_INROLL. A form of “enroll,” used in the old books. 3 Rep. Ch. 63.73; 3 Bast, 410. Y. Supp. 920. On the other hand, lunacy is a total deprivation or suspension of the ordinary powers of the mind, and is to be distinguished from imbecility, where there is a more or less advanced decay and feebleness of the Intellectual facultles. In re Vanauken, 10 N. J. Eq. 186, 195; Odell v. Buck, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 142. As to all other forms of insanity, lunacy was originally distinguished by the occurrence of lucid intervals, and hence might be described as a periodical or recurrent insanity. In re Anderson, 132 N. C. 243, 43 S. E. 649; Hiett v. Shull, 36 W. Va. 563, 15 S. E. 146. But while these distinctions are still observed in sume Jjurisdictions, they are more generally disregarded ; so that, at present, in inquisitions of lunacy and other such proceedings, the term “lunacy” has almost everywhere come to be synonymous with “insanity,” and is used as a general description of all forms of derangement or mental unsoundness, this rule being established by statute in many states and by judicial decisions in others. In re Clark, 175 N. Y. 139, 67 N. FE. 212; Smith v. Hickenbottom, 57 Iowa, 733, 11 N. W. 664; Cason v. Owens, 100 Ga. 142, 28 S. E. 75; In re Hill, 31 N. J. Ey. 203. Cases of arrested mental development would come within the definition = of lunacy, that is, where the patient was born with a normal brain. but the cessation of mental growth occurred in infancy or so near it that he never acquired any greater intelligence or discretion than belongs to a normally healthy child. Such a_ subject might be scientifically denominated an “idiot,” but not legally, for in law the latter term is applicable only to congenital amentia. The term “lucid interval’ means not an apparent tranquility or seeming repose, or cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, or a simple diminution or remission -of the disease, but a teinporary cure—an intermission so clearly marked that it perfectly resembles a return of health; and it must be such a restoration of the faculties as enables the patient beyond doubt to comprehend the nature of his acts and transact his affairs as usual; and it must be continued for a length of time sufficient to give certainty to the temporary restoration of reason. Godden v. Burke, 35 La. Ann. 160, 173; Ricketts v. Joliff, 62 Miss. 440; Ekin v. MeCracken, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 534; Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 260. Idiocy is congenital amentia, that is, a want of reason and intelligence existing from birth and due to structural defect or malformation of the brain. It is a congenital obliteration of the chief mental powers, and is defined in law as that condition in which the patient has never had, from his birth, even the lenst glimmering of reason; for a man is not legally an “idiot” if he can tell his parents, his age, or other like common matters, This is not the condition of a deranged mind, but that of a total absence of mind, so that, while idiocy is generally classed uncer the general designation of “‘insanity,” it is rather to be regarded as a nat: ural defect than as a disease or as the re sult of a disease. It differs from “lunacy,” because there are no lucid intervals or periods of ordinary intelligence. See In re Beaumont, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 53, 20 Am. Dec. 33; Clark y. Robinson, 88 Ill. 502; Crosswell v. People, 18 Mich. 427, 87 Am. Dec. 774; Hiett v. Shull, 36 W. Va. 563, 15 S. B. 146; Thompson v. Thompson, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 128; In re Owings, 1 Bland (Md.) 386, 17 Am. Dec. 311; Francke v. His Wife, 29.La. Ann. 304; Hall v. Unger, 11 Fed. Cas. 261; Bicknell v. Spear, 38 Misc. Rep. 389, 77 N. Y. Supp. 920. Imbecility. A more or less advanced decay and feebleness of the intellectual faculties; that weakness of mind which, without Gepriving the person entirely of the use of his reason, leaves only the faculty of conceiving the most common and ordinary ideas and such as relate almost always to physical wants and habits. It varies in shades and degrees from merely excessive folly and eccentricity to an almost total vacuity of mind or amentia, and the test of legal capacity, in this condition, is the stage to which the weakness of mind has advanced, aS measured by the degree of reason, judgment, and memory remaining. It may proceed from paresis or general paralysis, from senile decay, or from the advanced stages of any of the ordinary forms of insanity; and the term is rather descriptive of the consequences of insanity than of any particular type of the disease. See Calderon v. Martin, 50 La. Ann. 1153, 23 South. 909; Delafield v. Parish, 1 Redf. (N. Y.) 115; Campbell v. Campbell, 130 Ill. 466, 22 N. E. 620, 6 L. R. A. 167; Messenger v. Bliss, 35 Ohio St. 392. Non compos mentis. Lat. Not of sound mind. <A generic term applicable to all insane persons, of whatsoever specific type the insanity may be and from whatever cause arising, provided there be an entire loss of reason, as distinguished from mere weakness of mind. Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 244; In re Beaumont, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 53; Burnham v. Mitchell, 34 Wis. 186; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 537, 84 Am. Dec. 97; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 350, 50, Am. Dec. 329: Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 207, 15. Am. Dec. 354; Stanton v. Wetherwax, 16 Barb. (N. Y.)- 262. Derangement. This term includes all forms of mewtal unsoundness, except of the natural born idiot. Hiett v. Shull, 36 W. Va. - 663, 15 S. E. 147. Delusion is sometimes loosely used as synonymous with insanity. But this is incorrect. Dehision is not the substance but the evidence of insanity. The presence of an insane delusion is a recognized test of insanity in all cases except amentia and Imbectlity, and where there is no frenzy or raving nadae a. a ness: and in this sense an insane delusion is a fixed belief in the mind of the patient of the existence of a fact which has no objective existence but is purely the figment of his imagination, and which is so extravagant that no sane person would believe it under the circumstances of the case, the belief, nevertheless, being so unchangeable that the patient is incapable of being permanently disabused by argument or proof. The characteristic which distinguishes an “insane’’ delusion from other mistaken beliefs is that it is not a product of the reason but of the imagination, that is, not a mistake of fact induced by deception, fraud, insufficient evidence, or erroneous reasoning, but the spontaneous conception of a perverted imagination, having no basis whatever in reason or evidence. Riggs v. Missionary Soc., 35 Hun (N. Y.) 658; Buchanan v. Pierie, 205 Pa. 123, 54 Atl. 583, 97 Am. St. Rep. 725; Gass v. Gass, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 283; Dew v. Clarke, 3 Add. 79; In re Bennett’s Estate, 201 Pa. 485, 51 Atl. 336; In re Scott’s Estate, 128 Cal. 57, 60 Pac. 527; Smith v. Smith, 48 N. J. Eq. 566, 25 Atl. 11; Guiteau’s Case (D. C.) 10 Fed. 170; State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241; In re White, 121 N. Y. 406, 24 N. larly called “St. Vitus’ dance.”—Puerperal insanity is mental derangement occurring in women at the time of child-birth or immediately after ; it is also called “eclampsia parturientium.”—Folie brightique. A French term sometimes used to designate an access of insanity resulting from nephritis or Say hes disease.” See In re McKean’s Will, 31 Misc. Rep. 703, 66 N. Y. Supp. 44.—Delirlum tremens. A disease of the nervous system, induced by the excessive and protracted use of intoxicating liquors, and affecting the brain so as to produce incoherence and lack of continuity in the intellectual processes, a suspension or perversion of the power of volition, and delusions, particularly of a aida br nature, but not generally prompting to violence except in the effort to escape from imaginary dangers. It is recognized in law as a form of insanity, and may be of such a nature or intensity as to render the patient legally incapable of .committing a crime. United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 1, 26 Fed. Cas. . 1093; Insurance Co. v. Deming, 123 Ind. 384 24 .N. E. 86; Maconnehey v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77; Erwin v. State, 10 Tex. App. 700; Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500, 62 Am. Dec. 5339. In some states the insanity of alcoholic intoxication is classed as ‘temporary,’ where induced by the voluntary recent use of ardent spirits and carried to such. a degree that the person becomes incapable of judging the consequences or the moral aspect of his acts, and “settled,” where the condition is that of delirium tremens. Settled insanity, in this sense, excuses from civil or criminal responsibility; temporary insanity docs not. The ground of the distinction is that the former is a remote effect of imbibin alcoholic liquors and is not voluntarily incurred, while the latter is a direct result cola ay ss ag for. E\vers v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 318, 20 S. W. 744, 18 L. R. A. 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811; Maconnehey v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77. hilitic insanity is paresis or progressive imbecility resulting from the infection of syphilis. It is sometimes called (as being a sequence or result of that disease) “‘metasyphilis”’ or “parasyphilis."—Tabetic dementia, A form of mental] derangement or insanity complicated with ‘“‘tabes dorsalis” or locomotor ataria, which generally precedes, or sometimes follows, the mental attack. As to insanity resulting from cerebral embolism, see EMBOLISM $ from epilepsy, see Eritepsy. As to chronic alcoholism as a form of insanity, see ALCOHOL- it denotes a clouding or weakening of the mind, not inconsistent with some measure of memory, reason, and judgment. But the term. in this sense, does not convey any very definite meaning, since it may range from mere feeble-mindedness to almost the last stages of imbecility. State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 383, 9 Am. Rep. 242; Appeal of Dunham, 27 Conn. 205.—Recurrent imsanity. Insanity which returns from time to time, hence equivalent to “lunacy” (see supra) in its common-law sense, as a mental disorder broken by lucid intervals. There is no presumption that fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are continuous. Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 3 S. W. 538, 58 Am. Rep. 638.— Moral insanity. <A morbid perversion of the feelings, affections, or propensities, but without any illusions or derangement of the intellectual faculties; irresistible impulse or an incapacity to resist the prompting of the passions, though accompanied by the power of discerning the -moral or immoral character of the act. Moral insanity is not admitted as a bar to civil or criminal responsibility. for the patient’s acts, unless there is also shown to be intellectual disturbance, as manifested by insane delusions or the other recognized criteria of legal insanity. Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 3 8. W. 589, 58 Am. Rep. 638; In re Forman’s Will, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 291; State v. Leehman, 2 8. D. 171, 49 N. W. 3. The term “emotional insanity’ or mania transitoria applies to the case of one in the possession of his ordinary pees 3 faculties who allows his passions to convert him into a temporary maniac. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, Ed. 236.—Psychoneurosis. Mental disease without recognizable anatomical lesion, and without evidence and history of preceding chronic mental degeneration. Under this head come melancholia, mania, primary acute dementia, and menia hallucinatoria. Cent. Dict. “Neuro sis,” in its broadest sense, may include any disease or disorder of the mind, and hence all the forms of insanity proper. But the term “psychoneurosis” is now employed by Freud and ot er Kuropean specinlists to describe that class of exaggerated individual peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of thought towards special objects. or topics which are absent from the perfectly normal mind, and which yet have so httle influence upon the patient’s conduct or his general modes of thought that they cannot properly be described as “insanity” or as any form of “mania,” especially because ordinarily unaccompanied by any kind of delusions. At most, they lie on the debatable border-land between sanity and insanity. These idiosyncrasies or obsessions may arise from superstition, from a real incident in the patient’s past history upon which he has brooded until it has assumed an unreal importance or significance, or from general neurasthenic conditions. Such, for example, are a terrified shrinking from certain kinds of animals, unreasonable dread of being shut up in some enclosed place or of being alone in a crowd, excessive fear of being poisoned, groundless conviction of irredeemable sinfulness, and countless other prepossessions, which may range from mere weak-minded superstition to actual monomania.—Katatonia. <A form of insanity distinguished by periods of acute mania and melancholia and especially by cataleptic states or conditions; the “insanity of rigidity.’’ (Kahlbaum.) A type of insanity characterized particularly by “stereotypism,” an instinctive inclination to purposeless repetition of the same expressions of the will, and ‘“‘negativism,” a senseless resistance against every outward influence. (Kraepelin.)}—Folie ciroulaire. The French name for circular insanity or maniacaldepressive insanity.—General paralysis. Dementia paralytica or paresis. Amentia, dementia, and mania. The classification of insanity into these three types or forms, though once common, has of late given 583, 21 L-. way to a more scientific nomenclature, based chiefly on the origin or cause of the disease in the particular patient and its clinical history. These terms, however, are still occasionally encountered in medical jurisprudence, and the names of some of their subdivisions are in constant use. Amentia. A total lack of intelligence, reason, or mental capacity. Sometimes so used as to cover imbecility or dotage, or even as ap: plicable to all forms of insanity; but properly restricted tq a lack of mental aerags 4 due to original defective organization of the brain Wcsey) or arrested cerebral development, as istinguished from the degeneration of intellectual facuities which once were normal. Demontia...A form of Sretaee resulting from degeneration or disorder of the brain (ideopathic or traumatic, but not congenital) and characterized by general menta]) weakness and decrepitude, forgetfulness, loss of coherence, and total inability to reason. but not accompanied by delusions or uncontrollable ganpulecs: Pyott Il]. App. 221; Hall v. Unger, 2 . 10, Fed: Cas. No. 5,949; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531, 84 Am. Dec. 97; People v. Lake, 2 Parker, Cr. R. (N. Y.) 218. By some writers dementia is classed as a terinal stage of various forms of insanity, and ence may follow mania. for example, as its final condition. Among the sub-divisions of dementia should be noticed the following: Acute primary dementia is a form of temporary dementia, though often extreme in its intensity, and occurring in young people or adolescents, accompanied by general physical debility or exhaustion and induced by conditions likely to roduce that state, as malnutrition, overwork, issipation, or too rapid growth. Dementia parralytica is a progressive form of insanity, bes pons with slight degeneration of the physical, ntellectual, and moral power: and leading to complete loss of mentality, or imbeclility, with genera’ paralysis. Also called paresis, paretic ementia, or cirrhosis of the brain, or (popularly) “softening of the brain.” Dementia precoa. A term applicable either to the early stages of dementia or to the dementia of adolescence. but more commonly applied to the latter. It is often (but not invariably) attributable to onanism or self-abuse, and is characterized by mental and moral stupidity, absence of any strong feeling of the impressions of life or interest in its events, blunting or obscuration of the moral sense, weakness of judgment, flichtiness of thought, senseless Jaughter without mirth. automatic obedience. and apathetic despondency. (Kraepelin.) Senile dementia. Dementia occur ring in persons of advanced age, and characterized by slowness and weakness of the mental processes and general physical degeneration, verging on or passing into imbecility, indicating the breaking down of the mental powers fn advance of bodily decay. HBiett v. Shull, 36 W. Va. 163. 15 S. E. 146: Pyott v. Pyott, 191 Til. 280, 61 N. E. 88; McDaniel v. McCoy, 68 Mich. 332. 36 N. W. 84; Hamon v. Hamon, 180 Mo. 685, 79 S. W. 422. Tonic dementia. Weakness of mind or feeble cerebral activity, apvronching imbecility. resulting from continued administration or use of slow poisons or of the mere active poisons in repeated sm1ll doses, as in cises of lead poisoning and in some cases of addiction to such drugs as opium or alcohol. Mania. That form of insanity in which the patient is subject to hallucinations ard illusion accompanied by a high state of general menta excitement, sometimes amovnting to fury. See ‘Hall v. Unger, 2 Abb. U. S. 510, 11 Fed. Cas. 261; People v. Lake, 2 Parker Cr. R. (N. Y.) 218: Smith v. Smith, 47 Miss. 211: In re Gannon’s Will, 2 Misc. Rep. 329, 21 -N. Y. Supp. 960. In the case first above cited. the following description is given by Justice Fieid: “Mania is that form of insanity where the men- tal derangement is accompanied with more or less of excitement. Sometimes the excitement amounts to a fury. The individual in such casevs is subject to hallucinations and illusions. He is impressed with the reality of events which have never occurred, and of things which do not exist, and acts more or less in conformity with his belief in these particulars, The mania may be general, and affect all or most of the operations of the mind; or it may be partial, and be confined to particular subjects. In the latter case it is generally termed ‘monomania.’” In a more popular but less scientific sense, “mania” denotes a morbid or unnatural or excessive craving, issuing in impulses of such fixity and intensity that they cannot be resisted by the patient in the enfeebled state of the will and blurred moral concepts which accompan the disease. It is used in this sense in su compounds as “homicidal mania,” “dipsomania,” and the like.—Hypomania. A mild or slightly developed form or type of mania.—Mono<« ma - A perversion or derangément of the reason or understanding with reference to a single bit beak or small class of subjects, with considerable mental excitement and delusions, while, as to all matters outs'de the range of the peculiar infirmity, the intellectual faculties remain unimpaired and function i ea Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 380, 83 Am. Dec, 231; In re Black’s Estate, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 27; Owing’s Case, 1 Bland (Md.) 388, 17 Am. Dec. 311; Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 70, 45 S. W. 21; In re Gannon’s Will, 2 Misc. Rep. 329, 21 N. Y. Supp. 960.—Paranoia. Monomania in general, or the obsession of a delusion or system of delusions which dominate without destroying the mental capacity. leaving the patient gane as to all matters outside their particular range, though subject to perverted ideas, false beliefs, and uncontrollable impulses within that range; and particularly, the form of monomania where the delusion is as to wrongs, injuries, or persecution inflicted upon the patient and his consequently justifiable resentraent or revenge. Winters v. State, 61 N. J. Law, 613, 41 Atl. 220; People v. Braun, 158 N. Y. 558, 53 N. E. 529; Flanagan v. State, 108 Ga. 619, 30 S. E. 650. Paranoia is called by Kraepelin “progressive systematized insanity,’’ because the delusions of being wronged or of persecution and of excessive self-esteem develop quite slowly, without independent disturbances of emotional] life or of the will becoming prominent, and because there occurs regularly a mental working up of the delusion to form a delusionary view of the world,—in fact, a system,—'eading to a derangement of the stand-point which the patient takes up towards the events of life.—Homiciaal mania. A form of mania in which the morbid state of the mind manifests itself in an irresistable inclination or impulse to commit homicide, prompted usually by an insane delusion either as to the necessity of self-defense or the avenging of injuries, or as to the patient being the appointed instrument of a superhuman justice. Com. v. Sayre, 5 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 425; Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 266.—Methomania. An irresistible craving for alcoholic or other intoxicating liquors, manifested by the periodical recurrence of drunken debauches. State v. Savage, 89 Ala. 1, 7 South. 183, 7 L. R. A. 426.—Dipso-« mania, Practically the same thing as methomania, except that the irresistible impulse to intoxication is extended by some writers to include the use of such drugs as opium or cocaine as well as alcohol. See State v. ra a, 9 Houst. (Del. 470, 14 Atl. 550; allard v. State, 19 Neb. 609, 28 N. W. 271.—Mania a potu. Delirium tremens, or a species of temporary insanity resulting as a secondary effect produced by the excessive and protracted indulence in intoxicating liquors. See State v. Hurey, Houst. Cr. Cas. (Del.) 28, 33.—Toxicomania. An excessive addiction to the use of toxic or poisonous drugs or other substances; a form of mania or affective insanity ebaractertis_by an irresistible impulse to indulgence in oplum, cocaine, chloral, alcohol, etc.—Mania fanatica. A form of insanity characterized by a morbid state of religious feeling. Ekin v. McCracken, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 540.—Sebastomamia. Keligious insanity: demonomania.—Megalomania. The so-called “delirium of grandeur” or “folie de grandeur ;” a form of mania in which the besetting delusion of the patient is that he is some person of great celebrity or exalted rank, historical or contemporary.—Kleptomania. A species (or symptom) of munia, eonsisting in an irresistible igs elt to steal. Looney v. State, 10 Tex. App. 525, 38 Am. Rep. 646; State y. Reidell, 9 Houst. (Del.) 470, 14 Atl. 550.—Pyromania. Incendiarism; a form of affective insanity in which the mania takes the form of an irresistible impulse to burn or set fire to things —Oikei mania, a form of insanity manifesting itself in a morbid state of the domestic affections, as an unreasonable dislike of wife or child without cause or provocation. Ekin v. McCracken, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 540.—Nymphomania. A form of mania characterized by & morbid. excessive, and uncontrollable cravin for sexual intercourse. This term is appli only to women. The term for a corresponding mania in men is “satyriasis."—Erotomania. A form of mania similar to nymphomania, except that the present term is applied to patients of both sexes, and that (according to some authorities) it is applicab'e to all cases of excessive sexual craving irrespective of origin; while nymphomania is restricted to cases where the disease is caused by a local disorder of the sexual organs reacting on the brain. And it is to be observed that the term “erotomania” is now often used, especially by French writers, to describe a morbid propensity for “falling in love” or an exaggerated and excited condition of amativeness or love-sickness, which may affect the general physical health, but is not necessarily correlated with any sexual craving, and which, though it may. unnaturally color the imagination and distort the subject’s view of life and affairs, does not at all amount to insanity, and should not be so considered when it leads to crimes of violence, as in the too common case of a rejected lover who kills his mistress.—-Necrophilism. <A form of affective insanity manifesting itself in an unnatural and revolting fondness for corpses, the patient desiring to be in their presence, to caress them, to exhume them, or sometimes to mutilate them, and even (in a form of sexual perversion) to violate them. Melancholia. Melancholia is a form of insanity the characteristics of which are extreme mental depression, associated with delusions and hallucinations, the latter relating especially to the financial or social position of the patient or to impending or threatened dangers to his person, property, or reputation, or issuing in distorted conceptions of his relations to socicty or his family or of his rights and duties in general. . Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. 92, 27 Am. Rep. 689; State v. Reidell, 9 Houst. ae 470, 14 Atl. 551; People v. Krist, 168 N. Y¥. 19, 60 N. E. 1057. Hypochondria or hypochondriasis. A form of melancholia in which the patient has exaggerated or causeless fears concerning his health or suffers from imaginary disease. TJoziphodia. Morbid dread of being poisoned; a form of insanity manifesting itself by an excessive and unfounded apprehension of death by poison. Specific definitions and applications in law. There are numerous legal proceedings where insanity may be shown, and the rule for establishing mental capacity or the want of it varies according to the object or purpose of the proceeding. Among there may be enumerated the following: A criminal prosecu- tion where Insanity is alleged as a defense; a proceeding to defeat a will on the ground of the insanity of the testator; a suit to avoid a contract (including that of marriage) for similar reasons; a proceeding to secure the commitment of a person alleged to be insane to an asylum; a proceeding to appoint a guardian or conservator for an alleged lunatic; a plea or proceeding to avoid the effect of the statute of limitations on account of insanity. What might be regarded as insnnity in one of such cases would not necessarily be so regarded in another.’ No definite rule can be laid down which would apply to all cases alike. Snyder v. Snyder, 142 III. 60, 31 N. E. 303; Clarke v. Irwin, 63 Neb. 539, 88 N. W. 783. But the following rules or tests for specific cases have been generally accepted and approved: In criminal law and as a defense to an accusation of crime, insanity means such a perverted and deranged condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render the person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or to render him at the time unconscious of the nature of the act he is committing, or such that, though he may be conscious of it and also of its normal quality, so as to know that the act in question is wrong, yet his will or volition has been (otherwise than voluntarily) so completely destroyed that his actions are not subject to it but are beyond his control. Or, as otherwise stated, insanity is such a state of mental derangement that the subject is incompetent of having a criminal intent, or incapable of so controlling his will as to avoid doing the act in question. Davis v. U. S., 165 U. S. 373, 17 Sup. Ct. 360, 41 L. Ed. 750; Doherty v. State, 73 Vt. 380, 50 Atl. 1113; Butler v. State, 102 Wis. 364, 78 N. W. 590; Rather v. State, 25 Tex. App. 623, 9 S. W. 69; Lowe v. State, 118 Wis. 641, 96 N. W. 424; Genz v. State, 59 N. J. Law, 488, 37 Atl. 69, 59 Am. St. Rep. 619; In re Guiteau (D. C.) 10 Fed. 164; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482; People v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120, 45 Am. Rep. 651; Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 284, 22 S. E. 570; Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312; State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S. W. 734; Hotema v. U. S., 186 U. S. 418, 22 Sup. Ct. 893, 46 L. Ed. 1225. Testamentary capacity includes an intelligent understanding of the testator’s property, its extent and items, and of the nature of the act he is about to perform, together with a clear understanding and purpose as to the manner of its distribution and the persons who are to receive it. Lacking these, he is not mentally competent. The presence of insane delusions is not inconsistent with testamentary capacity, if they are of such a nature that they cannot reasonably be supposed to have affected the dispositions made by the will; and the same is true of the various forms of monomania and of all kinds of eccentricity and personal idiosyncrasy. But imbecility, senile dementia, and all forms of systemntized mania which affect the understanding and judgment generally disable the patient from making a valid will. See Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 585, Fed. Cas. No. 6,141; Smee v. Smee, 5 Prob. Div. 8t; Banks v. Goodfellow, 39 Law J. R., Q. B., 248; Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495; Whitney v. Twombly, 1386 Mass. 147; Lowder v. Lowder, 58 Ind. 540; In re Halbert’s Will, 15 Mise. Rep. 308, 37 N. Y. Supp. 757; Den v. Vancleve, 5 N. J. Law, 660. . As a ground for avoiding or annulling a contract or conveyance, insanity does not mean a total deprivation of reason, but an inability, from defect of perception, memory, and judgment, to do the act in question or to understand its nature and consequences. Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 260. The insanity must have entered into and induced the particular contract or conveyance; it lust appear that it was not the act of the free and untrammeled mind, and that on account of the diseased condition of the mind the person entered into a contract or made a conveyance which he would not have made if he had been in the possession of his reason. Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N. W. 276, 40 Am. St. Rep. 468; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 537, 84 Am. Dec. 97. Insanity sufficient to justify the annulment of a marriage meuns such a want of understanding at the time of the marriage as to render the party incapable of assenting to the contract of marriage. The morbid propensity to steal, called “kleptomania,” does not answer this description. Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323, 9 L. R. A. 505, 20 Am. St. Rep. 539. As a ground for restraining the personal liberty of the patient, it may be said in general that the form of insanity from which he suffers should be such as to make his going at large a source of danger to himself or to others, though this matter is largely regulated by statute, and in many places the law permits the commitment to insane asylums and hospitals of persons whose insanity does not manifest itself in homicidal or other de structive forms of mania, but who are incapable of caring for themselves and their property or who are simply fit subjects for treatment in hospitals and other institutions specially designed for the care of such patients. See, for example, Gen. St. Kan. 1901, § 6570. To constitute insanity such as will authorize the appointment of a guardian or conservator for the patient, there must be such a deprivation of reason and judgment as to render him incapable of understanding and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life; a want of sufficient mental capacity to transect ordinary business and to take care of and manage his property and affairs. See Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Ill. 60, 31 N. E. 3083; In re Wetmore’s Guardianship, 6 Wash. 271, 33 Pac. 615. Insanity as a plea or proceeding to avoid the effect of the statute of limitations means practically the same thing as in relation to the appointment of a guardian. On the one hand, it does not require a total deprivation of reason or absence of understanding. On the other hand, it does not include mere weakness of mind short of imbecility. It means such a degree of derangement as renders the subject incapable of understanding the nature of the particular affair and his rights and remedies in regard to it and incapable of taking discreet and intelligent action. See Burnham v. Mitchell, 34 Wis. 134. There are a few other legal rights or relations into which the question of insanity enters, such as the capacity of a witness or of a voter; but they are governed by the same general principles. The test is capacity to understand and appreciate the nature of the particular act and to exercise intelligence in its performance. A witness must understand the nature and purpose of an oath and have enough intelligence and memory to relate correctly the facts within his knowledge. So a voter must understand the nature of the act to be performed and be able to make an intelligent choice of candidates. In either case, eccentricity, “crankiness,” feeble-mindedness not amounting to imbecility, or insane delusions which do not affect the matter in hand, do not disqualify. See District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 521, 2 Sup. Ct. 840, 27 L. Ed. 618; Clark v. Robinson, 88 Ill. 502, Insanus est qui, abjecta ratione, omnia cum impetu et furore facit. He is insane who, reason being thrown away, does everything with violence and rage. 4 Coke, 128. And see State v. O’Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 33 Pac. 287, 24 L. BR. A. 550. And see Cheney v. Price, 90 Hun, 238, 37 N. Y. Supp. 117; In re Black's Estate, 1 Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 24; In re Mason, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 380; Hart v. Miller, 29 Ind. App. 222, 64 N. E. 239; In re Lindsley, 44 N. J. Eg. 564, 15 Atl. 1, 6 Am. St. Rep. 913; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531, 84 Am. Dec. 97; Edwards vy. Davenport (C. C.) 20 Fed. 758; Witte v. Gilbert, 10 Neb. 539, 7 N. W. 288; Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 300.