Definition
A writ of execution directing a sheriff or other enforcement officer to seize and sell sufficient goods, chattels, or other property of a judgment debtor to satisfy the amount of a court judgment. The writ issues after a plaintiff has obtained judgment in an action for debt or damages and commands the officer to "cause to be made" — the literal translation of the Latin — the sum owed from the defendant's property. Commonly abbreviated fi. fa. in practice and in historical legal records.
The writ operates by authorizing the levying officer to take possession of the debtor's personal property, sell it at public sale, and apply the proceeds to the judgment. At common law, it was the standard post-judgment remedy for money judgments and remained foundational to civil enforcement practice well into the nineteenth century.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "In English law, a writ of execution issued after judgment obtained in a legal action for debt or damages."
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "A judicial writ that lies for one who has recovered in debt or damages, commanding the sheriff that he cause to be made of the goods, chattels, or real estate of the defendant, the sum claimed."
Fieri facias is Latin legal terminology with no meaningful counterpart in ordinary English usage. The common definitions above are themselves legal definitions, not lay usages. Researchers should note that even Webster's 1913 treats this as a term of art requiring legal explanation rather than a word with independent common meaning.
Recognized Forms
/SUBTYPES
Fieri facias de bonis ecclesiasticis: A specialized variant issuing when the sheriff returns nulla bona on a standard fi. fa. and the judgment debtor is a beneficed clergyman holding no lay fee. In such cases, the writ redirects enforcement against ecclesiastical goods and property — reflecting the historical reality that clergy held property under distinct legal regimes that a standard fi. fa. could not reach.
Fieri facias de bonis testatoris: Issued against the goods of a deceased debtor held by an executor or administrator, targeting the estate rather than the debtor personally.
Why It Matters in Research
Structural pattern: historical evolution with deep procedural specificity. The term belongs to the classical common law writ system, and researchers working in sources before the late nineteenth century will encounter it constantly in any litigation involving money judgments.
Several research traps apply. First, the abbreviation fi. fa. appears far more often in historical records than the full Latin, and researchers unfamiliar with the abbreviation may fail to identify the writ. Docket books, sheriff's returns, and execution records from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries use fi. fa. as a matter of course.
Second, the writ's scope shifted over time. At common law, fi. fa. operated primarily against goods and chattels (personal property). Extension to real property varied by jurisdiction and period, and the Webster's 1913 reference to "real estate" reflects a later or jurisdiction-specific expansion rather than the pure common law rule. Burrill's formulation — "goods and chattels or real estate" — signals this extension had become standard by the mid-nineteenth century, but researchers should not assume uniform treatment across earlier sources.
Third, fieri facias was superseded in most American jurisdictions by codified execution statutes under the Field Code and subsequent procedural reforms. Modern researchers looking for equivalent mechanisms in post-nineteenth century practice should search under "writ of execution" or the specific statutory term used in the relevant jurisdiction. The Latin form may still appear in historical research, appellate opinions discussing procedural history, or jurisdictions retaining traditional writ terminology.
Fourth, the fi. fa. connects directly to the sheriff's return procedure. Researchers tracing enforcement failures will encounter paired terminology: nulla bona (no goods found, the sheriff's return when nothing is available to levy) and the subsequent writs — including fi. fa. de bonis ecclesiasticis — that issued in response. Understanding the fi. fa. is prerequisite to understanding these downstream enforcement mechanisms.
Historical Dictionary Support
All three source dictionaries agree on core meaning: a writ of execution commanding the officer to levy the judgment amount from the debtor's property. The translations are consistent — Black's and Burrill both render the Latin as "you cause to be made" or "that you cause to be made," and the functional description is uniform.
Burrill offers the most practically useful formulation by specifying that the writ is "usually termed for brevity fi. fa." — a detail the Black's entries omit but one essential for any researcher working with period records. Burrill also explicitly names both goods and chattels and real estate as subjects of levy, while the first edition of Black's restricts the description to "goods and chattels," suggesting either a stricter rendering of the common law baseline or a drafting limitation.
The second edition of Black's adds meaningful doctrinal depth by including the fi. fa. de bonis ecclesiasticis subtype with procedural context — the nulla bona return triggering the variant writ — that neither the first edition nor Burrill develops. This makes the second edition entry the more useful research starting point for anyone tracing enforcement against clergy or ecclesiastical property.
None of the historical dictionaries adequately addresses the writ's displacement by statutory execution practice, which is the most practically significant development for researchers working across the pre- and post-code divide.
Jurisdictional Note
Fieri facias remained in active use under that name in England longer than in most American states. Several American jurisdictions — particularly in the South — retained the Latin terminology and traditional writ form well past the procedural reform era and some retain statutory references to fi. fa. to this day. Researchers should not assume that procedural reform displaced the term uniformly or simultaneously across jurisdictions.