In Spanish Law. The right of a public officer to retire from office, retaining his title and his salary, either in whole or in part, after he has at- tained the age of fifty years and been in public service at least twenty years, when- ever his infirmities prevent him from dis- charging the duties of his office. JUDAISMUS (Lat.). The religion and rites of the Jews. Du Cange. A quar- ter set apart for residence of Jews. Du Cange. A usurious rate of interest. 1 Mon. Angl. 839; 2 id. 10, 665. Sex marcos sterlingorum ad acquietandam terram præ dictam de Judaismo, in quo fuit impigne- rata. Du Cange. An income anciently ac- cruing to the king from the Jews. Blount. JUDEX (Lat.). In Old English Law. A juror. Spelman, Gloss. A judge, in modern sense, especially-as opposed to justiciarius, i. e. a common-law judge to denote an ecclesiastical judge. Bracton, fol. 401, 402. In Roman Law. One who, either in his own right or by appointment of the magistrate for the special case, judged causes. Thus, the prostor was formerly called judex. But But, generally, prætors and magistrates who who judge of their own right were distinguished from judices, who were private persons, appointed by the prætor, on application of the plaintiff, to try the cause, as soon as issue was joined, and furnished by him with Instructions as to the legal principles involved. They were variously called judices delegati, or pedanei, or speciales. It has been said that they resembled in many respects jurors: thus, both are private persons, brought in at a certain stage of the proceedings, dings, viz., issue joined, to try the cause, under instructions from the judge as to the law of the case. But civilians are not clear whether the judices had to decide the fact alone, or the law and fact. The judex resembles in many respects the arbitrator, or arbiter, the chief differences being, first, that the latter is appointed in cases of trust and confidence, the former in cases where the rela- tions of the parties are governed by strict law (in pactionibus strictis); second, the latter has the whole control of cases, and decides according to equity and good conscience, the former by strict formule; third, that the latter may be a magistrate, the former must be a private person; fourth, that the award of the arbiter derives its force from the agreement of submission, while the decree of the juder has its sanction in the command of the prætor to try the cause; Calvinus, Lex. 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 210, note; Mackeldey, Civ. Law, Kaufmann ed. § 198, note. It has been said that there was generally one judex, sometimes three, -in which case the decision of two, in the absence of the third, had no effect; Calvinus, Lex. But another careful writer says that "although there could never be more than one judez, there were sometimes several arbitri, but the arbiter was chosen from the same class as the judez." Sand. Inst, Just. Introd. Ixiii. Down to the time of handing over the cause to the judez, that is, till issue joined, the proceedings were before the prætor, and were said to be in jure; after that before the juder, and were said to be in judicio. In all this we see the germ of the Anglo-Saxon system of judicature; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 67. A judge who conducted the trial from beginning to end; magistratus. The prac- tice of calling in judices was disused before Justinian's time: therefore, in the Code, Institutes, and Novels, judex means judge in its modern sense. Heineccius, Elem. Jur. Civ. § 1327. The term fuder is used with very different signifi- cations at different periods of Roman law. The distinctive features of the position of the juder belong to the earlier history of the Roman law. A recent writer defines very clearly the functions of the judez at that period as distinguished from those of the magistrate: "In the the earlier history of civil procedure in Rome, we find two sharply defined divisions, the proceedings which were said to be in jure, and those which were in judicio. The former took place before the magistrate, who represented officially the judicial power of the State. This magistrate in this capacity decided, in the first instance, whether the claim of the complaining party was cognizable at all, whether there was any form of procedure by which it could be enforced. If it was controverted, and there seemed to be any action that would fit the case, the litis contestatio was formed, by a solemn appeal addressed by each party to his witnesses, and the controversy was then referred to the judez, or in some cases to a body or college of judices. The judices were not magistrates, and did not represent the power of the State. They were, it would seem, more in in theory like referees. They took up the issue which had been stated by the magistrate, heard the testimony, and pro- nounced the sententin, and this finding was after- wards enforced by the magistrate." Howe, Stud- Civ. L. 946. This relates to the period during which the sharply defined distinc