Definition
In legal contexts, "keeping" most often appears not as a standalone doctrine but as a term of construction within contracts, statutes, and insurance policies. Its legal significance turns on whether a particular act constitutes mere temporary possession or something more continuous and habitual. Courts have interpreted "keeping" to connote a degree of permanence, regularity, or settled custodial intent — distinguishing it from transient handling, incidental presence, or single-occasion use.
The term arises most commonly in three contexts:
1. Insurance policy construction: A prohibition on "keeping" a hazardous substance on insured premises has been construed to target permanent or habitual storage, not momentary or incidental presence. Bringing a prohibited article onto the premises briefly for a functional purpose — such as using benzine to clean machinery — has been held not to constitute "keeping" within the meaning of such a clause.
2. Animal liability: Statutes imposing liability on persons who "keep" animals (particularly dogs or livestock) typically require that the defendant exercise some degree of habitual custody or control, not merely that the animal happened to be on their land at the moment of injury.
3. Criminal and regulatory law: "Keeping" a disorderly house, gambling establishment, or similar prohibited place implies continuous or regular operation, not a single incident.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Conformity or harmony; charge or care; maintenance, support, or provision.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): A holding; restraint; custody; guard; charge; care; preservation. Also: maintenance, support, feed, or congruity between parts.
The ordinary English sense of "keeping" overlaps substantially with its legal usage — both imply custody, care, and continuity. The gap that matters for legal research is one of degree and intent: common usage tolerates loose application of the word to any act of holding or tending, while legal construction in insurance and regulatory contexts demands a showing of habitual, permanent, or settled custody before the term's prohibitions or liabilities attach. A researcher treating "keeping" as a simple synonym for "having" will misread the case law.
Common Confusion
"Keeping" is frequently conflated with "having," "possessing," or "storing" in both drafting and litigation. These are not synonyms under careful legal construction. "Possession" is a broader term with its own doctrinal framework (actual vs. constructive, knowing vs. unknowing); "storing" may imply intent to retain for future use; "having" suggests mere presence. "Keeping," by contrast, has been construed to require a degree of regularity or permanence that the others do not necessarily imply. Courts and counsel sometimes use these words interchangeably in contract drafting, which creates ambiguity that litigation then has to resolve.
Why It Matters in Research
The primary research value of "keeping" lies in contract and policy interpretation. When a historical insurance policy, lease, municipal ordinance, or regulatory statute uses the word "keeping," the researcher should not assume it means simple possession. The interpretive question is always whether the act in question rose to the level of habitual or settled custody the drafters intended to reach.
The Pennsylvania case noted in Bouvier's (92 Pa. 15) is an early and instructive example of courts narrowing the reach of "keeping" clauses to avoid forfeiture based on incidental use. Researchers working with 19th- and early 20th-century insurance disputes should look for this limiting construction as a recurring pattern, particularly in cases involving hazardous materials (benzine, gunpowder, kerosene) stored on commercial premises.
In criminal law research, "keeping" a prohibited establishment is a distinct offense from merely being present in or visiting one. Historical indictments for keeping a bawdy house, gaming house, or disorderly house will use the term in this habitual-operation sense. Researchers should be alert to the fact that early American statutes borrowed this usage from English common law without always defining the term, leaving courts to supply the habituality requirement by construction.
Jurisdictional variation in animal-keeping statutes is also significant: some states impose strict liability on anyone who "keeps" a dangerous animal; others require that the keeper knew of the animal's dangerous propensities. The word "keeping" does the same definitional work in both, but the liability consequences differ sharply.
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's entry on "keeping" is notably brief and context-specific, offering the benzine/insurance example as its primary illustration rather than a general definition. This reflects the term's status as a word of ordinary construction rather than a term of art with an independent doctrinal life. Bouvier does not attempt a comprehensive definition, leaving researchers to derive meaning from context and case law.
What Bouvier's entry usefully establishes is the interpretive principle: keeping connotes permanence and habit, not momentary possession. The entry's reliance on a single Pennsylvania case also signals that this was an unsettled area of construction in the mid-to-late 19th century, with courts still working out where the line fell.
Older dictionaries and treatises do not treat "keeping" as a major legal concept in its own right. Researchers looking for extended doctrinal treatment will find more in case annotations and practice guides specific to insurance law, animal law, and criminal nuisance than in the general legal dictionaries.
Jurisdictional Note
The construction of "keeping" in insurance policies varies by jurisdiction and has evolved with modern policy language. Many contemporary policies have replaced vague "keeping" clauses with more precise defined terms. Researchers working with pre-1950 policies should consult the case law of the relevant state rather than relying on a uniform national standard.