Definition
A Latin ablative of *jus* (right, law), used almost exclusively in compound legal phrases meaning "by right," "in right of," or "by the law." JURE does not appear as a standalone legal term of art; its legal significance lies entirely in the phrases it anchors. These compounds identify the legal basis, authority, or capacity by which something is held or done — whether by divine right, civil law, law of war, or some other recognized legal source. The most consequential of these phrases remain alive in modern legal usage, particularly in property and constitutional contexts.
Common Language
The word has no independent common English usage. It is a functional Latin particle that survives in law as a term-framing prefix, not a freestanding concept.
Recognized Forms
/SUBTYPES
The historically recognized compound phrases include:
JURE BELLI — By the right or law of war. Used in the law of nations and prize law to identify rights acquired through lawful belligerent action, including capture of enemy property.
JURE CIVILI — By the civil law. References rights or rules derived from Roman civil law rather than common law or custom.
JURE CORONAE — In right of the crown. Identifies a property or privilege held by virtue of royal prerogative rather than by grant or inheritance through private channels.
JURE DIVINO — By divine right. The claim that authority — particularly sovereign or ecclesiastical authority — derives from God rather than from human law or consent.
JURE ECCLESIAE — In right of the church. Describes property or rights held in an ecclesiastical capacity rather than in a personal or civil one.
JURE EMPHYTEUTICO — By the right or law of emphyteusis. Identifies a holding under an emphyteutic lease, a long-term or perpetual lease of land carrying both rights and obligations. See EMPHYTEUSIS.
JURE GENTIUM — By the law of nations; by international law. One of the most enduring of the compounds, used to describe rights, obligations, or status recognized across civilized nations rather than by any single domestic system.
JURE MARITI — In right of a husband. At common law, the right by which a husband acquired an interest in his wife's personal property upon marriage. Largely abolished by married women's property legislation in the nineteenth century.
JURE NATURAE — By the law of nature; by natural law. Used to identify rights or duties said to exist independently of positive law.
JURE PROPINQUITATIS — By right of nearness of kin; by right of consanguinity. Used in succession and inheritance contexts.
JURE REPRAESENTATIONIS — By right of representation; per stirpes. Describes the mode of inheritance by which descendants take by representing a deceased ancestor. See PER STIRPES.
JURE SANGUINIS — By right of blood. A foundational principle of nationality law: citizenship transmitted through parentage rather than place of birth. Contrasts with jus soli. Still in active use in immigration and nationality statutes worldwide.
JURE UXORIS — In right of a wife. Describes property or rights held by a husband through his wife's title, as distinguished from his own.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encountering JURE in older texts need to understand that it functions as a legal qualifier, not a substantive term. Its meaning is entirely phrase-dependent. The same surface structure — "by right of X" — can carry very different legal weight depending on the compound: JURE MARITI, for instance, represents a abolished common law doctrine, while JURE SANGUINIS remains operative in modern nationality law and appears in contemporary statutory and treaty texts.
Two traps deserve attention. First, historical sources often abbreviate these phrases or cite only the second element, assuming reader familiarity with the jure construction. A case discussing rights held *uxoris* or *mariti* without the full phrase may be invoking JURE UXORIS or JURE MARITI doctrines without signaling it. Second, the same compound can carry different technical meanings depending on legal system: JURE CIVILI in a treatise drawing on Justinian reads differently from the same phrase in an English equity court's opinion.
JURE GENTIUM has the longest doctrinal life and connects the private law corpus to international law sources. Researchers tracing prize law, slavery, or the law of nations debates in early American and British sources will encounter it repeatedly in opinions, treatises, and diplomatic correspondence. JURE SANGUINIS is the compound most likely to appear in modern research, particularly in immigration, nationality, and dual-citizenship contexts.
The Rapalje & Lawrence entry for this term is unhelpful — the relevant content was displaced by adjacent entries in that edition's arrangement. Researchers should not treat that source as authoritative on JURE compounds.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's definition — "by right; in right; by the law; according to the law" — is the most complete and structurally accurate of the historical entries, correctly identifying JURE as the ablative of *jus* and noting its function as a qualifier. Black's (both editions) offer essentially the same gloss with the 2nd edition providing the more useful contribution: a working list of the principal compounds with brief definitions and citations to Blackstone's Commentaries and Kent's Commentaries, which remain good starting points for understanding how these phrases operated in Anglo-American legal thought.
None of the historical dictionaries provide analytical depth on any individual compound. They catalog rather than explain. For substantive doctrine under any given JURE phrase, researchers will need to consult the treatises those entries point toward — Blackstone, Kent, and the relevant title in a systematic treatise on property, succession, or the law of nations — rather than relying on dictionary treatment alone.
Jurisdictional Note
JURE SANGUINIS and JURE SOLI (the latter more commonly rendered JUS SOLI in modern texts) remain meaningful distinctions in comparative nationality law, with different jurisdictions weighting each differently. JURE MARITI and JURE UXORIS are of primarily historical relevance in common law systems, having been superseded by married women's property legislation, but retain significance in jurisdictions where those reforms came later or were incomplete.