Definition
A Latin adverb meaning "generally" or "in general terms." In legal usage, *generaliter* appears principally in the context of the maxim *Generaliter dicta generaliter sunt interpretanda* — "things expressed in general terms are to be interpreted generally." The term signals that a word, phrase, or provision is to receive its broadest natural construction rather than a narrowed or restricted reading. It functions as both a standalone term of drafting description and as a structural component of a canon of construction.
Common Confusion
*Generaliter* is sometimes loosely associated with the broader principle that ambiguous provisions should be construed against the drafter, but the two are distinct. The maxim built around *generaliter* is not about resolving ambiguity — it applies precisely when language is *not* ambiguous but is simply broad. The instruction is to honor that breadth, not to supply a meaning where the text is unclear.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encounter *generaliter* almost exclusively in one of two contexts: (1) as a citation anchor for the interpretive maxim in older treatise and digest literature, or (2) as a shorthand in pleading discussions where general versus particular pleading is at issue.
The interpretive canon itself has a long shelf life. The underlying principle — that general language receives general construction — survived the transition from Latin maxim to English common law doctrine and remains operative in statutory interpretation today, though modern courts rarely cite the Latin. A researcher tracing interpretive canons backward through primary sources will find *generaliter* appearing in digests and citation clusters without further explanation, on the assumption that the reader recognizes it. Missing this can cause a researcher to misread the scope of a holding or the intent behind a cited passage.
The Rapalje & Lawrence entry under this headword contains a notable mismatch: the text supplied is not a definition of *generaliter* at all, but rather an entry for "Generals of Orders" — a completely different subject. This appears to be a printing or indexing error in the source. Researchers relying on Rapalje & Lawrence for this term should treat that entry with caution and cross-reference Burrill's, which provides the accurate and useful entry.
Historical sources that deploy *generaliter* as a term of pleading art — distinguishing *generaliter* pleading from particular or special pleading — use it in a procedural sense that is effectively obsolete under modern civil procedure. In that older context, to plead *generaliter* was to make a general rather than particularized allegation. Conflating this procedural usage with the interpretive canon usage will produce confusion when reading older pleading treatises alongside substantive law authorities.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's is the controlling source here. The entry correctly identifies *generaliter* as a Latin adverb derived from *generalis*, defines it as "generally," and ties it immediately to its operative legal context: the maxim *Generaliter dicta generaliter sunt interpretanda*, with references to Digest 50.17.78 and Sheppard's *Touchstone* at page 88. Burrill also notes the variant formulation *Generaliter dictum generaliter interpretandum*, citing 1 Eden 96. This dual-form treatment is useful because historical researchers may encounter either phrasing and need to recognize them as expressing the same canon.
Rapalje & Lawrence, as noted above, is unreliable for this entry. The headword appears correctly, but the definition supplied belongs to an entirely different subject. This is the kind of source error that an uncritical reader could import into research without recognizing the problem.
Neither dictionary addresses the term's procedural usage in pleading, which is recoverable from older common law pleading treatises rather than general law dictionaries.
Jurisdictional Note
The maxim associated with *generaliter* is a general common law canon of construction with no jurisdiction-specific variation in its formulation. Its weight and frequency of application vary by court and era, but it is not a creature of any particular jurisdiction's statutes or rules.