Definition
A Latin phrase meaning "in its individual, specific, or identical form." Used to describe the return or delivery of a thing as the very same thing, not a substitute or equivalent. When a legal obligation requires performance in individuo, the obligated party must return or deliver the precise, specific object itself — not a replacement, money equivalent, or fungible substitute.
The phrase is closely associated with bailment law, where it describes the bailee's duty to return the exact item entrusted, rather than merely something of equal kind or value.
Common Language
This is pure Latin legal terminology with no meaningful common English counterpart. The phrase is not used in ordinary speech. Omitting COMMON LANGUAGE section.
Common Confusion
IN INDIVIDUO vs. IN SPECIE: The two phrases are frequently treated as synonymous in legal sources, and the historical dictionaries themselves use each to define the other. In practice, they are nearly interchangeable. The slight distinction, where one is drawn, is that in specie emphasizes the kind or species of thing (coin for coin, cattle for cattle), while in individuo emphasizes the numerical identity of the very object itself — this specific horse, this specific barrel. Researchers should not assume a meaningful doctrinal distinction between the two phrases when encountered in older texts; context in the source governs.
IN INDIVIDUO vs. IN GENERE: These are genuine opposites. An obligation in genere is satisfied by delivering anything of the same class or kind. An obligation in individuo requires the identical thing. The distinction tracks the civil law division between specific and generic obligations.
Why It Matters in Research
This phrase appears almost exclusively in older legal sources, particularly treatises and equity materials dealing with bailment, specific performance, and the civil law of obligations. Researchers working in pre-twentieth-century case law or treatise literature will encounter it most often in the context of what a bailee owes and whether a court of equity can compel return of a specific item.
The phrase has largely fallen out of active judicial use. Modern courts expressing the same concept use plain English — "the specific item," "the identical property," "in kind" — or rely on the doctrine of specific performance. Researchers using full-text search in modern materials should pivot to these functional equivalents; a search for in individuo in contemporary caselaw will return very little.
In historical sources, the phrase signals a key doctrinal question: whether the obligation at issue is one of specific restitution or merely generic compensation. This has direct relevance to remedy analysis — courts of equity intervened precisely when in individuo return was required but damages were inadequate. Researchers tracking the history of specific performance in equity should treat occurrences of this phrase as markers of that remedial question.
The Burrill entry adds a secondary meaning — "in particular; particular; special" — that is not emphasized in the other dictionaries. This broader usage occasionally appears in older ecclesiastical and civil law materials where the phrase describes particularity of description rather than identity of object. Be alert to this contextual variation when reading pre-nineteenth-century sources.
Historical Dictionary Support
All four historical dictionaries agree on the core definition: delivery or return of the distinct, identical, specific thing. Black's (both editions), Bouvier, and Burrill all cite Story on Bailments § 97 as the authoritative source, reflecting how completely this phrase was anchored in that single treatise in American legal usage.
Burrill is the only dictionary to note the secondary meaning ("in particular; special"), which suggests broader civil law usage that the American bailment treatise tradition did not foreground. Researchers working in civil law jurisdictions or with older English ecclesiastical sources should note this extension.
None of the historical dictionaries develop the contrast with in genere or engage with the remedial implications of the phrase, which are doctrinally more significant than the definitions suggest. The entries are definitional placeholders pointing to Story rather than independent analytical treatments.
Jurisdictional Note
The phrase carries more doctrinal freight in civil law jurisdictions, where the distinction between specific and generic obligations is a formal category in the law of obligations. In common law jurisdictions, the concept survives through specific performance doctrine and the rules governing what a bailee must return, but the Latin phrase itself is not in active use.