Definition
A gift is a voluntary transfer of property from one person (the donor) to another (the donee), made without consideration — that is, without payment, exchange, or the obligation of blood relationship as a legal basis. Three elements are universally required: (1) the transfer must be voluntary, (2) it must be gratuitous (no consideration), and (3) it must be executed, typically by delivery of the property or its equivalent.
In the law of personal property, a gift transfers ownership of movable goods or money. In real property law, the term historically described a specific form of conveyance — a deed whose operative words were "do" or "dedi" (I give, or I have given) — and in English common law carried the particular meaning of a conveyance of an estate in fee tail. Modern usage has largely shed the formal conveyance distinction; in contemporary practice, gift refers to any gratuitous transfer regardless of the property type, and the critical legal questions usually concern completion, delivery, and donative intent.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Something given to another voluntarily, without charge; also a talent or natural ability; something gained incidentally without effort.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Anything voluntarily transferred by one person to another without compensation; a present or offering; also the act or power of bestowing; and notably, a bribe.
The ordinary meanings of "gift" track the legal definition more closely than most legal terms do, but two gaps matter for research. First, the legal definition requires completion by delivery — an announced intention to give, without transfer of possession or its equivalent, is not a legally enforceable gift. Common usage attaches no such requirement. Second, Webster's 1913 includes "bribe" as a recognized sense, reflecting scriptural and archaic usage; this meaning is wholly separate from the legal concept and should not be read into historical legal sources that use the term.
Core Elements
To constitute a valid inter vivos gift, courts generally require:
1. DONATIVE INTENT — The donor must intend to make an immediate, present transfer of the property, not a future promise to give.
2. DELIVERY — Actual, constructive, or symbolic delivery of the property sufficient to divest the donor of dominion and control.
3. ACCEPTANCE — The donee must accept the gift; acceptance is presumed for beneficial transfers but can be disclaimed.
All three elements must be satisfied at the time of the transfer. A gift that is incomplete — particularly one lacking delivery — is typically unenforceable and revocable during the donor's lifetime.
Recognized Forms
/SUBTYPES
INTER VIVOS GIFT — A gift made between living persons, effective immediately and irrevocable once complete.
GIFT CAUSA MORTIS — A gift made in anticipation of the donor's imminent death, conditional on the donor's death from the contemplated cause. Unlike an inter vivos gift, it is revocable and lapses if the donor recovers.
TESTAMENTARY GIFT — A transfer made by will, effective only at death; governed by the law of wills, not the law of gifts.
GIFT OF REALTY (HISTORICAL) — In English common law, the formal conveyance of a freehold or fee tail estate using donative operative words; distinguished from feoffment and grant by Blackstone and Watkins on Conveyancing as reflecting the motive rather than the form of the transaction.
CHARITABLE GIFT — A gratuitous transfer to a qualifying charitable organization; subject to distinct tax rules governing deductibility.
Why It Matters in Research
Several navigational points are critical for researchers working in the Law Mind corpus.
DELIVERY REQUIREMENT IN HISTORICAL SOURCES: Older sources — including Blackstone, Kent, and the historical dictionaries here — emphasize delivery as an essential element but do not always distinguish clearly between actual, constructive, and symbolic delivery. Researchers tracing gift law in equity, particularly gifts of choses in action or interests in trust, will find the doctrine more complex than the baseline definitions suggest. The constructive delivery cases accumulated heavily in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
REAL PROPERTY USAGE IN HISTORICAL SOURCES: Burrill, Bouvier, and both Black's editions carry the English common law sense of "gift" as a conveyance of lands in tail using donative language. This technical meaning is obsolete in American practice but appears in older deeds and conveyancing treatises. A researcher encountering "gift" in a pre-twentieth-century instrument relating to real property should consider whether the fee tail meaning is implicated.
TAX LAW INTERSECTION: The federal gift tax, enacted in 1932 and substantially restructured in 1976 as part of the unified transfer tax system, gives "gift" a statutory meaning that diverges from common law in important respects — particularly around the concept of adequate and full consideration, transfers in trust, and the annual exclusion. Researchers moving between common law gift doctrine and tax materials must be alert to this divergence. The Law Mind Tax Encyclopedia entries on gift tax and the exclusions for gifts and inheritances address these distinctions directly.
GIFT VS. PROMISE: The common law refuses to enforce a gratuitous promise as a gift on the ground that it lacks the delivery and present transfer required to complete the gift, and lacks the consideration required to enforce a contract. This creates a doctrinal gap — the "imperfect gift" problem — that courts have addressed inconsistently. Researchers should cross-reference promissory estoppel and constructive trust doctrines when the gift fails at the delivery stage.
DONATIVE INTENT OVER TIME: The California Civil Code definition quoted in Black's first edition — that a gift "is a transfer of personal property, made voluntarily and without consideration" — was among the early statutory codifications. Researchers working in code states versus common law states may find the elements articulated differently, with some codes reducing emphasis on delivery for certain property types.
Historical Dictionary Support
The five historical sources are in close agreement on the core definition, all tracking Blackstone's formulation: a voluntary, gratuitous conveyance or transfer not founded on consideration of money or blood. Black's (1st and 2nd editions) and Burrill quote 2 Bl. Comm. 440, 2 Steph. Comm. 102, and 2 Kent, Comm. 437 as common authorities, establishing that the definition was settled and citation-stable by the mid-nineteenth century.
Bouvier adds a useful refinement from Watkins on Conveyancing — that "gift" denotes the motive of a conveyance rather than its form, so that a feoffment or grant becomes a gift when it is gratuitous. This insight separates the transactional category from the documentary form, a distinction that matters when reading historical instruments.
Anderson's Dictionary is notable for emphasizing delivery: "An immediate, voluntary and gratuitous transfer of his personal property by one to another, the transfer being executed by delivery." Anderson further notes that "as a general rule, delivery is essential" — a qualification the other sources treat as implicit rather than express. This makes Anderson's the most practically specific of the shelf sources on this point.
Burrill preserves the English-law meaning of gift as a conveyance in tail, which neither Black's edition nor Bouvier develops at equal length. Burrill's observation that the operative words are "do" or "dedi" echoes Bouvier's similar note, and together they explain why the term appears as a term of art in older English conveyancing materials where American readers might expect "deed" or "grant."
No shelf source directly addresses gift causa mortis as a separate entry under this headword; researchers must look to that term independently. Similarly, the tax dimension is entirely absent from all historical sources, as expected given the date of the federal gift tax.
Jurisdictional Note
The delivery requirement varies in application across jurisdictions. Some states have relaxed strict actual delivery requirements for gifts of intangibles, securities held in brokerage accounts, and interests in entities. Louisiana's civil law tradition treats donations (including gifts) through a distinct framework requiring notarial acts for inter vivos donations of immovable property exceeding certain values. Federal tax law defines "gift" for gift tax purposes by reference to transfers for less than adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth — a standard that can capture transfers that would not constitute gifts under common law.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Gift Tax Overview (The Law Mind Tax Encyclopedia)
Exclusions — Gifts and Inheritances (The Law Mind Tax Encyclopedia)
Gift-Splitting, Tuition and Medical Exclusions, and Special Gift Tax Rules (The Law Mind Trusts, Estates & Probate Encyclopedia)