GRESS

4 definitions found across Law Mind sources

GRESSAuthored
The Law Mind • 855 words
Definition
Gress is a root term appearing in legal usage almost exclusively in compound forms — ingress, egress, and regress — that together describe the right to enter, traverse, and return from a property or piece of land. Standing alone, "gress" has no independent legal definition of substance; its legal significance is entirely contextual and compositional. The three derived terms function as a set: 1. Ingress: The right to enter land or premises. 2. Egress: The right to leave or exit land or premises. 3. Regress: The right to return to land again and again as often as reasonably necessary. In practice, the phrase "ingress, egress, and regress" appears as a fixed legal formula in leases, easement grants, and conveyances to confirm that a party holding a right of access may exercise it repeatedly and completely — not merely once.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "Gress" does not appear as a standalone English word in modern general usage. Its derivatives — ingress, egress — are used in everyday contexts (building codes, event management, emergency planning) to mean simply entry and exit. Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Webster's 1913 similarly treats "gress" only as a root element, not an independent entry. "Ingress" and "egress" appear as ordinary English words meaning going in and going out, respectively. Editorial note: The gap in legal usage is not between common and legal meaning but between the casual pairing of "ingress and egress" in modern usage and the traditional legal formula "ingress, egress, and regress." Non-lawyers routinely omit regress, which in legal instruments is the operative term confirming the right of repeated return — the element most likely to matter in a tenancy or emblements dispute.
Common Confusion
The three-part formula is frequently collapsed. Modern drafters and lay readers often write only "ingress and egress," treating egress as sufficient to imply the right of return. It is not identical. Regress specifically confirms the right of repeated access — historically tied to tenants entitled to emblements (the right to return to harvest crops planted before a tenancy ended). Dropping regress from an access grant may leave the scope of the right ambiguous in jurisdictions that read instruments narrowly. Ingress should not be confused with the abolished writ of ingressu (or ingressu), a separate ancient common-law writ by which a plaintiff sought re-entry into lands wrongfully held. That writ was abolished in England in 1833 and is a distinct historical artifact, not a synonym for the access right described here.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encountering "gress" alone in historical instruments should treat it as a drafting fragment or root reference, not a standalone legal concept. The research work lies in the compound terms. The formula "ingress, egress, and regress" is heavily period-dependent. In older leases and conveyances — particularly those predating the twentieth century — all three terms appear regularly as a matter of drafting convention. In modern instruments, the formula is frequently shortened or replaced by general access language, which can create interpretive questions when disputes arise over the scope of an easement or access right. The emblements connection is a specific historical trap: when researching tenant rights in agricultural leases, regress is the term that unlocks the right to re-enter and harvest. Sources that only index ingress and egress will miss this dimension. The Rapalje & Lawrence source material pulled for this entry is not relevant to gress; it reflects a cross-reference error in the source corpus. Researchers should be aware that historical dictionary compilations occasionally produce stray entries under loosely related headwords.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary addresses gress through its compound forms, explaining that regress denotes the right to go on land again and again as often as may be reasonably necessary, specifically illustrating with the case of a tenant entitled to emblements. It also describes ingress, egress, and regress together as expressing the lessee's right to enter, go upon, and return from the lands in question. These two entries are consistent and complementary. Bouvier's Law Dictionary adds the historical dimension most useful to researchers: the writ of ingressu, an ancient Latin form by which a plaintiff sought entry into his lands, abolished in 1833. Bouvier distinguishes this from the access-right formula, though the shared Latin root creates a surface similarity that can mislead. Bouvier's definition of the access formula aligns with Black's. Neither dictionary provides a standalone definition for "gress" as an independent term, which is consistent with its function as a root rather than an operative legal word. Rapalje & Lawrence contributes nothing substantive to this term; the source material associated with it in the corpus is unrelated.
Jurisdictional Note
The formula "ingress, egress, and regress" is rooted in English common law and appears across American jurisdictions that inherited that tradition. The abolished writ of ingressu is relevant only to English legal history and pre-1833 English sources; it has no ongoing American procedural counterpart.
Related Terms
Ingress — Egress — Regress — Emblements — Easement of access — Right of way — Ingressu (writhistorical) — Tenancy — License (land access)
GRESSmain
Black's Law Dictionary • 1891
An expression used to denote that a person has the right to go on land again and again as often as may be reasonably nec- essary. Thus, in the case of a tenant enti- tled to emblements.
GRESSmain
Black's Law Dictionary • 1891
These words express the right of a lessee to enter, go upon, and return from the lands in question.
GRESSmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
"Contempts" punishable are either direct, which openly insult or resist the powers of the courts, or the persons of the judges who preside there, or else are consequential, which (without such gross insolence or direct oppo- sition) plainly tend to create a universal disregard of their authority. 104 Ky. 155, 46 S. W. 515. "Contempts" may arise by anything in short that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect which, when once courts of justice are deprived of their authority is entirely lost among the people. 160 Ky. 660, 170 S. W. 37. One deceiving the court by falsely pretend- ing to be sick is guilty of "contempt." 160 Ky. 664, 170 S. W. 37. One filing a false answer is guilty of "con- tempt." 160 Ky. 664, 170 S. W. 37. See CIVIL CONTEMPT; CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT; ORDER PUNISHING FOR CON- TEMPT: See DIRECT CONTEMPT. CONTEMPTIBILITER (L. Lat. con- temptuously; Lat. contemptus). In Old English Law. Contempt, con- tempts. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 60, § 35.

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