Definition
A Latin adjective meaning "general." In legal usage, *generalis* appears primarily as a component of maxims and doctrinal phrases governing the interpretation of legal instruments — deeds, statutes, contracts, and other written documents. Standing alone, it is not a term of art but a grammatical building block for several established interpretive rules. Its most significant appearance is in the maxim *generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae antea specialiter sunt comprehensa*: a general clause does not extend to those things already provided for specially. This principle operates whenever a document addresses specific matters first, then concludes with a broad or sweeping provision. The general language is read as not re-absorbing what the specific language has already carved out.
A related superlative form, *generalissimum*, meaning "most general" or "the broadest category," appears occasionally in taxonomic legal discourse — for example, in discussions of how property classifications proceed from the broadest genus downward to specific kinds.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): *General* means relating to the whole rather than particulars; widespread; not specialized.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "Relating to a genus or kind; pertaining to a whole class or order; not special or particular; including all, or nearly all."
The gap between common and legal usage here is not one of definition but of function. In ordinary English, *general* simply describes breadth. In legal Latin maxims, *generalis* carries a technical interpretive consequence: general words appearing after specific words are presumed not to expand beyond what the specific words already cover. A reader familiar only with the ordinary meaning of "general" would not anticipate this limiting, rather than broadening, effect.
Common Confusion
*Generalis* is sometimes conflated with the principle it generates. The maxim *generalis clausula non porrigitur* is the operative rule; *generalis* alone is merely the adjective. Researchers should not treat the term as itself a doctrine. Additionally, this maxim is closely related to — but distinct from — *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* (the expression of one thing excludes others) and the *ejusdem generis* canon (general words following specific words are limited to the same class as the specific). These three canons work in overlapping but not identical territory. *Generalis clausula non porrigitur* applies specifically when prior special provisions exist and a later general clause threatens to swallow them. *Ejusdem generis* applies when general words follow a list and their scope must be bounded. Conflating them leads to misapplication.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers will encounter *generalis* almost exclusively as a fragment of a longer Latin phrase rather than as a standalone entry. When tracking the interpretive canon it anchors, be aware that:
**Deed construction:** The maxim arose most frequently in the conveyancing context. Historical English cases construed deed parcels that ended in sweeping general language after detailed specific descriptions. The general words were read as catching only what the special words had not already addressed. Rapalje & Lawrence's incomplete entry gestures at this: the general clause does not extend to things specially comprehended earlier. Researchers working with pre-modern property instruments should apply this rule carefully — the general habendum or warranty clause at the end of an early deed does not necessarily grant more than the premises clause.
**Statutory interpretation:** The same logic migrated into statutory construction. A statute dealing specifically with a subject in one section is not displaced by a later general provision unless legislative intent to displace is clear. This remains active doctrine in both common law jurisdictions.
**Corpus navigation:** Because *generalis* appears embedded in maxims, full-text searches for the word alone will retrieve not only relevant hits but also passages discussing unrelated Latin phrases that happen to use the word. Searching the full maxim string will return more precise results. Cross-reference against *ejusdem generis* and *expressio unius* entries when examining any interpretive canon in the same document cluster.
**Historical layering:** The maxim cited in Burrill traces to *Altham's Case*, 8 Co. 154b — an early seventeenth-century English report. This means the canon was established common law well before American independence and carried into American courts without statutory enactment. Its force in American jurisdictions derived from inherited common law, not codification, which affects how researchers find it applied in early American case law.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill provides the most complete treatment, offering both the Latin maxim and its translation, and anchoring it to Coke's Reports. The gloss is accurate: where specific words precede general words in the same instrument, the general words do not reopen what the specific words settled. Burrill also notes the superlative *generalissimum*, citing Blackstone, which signals that the term had taxonomic as well as maxim-based usage in classical common law writing.
Rapalje & Lawrence's entry is fragmentary — the text reproduced here breaks off mid-sentence — but is consistent with Burrill's account. Both dictionaries treat *generalis clausula non porrigitur* as the primary legal significance of the term. Neither dictionary addresses statutory interpretation applications explicitly, reflecting that canon-of-construction doctrine in those sources was primarily developed through property law rather than through administrative or regulatory materials. Researchers applying this maxim outside the deed context should account for that historical framing.
Neither source addresses the relationship to *ejusdem generis* directly, which became more systematically discussed in later nineteenth and early twentieth century treatises on statutory interpretation.
Jurisdictional Note
The canon is recognized across common law jurisdictions, including England, the United States, Canada, and Australia, though it operates as a presumption of interpretation rather than a mandatory rule. Courts may override it when legislative or drafting intent to the contrary is clear. Civil law jurisdictions have analogous rules but do not use the Latin maxim.