Definition
An archaic term for the act of forcible dispossession or compulsory expulsion, particularly as it relates to ouster from real property. In its legal sense, forcement denotes the wrongful forcing of a person out of possession of land or tenements through physical compulsion or unlawful pressure — essentially the forcible dimension of an ouster. The term appears in older common law pleading and property contexts as a descriptor of the manner by which dispossession is accomplished, distinguishing unlawful compulsion from peaceful or constructive displacement.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): The act of forcing; compulsion.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): The act of forcing; compulsion. [Obs.] Illustrated by J. Webster: "It was imposed upon us by constraint; And will you count such forcement treachery."
Both sources mark the word as obsolete in ordinary English. The legal and common meanings are not far apart in substance — both center on compulsion — but the legal usage is narrower and more technical, referring specifically to forcible dispossession in a property context rather than compulsion in any general sense. A researcher encountering "forcement" in a historical pleading should not read it as merely meaning persuasion or pressure; the term carries the specific connotation of physical or unlawful force applied to deprive a person of possession.
Common Confusion
Forcement and ouster are closely related but not identical. Ouster is the broader category — the dispossession of a person from real property — and may be accomplished by various means, including those that are constructive or non-physical. Forcement describes the forcible mode of accomplishing such a dispossession. Similarly, forcement should not be confused with forcible entry (the act of entering land by force) or forcible detainer (the wrongful holding of possession after lawful entry). Forcement focuses on the expulsive act, not the entry or retention.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers are most likely to encounter "forcement" in older common law pleading materials, writs, and treatises on real property actions — particularly in discussions of disseisin, novel disseisin, and related possessory remedies. The term is essentially obsolete in modern legal writing, so its appearance in a source is itself a dating and context signal: the document is drawing on pre-nineteenth-century common law vocabulary or is a close secondary source of that tradition.
The Rapalje & Lawrence entry does not define forcement directly; instead, the relevant entry is filed under OUSTER, with citations to Connecticut and Massachusetts decisions and to Chitty's General Practice. This indirect placement is a trap for researchers browsing alphabetically. A researcher looking for "forcement" in that dictionary will find nothing under that headword and must instead pursue the ouster entry and its subdivisions — particularly "what constitutes" ouster and "what is not" ouster — to find the substantive doctrine the term touches.
Because both Webster's 1913 and Wiktionary flag the word as obsolete, researchers should not expect it to appear in modern statutory codes or contemporary case law. Its value is almost entirely in reading and interpreting historical sources: writs, early American and English equity pleadings, and nineteenth-century treatises on real property and possessory actions.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence does not carry a standalone entry for FORCEMENT. The relevant material is consolidated under OUSTER, with citations addressing what constitutes an ouster (11 Pet. (U.S.) 41; 1 Mass. 323; 3 Mass. 523; 4 Mass. 418), what does not constitute an ouster (7 Mass. 381), and a reference to Chitty's General Practice (1 Chit. Gen. Pr. 374) for procedural context. The Connecticut citation (30 Conn. 492, 497) addresses ouster's definition. This structure reflects the nineteenth-century practice of subsuming manner-of-dispossession vocabulary under the broader doctrine rather than giving it independent treatment.
Webster's 1913 preserves forcement as an obsolete common English word, confirmed by Wiktionary, which suggests the term had already fallen out of active use by the time the major legal dictionaries of that era were compiled. This explains its absence as an independent headword in Rapalje & Lawrence — by the time American legal lexicography was being systematized, the term was receding from active pleading practice.
No significant divergence exists between the sources on the core meaning. All agree on compulsion or force as the central idea. The gap is between the general common-language sense and the specific legal-property application, which the common dictionaries do not capture.
Jurisdictional Note
Forcement as a term of art is rooted in English common law and early American common law property practice. No modern American jurisdiction uses the term in statutes or contemporary court rules. Researchers working in jurisdictions that retained strong common law pleading traditions into the nineteenth century — Massachusetts and Connecticut prominent among them, as reflected in the Rapalje & Lawrence citations — are most likely to encounter it in reported decisions from that period.