GENERALE

Definition

Generale is a Latin and Law French term with two distinct uses in historical legal sources. 1. (Ecclesiastical/monastic law) The usual or ordinary daily commons — that is, the standard food and provisions — provided to members of a religious house. Distinguished from pietantiae (or pietantiæ), which were supplementary allowances granted on special or extraordinary occasions beyond the regular commons. 2. (Latin maxim law) A term meaning "a general thing" or "a general expression," appearing principally as the subject of two foundational maxims of legal interpretation: — Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum: A general expression is to be interpreted generally. A broadly worded instrument, statute, or recital should receive a broad construction unless context restricts it. — Generale nihil certi implicat: A general expression implies nothing certain. Where language is general and unspecific, it does not carry the force of a particular, definite statement — and therefore cannot, for example, work an estoppel in the way that a precise recital would. A third maxim, preserved in Burrill, extends the principle: Generale tantum valet in generalibus, quantum singulare in singulis — a general expression is as effective in general matters as a specific one is in particular matters.

Common Confusion

The ecclesiastical meaning and the maxim-law meaning share the same word but arise in entirely different research contexts. A researcher encountering generale in a monastic or canon law source is reading about provisions and commons; a researcher encountering it in a pleading, evidence, or deed context is reading about interpretive rules. Historical dictionaries sometimes present both meanings in the same entry without clearly flagging the distinction, which can mislead. Generale should also be distinguished from its Law French form, which Burrill records as generalement (generally) — an adverbial form appearing in Britton and similar early sources, not a substantive legal concept.

Why It Matters in Research

The practical significance of generale in modern legal research lies almost entirely in the two Latin maxims, not in the ecclesiastical commons definition. Researchers working with deed construction, statutory interpretation, or evidence — particularly estoppel by recital — will encounter these maxims cited without translation or explanation in older treatises and judicial opinions. The maxim Generale nihil certi implicat carries specific doctrinal weight in the law of evidence: a general recital in a deed does not estop the maker in the same way a particular, certain statement would. This principle appears in Best on Evidence and is grounded in Doddington's Case (2 Co. 34b). Researchers tracing the estoppel-by-recital doctrine in early equity and common law sources need to recognize this maxim as a limiting principle — courts applying it were rejecting arguments that a broad, non-specific recital had binding effect. The interpretive maxim Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum (8 Coke, 116a) operates in the opposite direction: it counsels against artificially narrowing a general expression. It appears in statutory construction arguments throughout the 18th and 19th centuries and remains traceable in treatises on statutory interpretation. Researchers should note that this maxim interacts with — and sometimes tensions against — the maxim that general words following specific ones are restricted to the same class (ejusdem generis). The two maxims are not contradictory but apply at different analytical stages; conflating them is a recurring error in historical argument. For researchers in ecclesiastical or monastic legal history, the generale/pietantiae distinction is relevant to disputes over provisions, benefices, and the governance of religious houses — a narrow but occasionally significant area when working with pre-Reformation English ecclesiastical records.

Historical Dictionary Support

All four source dictionaries agree on the ecclesiastical definition, each tracing it to Cowell's Interpreter. This convergence suggests Cowell is the proximate authority for that meaning in the English legal tradition, and researchers should consult Cowell directly for fuller context. On the maxim content, Black's (both editions) and Rapalje & Lawrence are more selective, presenting the two principal maxims. Burrill is the richest source here: it separately identifies the Law French sense of generale, records the adverbial form generalement with a citation to Britton, and preserves the third maxim (tantum valet in generalibus) that the other dictionaries omit. Burrill also correctly identifies Doddington's Case as the authority for the nihil certi implicat maxim — a citation that Black's renders imprecisely. None of the historical dictionaries provide analytical commentary on how these maxims interact with one another or with the broader body of interpretive canons. Researchers should treat the dictionary entries as finding aids pointing to the primary sources, not as doctrinal analysis.

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