Definition
An "instrument of writing for the pay" is a historical phrase appearing in statutory contexts to describe a written document that serves as the vehicle for a money payment obligation — in essence, a written instrument (such as a note, bill, bond, or acknowledgment) by which one party undertakes or evidences an obligation to pay money to another. The phrase functions as a descriptive statutory term rather than a term of art with a fixed technical definition, and its precise scope was determined by the particular statute in which it appeared.
Why It Matters in Research
This phrase is primarily a creature of statutory construction, not common law doctrine. Researchers encountering it in historical Pennsylvania materials — particularly in cases interpreting early commonwealth statutes — should treat it as a term whose meaning was resolved by judicial interpretation of the specific enacting statute, not by reference to a general legal definition. The Rapalje & Lawrence entry points to 2 Whart. (Pa.) 209, which is the authoritative interpretive anchor for this phrase in that statutory context.
The phrase reflects an older drafting convention in which statutes described instruments functionally (what the instrument does — "for the pay of money") rather than by category (note, bill, bond). This creates research traps: modern index terms will not capture the phrase, and researchers searching for "promissory note" or "bill of exchange" in historical Pennsylvania statutes may miss cases that turned on this broader functional description. Conversely, cases construing this phrase may have broader applicability to questions about what written instruments suffice to evidence a debt obligation.
Researchers should also note that the phrase sits in a statutory enforcement context, not merely a definitional one. Courts asked to determine whether a given document qualified as an "instrument of writing for the pay of money" were deciding whether statutory remedies — often summary or expedited collection procedures — applied, which made the classification consequential.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence provide only a truncated reference: "MENT OF MONEY, (in a statute). 2 Whart. (Pa.) 209." The entry as preserved is fragmentary — the leading portion of the term ("INSTRU-") has been cut off in the source, with only "-MENT OF MONEY" surviving. This is a known artifact of the dictionary's print layout and columnar formatting. Taken in full, the entry catalogues the phrase "INSTRUMENT OF WRITING FOR THE PAY[MENT] OF MONEY" as a statutory term and cites a single Pennsylvania authority for its construction.
The dictionary makes no attempt to define the phrase independently, treating it as self-explanatory within its statutory home. This is consistent with the period practice of legal dictionaries functioning more as case-finding tools than as sources of substantive definition. The brevity of the entry signals that contemporaneous practitioners would have understood the general category — written payment instruments — and needed only the case citation to resolve specific questions of statutory scope.
No other source dictionaries in the present corpus address this phrase. Bouvier and Black, in their standard editions, do not carry a dedicated entry, though both discuss "instruments in writing" and "instruments for the payment of money" in related contexts under broader headings such as BILL, NOTE, and BOND.
Jurisdictional Note
The phrase appears specifically in a Pennsylvania statutory context as reflected in the Rapalje & Lawrence citation to Wharton's Pennsylvania Reports. Researchers working outside Pennsylvania should not assume the phrase carried the same statutory meaning in other jurisdictions, where equivalent statutes may have used different formulations.