utory provisions for the exemption of a certain amount or value of realty, occupied by a person as his homestead, from a forced sale for the payment of his debts. In some States restraints are placed upon alienation by the owner, and in some the property descends to the widow and minor children free from liability for his debts. The estate is like an estate for life.1 It is settled: 1. That the object of the homestead law is to protect the family of the owner in the possession and enjoyment of the property. 2. That that construction must be given such laws which will best advance and secure their object. 3. To divest a homestead estate, there must be a literal compliance with the mode of alienation prescribed by statutes.2 While a very limited estate in the land, perhaps even a leasehold, may support a claim, some estate is essential. Where the "joint consent" of a husband and wife is essential to the alienation of a homestead, the better rule is to have it evidenced by their signatures to the same instrument, before the same officer, and in the presence of each other.4 The act of May 20, 1862, is the first homestead law of the general government. By it a quantity of land not exceeding 160 acres is given to any person who is the head of a family, or who is twenty-one, and a citizen or intends to become such, on condition of settlement, cultivation, and continuous occupancy as a home for the period of five years. See ABANDON; The killing of any human creature.7 A generic term, embracing every mode by which the life of one man is taken by the act of another.8 Criminal homicide consists in the unlawful taking by one human being of the life of another in such a manner that he dies within a 1 See Barney v. Leeds, 51 Ν. Η. 261 (1871); Fink υ. O'Neil, 106 U. S. 275 (1882); 10 Am. Law Reg. 641-56, 705-17 (1862), cases; 20 id. 1-17, 137-50 (1871), cases, -as to the Southern States; Thompson, Homest, &c. §1; 4 Cal. 26, 33; 33 id. 226; 11 Ga. 89; 1 Iowa, 439; 18 Tex. 415; 34 Wis. 657; 61 id. 374; 102 U. S. 321; 1 Bouvier, Law Dict. 754. 2 Howell v. McCrie, 36 Kan. 644 (1887), cases, Simpson, Commissioner. 3 Myrick v. Bill, 3 Dak. 292 (1884), cases. Howell v. McCrie, 36 Kan. 645 (1887). *R. S. §§ 2289-2317; Seymour v. Sanders, 3 Dill. 441 (1874). Waiving the right, Linkenhoker's Heirs v. Detrick, 81 Va. 44, 56 (1885), cases. F. homicide, manslaughter: L. homicidium; or, a man-killer: L. homicida: homo, a man; cædere, to kill. 14 Bl. Comm. 177. year and a day from the time of the giving of the mortal wound.1 If committed with malice, express or implied, it is murder; if without malice, manslaughter. The injury must continue to affect the body of the victim till death. If death ensues from another cause, no murder or manslaughter has been committed. The person who unlawfully sets the means of death in motion, whether through an irresponsible instrument or agent, or in the body of the victim, is the guilty cause of the death at the time and place at which his unlawful act produces its fatal result.1 Homicidal. Involving or directed toward the killing of a fellow man: as, homicidal intent, or monomania. "Homicide," as a term, does not necessarily import crime: it includes acts which are crimes. The distinctions denoted by "fratricide," "matricide," "parricide," "patricide," "regicide," "sororicide," are not observed in law. But "prolicide," destroying offspring, "fœticide," killing an unborn child, "infanticide," killing an infant soon after its birth, and "suicide," killing one's self, are employed in senses which involve, more or less, commission of crime. Killing is justifiable, excusable, or felonious. Justifiable homicide. When a life is taken in the performance of a duty or the exercise of a right. This is (1) owing to some unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention, or design, and without any inadvertence or negligence in the party killing, and is, therefore, without blame. Or, it is (2) for the advancement of public justice - by permission: as, where an officer kills a person who resists lawful arrest; where one kills a person charged with felony; killing in dispersing a riot, or by a jailer to prevent an escape. In these cases there must be an apparent necessity. Of this character, also, is killing in war; and so were deaths in trials by battle. To this grade likewise belong killings to prevent forcible or atrocious crimes: as, robbery, murder, burglary, arson; but not mere larceny from the person, nor house-breaking in the day-time. A husband or father may kill for attempted rape,2-flagrante crimine. Where one in defense of his person, habitation, or property kills another, who manifestly intends and endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a forcible or atrocious felony, such killing is justifiable homicide. In that case, also, the justification must depend upon the circumstances as they appear to the prisoner. Excusable homicide. When a life is lost by an accident in the lawful doing of a proper act, or is taken to prevent death or grievous injury to another person. 1 Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 6-8 (1869), cases, Gray, J. 24 Bl. Com. 178-82. 3 Parrish v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 1, 14-16 (1884), cases. See in general, 26 Am. Law Reg. 706-8 (1887), & Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 303 (1850), cases; committed from necessity, 1 Law Quar. Rev. Shaw, C. J. 51-61 (1885). (33) See DEFENSE, 2;