The correct understanding or intention of the law; the true meaning or correct policy of a law. INTENT; INTENTION. Design; determination; purpose. "Intent" implies purpose only - refers to the quality of the mind with which an act is done. "Attempt" (q. v.) implies an effort to carry intent into execution.7 Criminal intent. Evil, malicious will expressed in a criminal act. While crime proceeds from a criminal mind, ignorance of the law is not a defense. General intent. A purpose to do something in general: as 1, to benefit a class of persons or objects by a charitable devise; 2, to violate law. Opposed, 1, particular intent: an intent, expressed in a will, which cannot be given effect, - see CY PRES; and, 2, specific intent: applied to an act done with a particular design. When an act, in general terms, is indictable, a criminal intent need not be shown, unless, from the language or effect of the law, a purpose to require the existence of such intent can be discovered. To introduce into the law the requisite of a guilty mind it must appear that such was the intent of the law-maker.1 Neglect to discharge a duty, or indifference to consequences, is, in cases, equivalent to a specific criminal intent.2 "Act" and "intention," in the phrase "die by his own act or intention," mean the same as "act" alone, for act implies intention. 3 A criminal intent and a criminal act make a crime. But here a "specific intent" and a "criminal intent" are not to be confounded: they have nothing in common except as mental operations. The former determines the object toward which the act shall be directed; the latter that the act so directed shall be done. The former, as part of the criminal act, must be alleged and proved as any other portion of the act; the latter is neither alleged nor proved, but inferred from the commission of the act. Thus, a criminal act presumes criminal intent, though the accused was intoxicated; but where the existence of a specific intent is necessary to the act, a degree of drunkenness incompatible with the formation of that intent negatives the act and disproves the crime. See further CRIME; INDICTMENT; MALICE; PREMEDITATE. Intention is judged of with reference to voluntary action. When guilty knowledge is an ingredient of an ofCommon intent. The ordinary meaning fense, evidence may be given of the commission of of words. 1 County of Allegheny v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 417 (1879): Worcester's Dict. 2 Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 421 (1874); Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 86 (1883). 3 Tatum v. State, 63 Ala. 152 (1879), Stone, J. Brockway v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 9 F. R. 253 (1881). See Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Foley, 105 U. S. 354 (1881); 122 id. 512; Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reif, 36 Ohio St. 599 (1881); 62 Cal. 178; 31 Iowa, 222; 70 N. Y. 605; 9 R. I. 346; 1 F. & F. 735. other acts of a like character where they are necessarily connected in time or place or as furnishing a clue to the motive. See further GUILTY. Intention may be proved inductively by collateral facts; as, in trespass, slander, libel, fraud, adultery, questions of good faith, of prudence, etc." 1 Halsted v. State, 41 N. J. L. 552, 589-91 (1879), cases, Beasley, C. J. See also United States v. Bayaud, 16 F. R. 383 (1883). 2 United States v. Thomson, 12 F. R. 245 (1882). 3 Chapman v. Republic Ins. Co., 6 Biss. 240 (1874). See 3 Greenl. Ev. §§ 13-19; 1 Bish. Cr. L. §§ 488-93; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Muskegon Bank, Broom, Com. 876, 887-88; 2 Steph. Hist. Cr. Law Eng. 122 U. S. 506 (1887), Miller, J. Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Davey, 123 U. S. 743-44 (1887); N. W. Life Ins. Co. v. Muskegon Bank, 122 id. 505 (1887), distinguished. Prince v. State, 35 Ala. 369 (1860), cases. 110-13; Commonwealth v. Hersey, 2 Allen, 179-81 (1861), cases. 5 Re Bininger, 7 Blatch. 267 (1870). People v. Gibbs, 93 N. Y. 473 (1883); 58 id. 555. 1 Whart. Ev. §§ 31-37, cases.