Definition
Formulaic Latin-origin phrases used as introductory words in common law pleading, specifically in declarations (the plaintiff's opening pleading in a civil action at common law).
FOR THAT: The standard introductory phrase beginning the statement of a cause of action in a declaration. It signals the transition from the formal opening of the writ or declaration into the substantive allegations of the plaintiff's grievance.
FOR THAT WHEREAS (also rendered FOR THAT WHERE): An amplified variant of the same introductory formula, combining "for that" with a recital clause ("whereas") to introduce background facts or circumstances preceding the main allegation. The "whereas" component introduces a narrative or recital of underlying facts upon which the cause of action depends, before the pleader states the specific wrong complained of.
Both phrases are artifacts of the formal system of common law pleading and have no operative role in modern civil procedure.
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Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "For that" functions in ordinary English as a causal conjunction meaning "because" or "in order that." "Whereas" functions as a conjunction meaning "in contrast to the fact that" or, in formal documents, as an introductory recital phrase.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "For that" was recognized as an archaic or formal conjunction meaning "because." "Whereas" was defined as introducing a preamble or recital of facts, as in legal instruments and legislative acts.
The legal pleading use is narrower and more technical than either common sense suggests. In common or documentary usage, "whereas" introduces a recital that stands on its own. In a declaration, "for that whereas" functions as a unified pleading formula — a term of art signaling the commencement of the gravamen — not simply a causal or contrastive conjunction. A researcher encountering these phrases in historical pleadings should not read them as substantive prose connectives but as structural markers with fixed procedural meaning.
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Common Confusion
These phrases are easily misread by researchers unfamiliar with common law pleading conventions. "For that" in a declaration does not mean "because" in the ordinary causal sense; it is a pleading term of art initiating the statement of claim. Similarly, "for that whereas" should not be parsed as two separate logical operators. The entire phrase functions as a single formulaic unit. Confusing the pleading formula with ordinary conjunctive usage can lead to misreading the structure and substance of historical declarations.
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Why It Matters in Research
Researchers working with pre-code common law pleadings — particularly English pleadings and early American state court records predating the adoption of code pleading in the mid-nineteenth century — will encounter these phrases frequently. They are structural markers, not substantive legal language, and understanding their function is essential to correctly parsing the grammar of a declaration.
The phrase "for that whereas" signals that what follows is first a recital of background facts (the "whereas" clause) and then the specific allegation. This two-part structure was conventional in many forms of action, particularly in assumpsit and case, where contextual facts needed to be laid before the breach or wrong was stated. Misidentifying where the recital ends and the operative allegation begins can distort a researcher's understanding of what the plaintiff actually claimed.
These phrases disappear from American pleading practice with the adoption of the Field Code in New York (1848) and its subsequent influence on other states, and from federal practice with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938). Any pleading containing these phrases post-dates the common law period and likely originates in a jurisdiction that retained common law pleading forms longer than most, or is reproducing a historical form for reference purposes.
The Rapalje & Lawrence reference to Hammond's Nisi Prius (Hamm. N. P. 9) situates these phrases within the nisi prius practice context — trial-level common law proceedings — where declarations were regularly filed and their formal requirements closely scrutinized.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence is the sole source dictionary for this entry and treats the terms briefly but precisely: "introductory words in pleading," with a cross-reference to Hammond's Nisi Prius and two American case references for "for that whereas" specifically. The entry distinguishes between "for that" (the base formula) and "for that whereas" (the variant used in declarations), which reflects genuine pleading practice — the "whereas" form was more common in declarations, while "for that" alone appeared in other pleading contexts.
The citation to 2 Mass. 358 and 4 Wheaton's American Criminal Law 205 (4 Wheel. Am. C. L. 205) grounds the "for that whereas" form in early American practice, confirming that English common law pleading conventions carried into the early republic substantially intact.
No major American legal dictionaries of the period (Bouvier, Black's early editions) give these phrases extended treatment, likely because they were understood by practitioners as self-evident pleading formalities requiring no elaboration. Their brevity in reference works is itself informative: these were known quantities to any common law practitioner, not contested or ambiguous terms.
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Jurisdictional Note
These phrases are features of common law pleading jurisdictions and are particularly associated with English and early American practice. Their use in American courts was concentrated in the period before individual states adopted code pleading reforms beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Researchers working with Southern and Mid-Atlantic state records may encounter these forms somewhat later than those working with New York or federal materials.
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