The right and wrong test seems to prevail in Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and in the Federal courts. 1 To that test seems to be added the power to control acts, in Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. While in Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, and New Hampshire, responsibility would seem to be left in broad terms to the jury.3 The required proof of insanity is either preponderance of testimony, or satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden to establish a prima facie case rests upon the accused; after which the prosecution may rebut. The defendant is not entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt whether he was or was not insane. See DOUBT, Reasonable. That the accused is more ignorant and stupid than common men, of bad education, and of bad passions and bad habits, does not excuse. Those qualities are but the common causes of crime. To constitute the crime of murder, the assassin must have a reasonably sane mind. "Sound memory and discretion," in the old common-law definition of murder, means that. The condition of mind of an irresponsibly insane man cannot be separated from his act. If he is laboring under disease of his mental faculties to such extent that he does not know what he is doing, or does not know that it is wrong, he is wanting in that sound memory and discretion which make a part of the definition of murder. As insanity is the exception, the law presumes sanity. It is for the defendant to prove insanity in the first instance, to show that the presumption is a mistake as far as it relates to him. Mind can only be known by its outward manifestations, - the language and conduct of the man. By these his thoughts and emotions are read, and according as they conform to the practice of people of sound mind, who form the large majority of mankind, or contrast harshly with it, we form our judgment as to his soundness of mind. Was the accused's ordinary, permanent, chronic condition of 1 25 Ala. 21; 71 id. 393; 24 Cal. 230; 62 id. 54, 120; 10 Conn. 136; 46 id. 330; 1 Houst. Cr. 249; 42 Ga. 9; 45 id. 57; 25 La. An. 302; 34 id. 186; 57 Me. 574; 3 S. & M. 518; 64 Mo. 591; 4 Neb. 407; 21 N. J. L. 196; 52 N. Y. 467; 75 id. 159; Phil. L. R. 376; 3 Heisk. 348; 40 Tex. 60; 20 Gratt. 860; 40 Wis. 304; 57 id. 56; 1 Cliff. 118. 231 Ind. 492; 88 id. 27; 25 Iowa, 67; 41 id. 232; 1 Duv. 224; 7 Met. 500; 13 Minn. 341; 23 Ohio, 146; 4 Pa. 264; 76 id. 414; 78 id. 128; 88 id. 291; 100 id. 573. $31 111. 385; 11 Kan. 32; 17 Mich. 9; 19 id. 401; 43 N. H. 224; 50 id. 369. See generally 16 Cent. L. J. 282-86 (1883), cases; 17 id. 408-10 (1883), cases; 36 Alb. Law J. 326-31 (1887), cases. State v. Johnson, 91 Mo. 443 (1886); United States v. Ridgeway, 31 F. R. 144 (1887). As to "reasonable doubt," see also 18 Cent. Law J. 402-5 (1884), cases. • United States v. Cornell, 2 Mas. 109 (1820), Story, J.; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550 (1883). See also 16 Cent. Law J. 282-86 (1883), cases; 4 Crim. Law Mag. 512-14 (1883), cases; Med. Leg. J., Sept. 1883; Wash. Law R., May, 1883. mind such, in consequence of disease, that he was unable to understand the nature of his actions, or to distinguish between right and wrong in his conduct? Was he subject to insane delusions that destroyed his power of so understanding? And did this continue down to and embrace the act for which he is tried? If so, he was simply an irresponsible lunatic. The answer of the judges in M'Naghten's Case has not been deemed entirely satisfactory, and the courts have settled down upon the question of knowledge of right and wrong as to the particular act, or rather the capacity to know it, as the test of responsibility. Distinction must be made between mental and moral obliquity; between a mental incapacity to understand the distinctions between right and wrong, and a moral indifference and insensibility to those distinctions. Indifference to what is right is not ignorance of it, and depravity is not insanity.1 The opinion of a non-professional witness as to the mental condition of a person, in connection with a statement of the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, upon which that opinion is formed, is competent evidence. In a substantial sense, and for every purpose essential to a safe conclusion, the mental condition of an individual, as sane or insane, is a fact, and the expressed opinion of one who has had adequate opportunities to observe his conduct and appearance is but the statement of a fact. Insanity is a condition, which impresses itself as an aggregate on the observer.2 See DELIRIUM; DELUSION; INTELLIGENCE; LUCID INTERVAL; WILL, 1. Sometimes, the insufficiency of the entire property and assets of an individual to pay his debts - the general and popular meaning. In a more restricted sense, inability to pay debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business, The term is used in the latter sense when traders and merchants are said to be insolvent, also in bankrupt laws. With reference to persons not engaged in trade and commerce, the term may have a less restricted meaning. Opposed, solvency, q. v. In the sense of the Bankrupt Act, means that a party, whose business affairs are in question, is unable United States v. Guiteau, 10 F. R. 163, 166, 167-68, 182-83 (Jan. 25, 1882), Cox, J.; note and cases to same, pp. 189-203, by Dr. Wharton. 2 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U. S. 618-20 (1884), Harlan, J.; 1 Whart. & S. Med. J. § 257. Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall. 47 (1871), Field, J. See Clarion Bank v. Jones, 21 id. 338 (1874); Cunningham v. Norton, 125 U. S. 90 (1888). C