grant be informal, or if he grants an estate contrary to the rules of law, - the grant is absolutely void.1 By a grant everything passes which is necessary to the full enjoyment of the right, title, or estate which is included in the words. A grant of a mere way carries an easement only -- the ownership of the soil not being essential to the free use of the right. But a grant of an estate designated only by the particular use for which the land is appropriated will pass the fee; as, a grant of "a house," "a wharf," "a mill," "a well," "a barn," and the like.2 With respect to "public grants," the rule is, that rights, privileges, and immunities not expressly granted are reserved. Nothing can be presumed against the State. There would be no safety to public interests in any other rule. The rule applies with special force where the claim would abridge or restrain a power of government, as, the power of taxation.3 Where a statute operates as a grant of public property to an individual, or the relinquishment of a public interest, and there is a doubt as to the meaning of its terms, or as to its general purpose, that construction should be adopted which will support the claim of the government rather than that of the individual. Nothing can be inferred against the State. Such acts are usually drawn by interested parties; and they are presumed to claim all they are entitled to. The rule serves to defeat any purpose concealed by the skillful use of terms, to accomplish something not apparent upon the face of the act, and thus sanctions only open dealing with legislative bodies. A more liberal rule of construction is allowable in interpreting a grant from one State or political community to another, than is permitted in interpreting a private grant. Where power or jurisdiction is delegated to any public officer or tribunal, and its exercise is confided to his or their discretion, acts done are binding as to the subject-matter; and individual rights will not be disturbed collaterally for anything so done. The only questions which can arise between an individual claiming a right under the acts and the public, or a person denying its validity, are power in the officer and fraud 12 Bl. Com. 346-48, 121, 380. 2 Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corporation v. Chandler, 9 Allen, 164 (1864), Bigelow, C. J.; Johnson v. Rayner, 6 Gray, 110 (1856), cases; United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumn. 500 (1833); Bank of British North America v. Miller, 7 Saw. 163 (1881), cases; Green Bay, &c. Canal Co. v. Hewitt, 66 Wis. 464-65 (1886): Lowell v. Strahan, 145 Mass. 1, 11 (1887), cases; 26 Am. Law Reg. 722-26 (1887), cases; 19 Cent. Law J. 446 (1884)-Solic. Journ. 3 The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 225 (1873), Field, J. See also Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 id. 62 (1874); Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold, &c. Co., 93 U. S. 638 (1876); Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 id. 371 (1882), cases; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 id. 531 (1883), cases Hannibal, &c. R. Co. v. Missouri River Packet Co., 125 id. 271 (1588), cases; Swann v. Jenkins, 82 Ala. 482 (1886); Omaha Horse R. Co. v. Cable Co., 30 F. R. 828 (1887), cases. Limitation on legislative grants, 26 Am. Law Reg. 65-71 (1887), cases. • Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U. S. 437 (1884), Field, J. Indiana v. Milk, 11 Biss. 205 (1882), Gresham, J. in the party. All other questions are settled by the decision made by the tribunal or officer, whether exесutive, legislative, judicial, or special, unless an appeal is provided for, or other revision, by some appellate or supervisory tribunal, is prescribed. In no case have documents of title, executed by officers of the government, been held sufficient where the fact in issue was whether the government had any title to convey, to establish the fact in dispute, as against parties claiming a pre-existing, adverse, and paramount title themselves.¹ No one can grant what he does not own." See DARE, Nemo, etc. See CHARTER, 2; CONDITION; DEED, 2; DELIVERY; DISCLAIMER, 2; DISPARAGEMENT, 2; INCIDENT; LAND, Public; PATENT 1 (1), 2. 4. To confer, bestow, allow, permit, award, issue: as, to grant a rule to show cause, letters testamentary or of administration, a writ of certiorari, habeas corpus, or mandamus. See CARE; CHARTER, 1; SEAL, 1. Compare GRAND; GROSS; MAGNUS. Greater. Larger; superior; chief; principal. The greater includes the less. The greater power of making wholly new legislation includes the lesser power of altering old legislation.4 The withdrawal or extinguishment of the greater carries the less; thus, the withdrawal or extinguishment of a franchise authorizes the withdrawal or extinguishment of every right which is a part of the franchise.5 1 Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U. S. 280 (1888), cases, Matthews, J., quoting United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. *727 (1832), cases. 223 How. 175; 1 Wall. 254; 11 id. 459; 94 U. S. 382; 95 id. 10; 34 La. An. 791. See 1 Greenl. Ev. § 66. ▲ Exp. Siebold, 100 U. S. 384 (1879). 5 Atlantic & Gulf R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 365 (1878); 54 Ga. 401; Branch v. Jesup, 106 U. S. 478 (1882); 21 Wall. 175; 111 U. S. 270.