Definition
In law, interruption refers to the occurrence of some act, fact, or circumstance that breaks the continuity required to establish a right by prescription or to sustain a claim under a statute of limitations — thereby stopping or resetting the running of the prescriptive or limitations period.
The term carries two principal legal meanings:
1. INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION / LIMITATIONS: Any act or legal event sufficient to arrest the running of a prescriptive period or statute of limitations. The interruption may be natural (caused by the physical act of a party — for example, actual dispossession or abandonment of use) or civil (arising from the legal effect of some fact or proceeding, such as the filing of a lawsuit or a formal claim by the true owner). Once interrupted, the prescriptive period generally must begin to run anew.
2. INTERRUPTION OF EASEMENTS AND SIMILAR RIGHTS: In the law of easements, profits à prendre, and analogous rights, interruption refers to a break in the continuity of enjoyment necessary to establish or maintain such a right. A distinction is drawn between interruption of possession (where the right is not exercised continuously, regardless of intent) and interruption of the right itself (where the person claiming the right ceases its exercise in a manner indicating abandonment of any claim to exercise it). This distinction matters because the former is largely factual; the latter carries a stronger implication of intent to relinquish.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): The act of breaking into someone else's speech or activity; a pause or cessation in an ongoing process.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "Obstruction caused by breaking in upon course, current, progress, or motion; stop; hindrance."
The common meaning captures the general sense of a break or intrusion, but the legal meaning is far more precise. In law, not every break constitutes an interruption — the break must be legally cognizable, sufficiently long, and in some contexts made by someone with standing to interrupt. A trivial or momentary cessation of use rarely qualifies. Researchers reading older legal sources should not assume that colloquial uses of "interruption" in historical texts have the technical prescription-law meaning.
Recognized Forms
/SUBTYPES
NATURAL INTERRUPTION: A factual break in possession or enjoyment caused by the physical act of one of the parties — most commonly, the owner forcibly or peaceably reclaiming the land or right from the adverse possessor or prescriptive claimant.
CIVIL INTERRUPTION: An interruption arising from a legal act or proceeding — typically, a judicial action (such as commencement of suit) by the true owner asserting title or right, or an acknowledgment by the prescriptive claimant of the owner's title. In civil law jurisdictions, this category is particularly well-developed; in common law jurisdictions, it appears most frequently in the context of statutes modeled on or responding to the English Prescription Act of 1832.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers working in property, limitations, and prescription must track this term carefully across several fault lines:
CIVIL LAW VS. COMMON LAW DIVERGENCE: The civil/natural interruption taxonomy is primarily a civil law inheritance and appears in American jurisdictions with French or Spanish colonial legal histories (Louisiana, and to a lesser extent the Gulf states) more formally than in purely common law states. Sources from these jurisdictions will use the terms with greater technical precision. Black's and Bouvier's both carry this taxonomy forward, but researchers should verify whether a given state's statutory or case law actually adopts it.
PRESCRIPTION ACT JURISDICTIONS: In English law after the Prescription Act 1832, interruption acquired specific statutory meaning tied to minimum periods and formal consent or submission requirements. Sources citing English cases (particularly Carr v. Foster and Flight v. Thomas, both referenced in Black's 2nd) apply a statutory framework that does not map precisely onto American common law states.
LIMITATIONS VS. PRESCRIPTION: In American practice, "interruption" and "tolling" are sometimes used interchangeably but are technically distinct. Tolling typically suspends the running of a limitations period (time freezes and resumes); interruption in the strict prescriptive sense can mean the entire period must begin again. This distinction is frequently collapsed in American legal writing and is a common research trap.
EASEMENT CONTEXT: When researching prescriptive easements, the possession/right distinction drawn by Rapalje & Lawrence is important: courts assessing whether a prescriptive easement has been defeated may look not just at whether use was continuous but at whether any gap in use was accompanied by a disclaimer of the right. Primary sources will not always make this analysis explicit.
SCOTCH LAW REFERENCES: Both Burrill's and Bouvier's note the Scots law usage, where interruption specifically means the true proprietor's claim during prescription. Researchers encountering this usage in older texts (particularly in cases citing Bell's Dictionary or Whishaw) should not read it back into English or American contexts without care.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's (1st and 2nd editions) and Bouvier's agree on the core definition: an act or fact sufficient to arrest the running of limitations or prescription, divided into natural and civil categories. This is the most stable layer of the term's legal meaning and has not changed significantly across editions.
Rapalje & Lawrence adds the valuable possession/right distinction in the easement context, which Black's handles more briefly. Researchers focused on prescriptive easement disputes should weight Rapalje & Lawrence's treatment.
Burrill's is narrowest in focus, emphasizing the Scots law usage and noting the term's absorption into English prescription law. His entry is less useful for American research but valuable for tracing the term's reception into common law systems from Scots and civil law antecedents.
What the historical dictionaries collectively underserve: they do not adequately distinguish interruption from tolling, a gap that becomes consequential in American statutory limitations research. None of the shelf sources addresses modern procedural contexts (e.g., whether filing in a court lacking jurisdiction constitutes civil interruption), which requires turning to primary sources and treatises.
Jurisdictional Note
Louisiana and other civil law-influenced jurisdictions formally recognize the natural/civil interruption taxonomy in their prescriptions statutes, and the doctrine operates somewhat differently than in common law states. In England, the Prescription Act 1832 gives interruption specific statutory content. Most American common law states lack a formal interruption doctrine distinct from tolling, and courts may use the terms interchangeably — researchers should examine the specific jurisdiction's treatment before relying on the civil law taxonomy.