true; to acknowledge." Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "The act or state of knowing; clear perception of fact, truth, or duty; certain apprehension; familiar cognizance; cognition." The everyday sense of knowledge suggests a high degree of subjective certainty — the opposite of mere belief or suspicion. Legal usage is considerably more fluid. Law routinely imputes knowledge a party does not actually possess (constructive knowledge), and in criminal law it may hold that awareness of a high probability of a fact constitutes knowledge of that fact, whether or not the actor would subjectively claim to "know" it. Researchers should not carry the ordinary intuition of epistemic certainty into statutory or case law analysis.
Common Confusion
Knowledge vs. Belief. Historical dictionaries treat these as differing only in degree of certainty, with knowledge being the firmer conviction. Modern criminal law draws a sharper distinction: knowledge requires awareness that a circumstance exists or that a result is substantially certain; belief, standing alone, may describe a mental state falling short of that threshold. The older formulation — that knowledge is simply firm belief — is inadequate for interpreting contemporary mens rea statutes. Knowledge vs. Notice. Notice is a legal mechanism by which a party is treated as though they knew a fact, whether or not they actually did (actual notice, constructive notice, inquiry notice). Knowledge, strictly used, denotes genuine awareness. In older equity cases and many modern statutes the terms appear interchangeably; researchers must read context carefully. Knowledge vs. Willful Blindness. Some doctrines equate deliberate ignorance — consciously avoiding confirmation of a suspected fact — with knowledge. This is not universally adopted and should not be assumed unless the relevant jurisdiction or statute has addressed it.
Core Elements
When knowledge is at issue as a mens rea element, courts typically examine: 1. Awareness of the nature of conduct. Did the actor know what they were doing, as opposed to acting by mistake or accident? 2. Awareness of attendant circumstances. Did the actor know the facts that make the conduct criminal or actionable (e.g., that property was stolen, that a person was a minor)? 3. Awareness of consequences. Did the actor know, or was it practically certain, that a particular result would follow? 4. Actual vs. constructive vs. imputed. Was awareness genuine, or is the law treating a party as knowing because reasonable inquiry would have revealed the fact, or because an agent knew?
Why It Matters in Research
Knowledge is one of the most context-dependent terms in the corpus. A researcher encountering "knowledge" in a criminal statute, a property deed, an agency agreement, and an evidence rule is dealing with four different analytical frameworks that share a label but not a definition. Mens rea research: The shift from common law formulations (guilty mind, scienter, willfulness) to the Model Penal Code's tiered structure (purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence) is a major fault line. Pre-MPC cases often conflate knowledge and intent in ways that will not map onto modern doctrine. Corpus searches mixing nineteenth-century and contemporary criminal law materials will surface apparent contradictions that are artifacts of this definitional evolution. Evidence research: The personal knowledge requirement in Rule 602 is strict and distinct from both the mens rea sense and the constructive knowledge sense. Conflating them in research on witness competency or lay opinion will generate false leads. Admiralty and limitation of liability: "Privity or knowledge" in the limitation of liability context has a specific technical meaning — whether the shipowner personally participated in or had awareness of the negligence. This is a term of art with its own case law and should not be read through a general mens rea lens. Constructive knowledge traps: In older equity and property sources, constructive knowledge is often described simply as "knowledge," with the fictional quality implied rather than stated. Researchers relying on pre-twentieth-century digests and treatises should treat any attribution of knowledge to a corporation, partnership, or absentee landowner as a potential constructive knowledge imputation.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (both editions) and Bouvier's agree on the core proposition: knowledge and belief differ in degree, not in kind, with knowledge representing firmer conviction. Bouvier adds usefully that knowledge "is not confined to what we have personally observed or to what we have evolved by our own cognitive faculties" — an early acknowledgment that law extends the concept beyond direct sensory experience. Anderson's Dictionary does not contribute a substantive entry on this term in the available extract. The historical sources share a common limitation: they describe knowledge as a psychological state — degrees of subjective certainty in a person's mind — without accounting for the constructive and imputed knowledge doctrines that by the late nineteenth century were already well established in equity. For research purposes, these dictionary entries capture the testimonial and moral dimensions of knowledge (how certain must a witness or defendant have been?) but are largely silent on the structural, agency-law dimensions that dominate much civil litigation. Researchers should supplement them with treatises on agency and equity when those doctrines are in play.
Jurisdictional Note
Knowledge as a mens rea element varies significantly by jurisdiction. States that have adopted MPC-style criminal codes use knowledge in a defined, technical sense. States retaining common law formulations may blend knowledge with intent or willfulness in ways the MPC structure does not permit. Federal statutes use "knowingly" pervasively but without a uniform statutory definition, leaving the content to case-by-case judicial construction.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
civpro_167: Personal Knowledge Requirement — Rule 602 (The Law Mind Civil Procedure & Evidence Encyclopedia) criminal_6: Criminal Law — Mens Rea (Intent, Knowledge, Recklessness, Negligence) (The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia) military_45: Limitation of Liability — Shipowner's Right to Limit, Privity or Knowledge, and the Limitation Fund (The Law Mind Military, Veterans & Admiralty Law Encyclopedia)
Related Terms
Actual Knowledge — Constructive Knowledge — Imputed Knowledge — Notice — Scienter — Mens Rea — Willfulness — Intent — Purpose — Recklessness — Negligence — Willful Blindness — Belief — Personal Knowledge (Evidence) — Privity — Inquiry Notice
KNOWLEDGEmain
Black's Law Dictionary • 1891
The difference between "knowledge” and “belief” is nothing more than in the degree of certainty. With re- gard to things which make not a very deep secular laws. impression on the memory, it may be called "belief." "Knowledge" is nothing more than a man's firm belief. The difference is ordinarily merely in the degree, to be judged of by the court, when addressed to the court; by the jury, when addressed to the jury. 9 Gray, 271. Knowledge may be classified, in a legal sense, as positive and imputed,-imputed, when the means of knowledge exists, known and accessible to the party, and capable of communicating posi- tive information. When there is knowledge, no- tice, as legally and technically understood, be- comes immaterial. It is only material when, in the absence of knowledge, it produces the same re- sults. However closely actual notice may, in many instances, approximate knowledge, and construct
KNOWLEDGEmain
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.) • 1910
of all contracts made therein, a meniber of the household being oné of the parties. Wharton. ; The difference between “knowledge” and “belief” is nothing more than in the degree of certainty. With regard to things which make not a very deer. impression on the memory, it may be called “belief.” “Knowledge” is nothing more than a man’s firm belief. The difference is ordinarily merely in the degree, to be judged of by the court, when addressed co the court; by the jury, when addressed to the jury. Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray (Mass.) 271. See Utley v.: Hill, 155 Mo. 232, 55 S. W. 1001, 49 L. R. A. 323, 78 Am. St. Rep. 569; Ohio Valley Coffin Co. v. Goble, 28 Ind. App. 362, 62 N. E. 1025; Clarke v. Ingram, 107 Ga. 565, 338 S. E. 802. Knowledge may be classified in a legal sense, as positive and imputed,—imputed, when the means of knowledge exists, known and accessible to the party, and capable of communicating positive information. When there is knowledge, notice, as legally and technically understo becomes immaterial. It is only material when, in the absence of knowledge, it produces the same results. However closely actual notice may, in many instances, approximate knowledge, and constructive notice may be its equivalent in effect, there may be actual notice without knowledge: and, when eas la Gehbe notice is made the test to determine puore es of right, it may fall far short of knowledge, and be sufficient. Cleveland Woolen Mills vy. Sibert, 81 Ala. 140, 1 South. 773. —Carnal knowledge. Coitus; copulation; sexual intercourse—Personal knowledge. Knowledge of the truth in regard to a particular fact or allegation, which is original, and does not depend on information or hearsay. Percone) knowledge of an allegation in an answer = porecnel knowledge of its truth or falsity; if the allegation is a negative one, this nec- ‘KYTH e of the truth or essarily includes a knowl Net West v. Home at of the ay en ape .(C.C.) 1
KNOWLEDGEmain
Anderson's Dictionary of Law • 1890
In kind. A payment of money, the delivery or deposit of an object, as of rent, or services rendered, are made or rendered "in kind," when of a thing or services which correspond in class or general nature to that intended. Opposed, in specie: in the identical state or condition, in exact terms. See DEPOSIT, 2, General. Compare GENUS. KING; QUEEN. 1. The person in whom is invested the supreme executive power of the government of Great Britain. 2. Sovereign power; government: commonwealth; state. Compare REX. The crown is hereditary, in the feudal path for succession to landed estates as marked out by the common law; but this does not imply an indefeasible right. Therefore, in his political capacity, the king never dies. His duty is to govern according to law; disobedience to his command is a high contempt or a misprision.2 As the fountain of justice, he is always ubiquitousalways present in his courts; hence he cannot be non-suit, and does not appear by attorney. affairs, is not to be imputed to him; or, that the prerogative extends not to an injury: in his political capacity the king is absolute perfection.1 The maxim has no place in our systems of constitutional law. The Constitution admits that heads of departments may do wrong, and provides for their impeachment.2 A wrong attempted in the name of a State is imputable to its government. 3 Statutes of parliament are generally cited by the name and the year of the sovereign in whose reign they were passed. In the subjoined table the Roman numerals indicate the year of accession: 1. William I, 1066. 2. William II, 1087. 3. Henry I, 1100. 4. Stephen, 1135. 5. Henry II, 1154. 6. Richard I, 1189. 7. John, 1199. 8. Henry III, 1216. 9. Edward I, 1273. 10. Edward II, 1307. 11. Edward III, 1327. 12. Richard II, 1377. 13. Henry IV, 1399. 14. Henry V, 1413. He is the steward of the public, to dispense justice 15. Henry VI, 1422. to whomsoever it is due.4 In foreign affairs he represents the nation: sends and receives ambassadors; makes treaties; proclaims war, and peace; issues reprisals, grants, safe-conducts. In domestic affairs he is part of the supreme legislative power: may negative a new law, and is bound by none unless specially named; is the general of the kingdom - raises armies, defends the kingdom; confines subjects within the realm, recalls them from abroad; is the general conservator of the peace erects courts, prosecutes offenders, pardons crimes, issues proclamations; is the fountain of office and privilege; is the arbiter of domestic commerce. erects marts, regulates weights and measures and the coinage of money; and is the supreme head of the church convenes and dissolves synods, nominates bishops, and receives appeals. His revenue is ordinary: ecclesiastical and temporal-from demesne lands of the crown, from the courts of justice, royal fish, wrecks, jetsam, flotsam, ligan, royal mines, treasure-trove, waifs, estrays, forfeitures for offenses and for deodands; from escheats, and from the custody of lunatics; and extraordinary: aids, subsidies granted by the Commons-now a tax, charged with the civil list, and with which the expenses of the civil government are defrayed. In the king there can be no negligence; no delay bars his right. See TEMPUS, Nullum, etc. "The king can do no wrong." This means either that whatever is exceptional in the conduct of public 11 Bl. Com. 191, 193, 196. 21 Bl. Com. 233; 4 id. 122. 1 Bl. Com. 270; 3 id. 24. 1 Bl. Com. 266. 1 Bl. Com. Ch. VII, VIII. 1 Bl. Com. 247. 16. Edward IV, 1461. 17. Edward V, 1483. 18. Richard III, 1483. 19. Henry VII, 1485, 20. Henry VIII, 1509. 21. Edward VI, 1547. 22. Mary, 1553.4 23. Elizabeth, 1559. 24. James I, 1603. 25. Charles I, 1625. 26. The Commonwealth, 1649. 27. Charles II, 1649.5 28. James II, 1685. 29. William and Mary, 1689. 30. William III, 1695.8 31. Anne, 1702. 32. George I, 1714. 33. George II, 1727. 34. George III, 1760. 35. George IV, 1820. 36. William IV, 1830. 37. Victoria, June 20, 1837. See BENCH; COUNCIL COUNSEL; COURT, 1; CROWN; FEUD; GOVERNMENT; PARLIAMENT; PATENT, 1; PATRIA; PEACE, 1; PREROGATIVE; TENURE, 1; TREASON; UBIQUITY, 1. 1. A being aware of: information, cognizance; notice. Absolute knowledge can be had of few things." 11 Bl. Com. 246; 2 id. 243; 3 id. 254; 4 id. 32. 2 Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 343 (1879). Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 290 (1885). In 1554, married Philip of Spain; hence, Philip and Mary, 1554–58. 5 Ascended the throne in 1660; his regnal.years are counted from 1649when Charles I died. 1-4, Normans; 5-12, Plantagenets; 13-15, House of Lancaster; 16-18, House of York; 19-23, House of Tudor; 24-25, 27-31, House of Stuart; 32-37, House of Hanover. Mary died in 1694. Story v. Buffum, 8 Allen, 38 (1864). E
KNOWLEDGEn.
Websters Unabridged Dictionary (1913) • 1913
The act or state of knowing; clear perception of fact, truth, or duty; certain apprehension; familiar cognizance; cognition. Knowledge, which is the highest degree of the speculative faculties, consists in the perception of the truth of affirmative or negative propositions. Locke. That which is or may be known; the object of an act of knowing; a cognition; -- chiefly used in the plural. There is a great difference in the delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges. Bacon. Knowledges is a term in frequent use by Bacon, and, though now obsolete, should be revived, as without it we are compelled to borrow "cognitions" to express its import. Sir W. Hamilton. To use a word of Bacon's, now unfortunately obsolete, we must determine the relative value of knowledges. H. Spencer. That which is gained and preserved by knowing; instruction; acquaintance; enlightenment; learning; scholarship; erudition. Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. 1 Cor. viii. 1. Ignorance is the curse of God; -Knowledge, the wing wherewith we fly to heaven. Shak. That familiarity which is gained by actual experience; practical skill; as, a knowledge of life. Shipmen that had knowledge of the sea. 1 Kings ix. 27. Scope of information; cognizance; notice; as, it has not come to my knowledge. Why have I found grace in thine eyes, that thou shouldst take knowledge of me Ruth ii. 10. Sexual intercourse; -- usually preceded by carnal; as, carnal knowledge.
KNOWLEDGEv.
Websters Unabridged Dictionary (1913) • 1913
To acknowledge. [Obs.] "Sinners which knowledge their sins." Tyndale.
knowledgeverb
Wiktionary (English) • 2026
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To confess as true; to acknowledge.
Knowledgename
Wiktionary (English) • 2026
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A course of study which must be completed by prospective London taxi drivers; consists of 320 routes through central London and many significant places.
knowledgenoun
Wiktionary (English) • 2026
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The fact of knowing about something; general understanding or familiarity with a subject, place, situation etc. | Awareness of a particular fact or situation; a state of having been informed or made aware of something. | Intellectual understanding; the state of appreciating truth or information. | Familiarity or understanding of a particular skill, branch of learning etc. | Justified true belief | Sexual intimacy or intercourse (now usually in phrase carnal knowledge). | Information or intelligence about something; notice. | The total of what is known; all information and products of learning. | Something that can be known; a branch of learning; a piece of information; a science. | Acknowledgement. | Notice, awareness. | The deep familiarity with certain routes and places of interest required by taxicab drivers working in London, England.

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